

WHEN CAN ELECTED POLITICIANS REWARD THEIR CONNECTED FIRMS? THE CONTINGENT ROLE OF ACCESS TO UNELECTED GOVERNMENT STAFF

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ABSTRACT

This study examines how unelected staff within the government bureaucracy conditions the capacity of elected politicians to generate returns for connected firms. These staff become critical sources of government-specific experience and decision power to transform the intent of elected officials into effective returns to connected firms. Using data on Brazilian mayoral elections (2004-2012), campaign contributions, political appointees, and public procurement contracts, we implement regression-discontinuity analyses comparing elected and runner-up candidates. Results show that firms connected to elected candidates receive larger sums of public contracts only when politicians have access to experienced and high-ranking political appointees within the public bureaucracy, mostly when both conditions jointly hold. Qualitative interviews corroborate these mechanisms. The study highlights the within-government human resource foundations of the returns to political connections.

Keywords: non-market strategy, public procurement, human capital, emerging markets, political connections.

JEL classification: D21, D72, D73, H57, H72.

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INTRODUCTION

Strategy scholars are increasingly interested in studying how certain private firms achieve superior performance in markets influenced by the public sector, such as public services (Inoue, 2020; Teodorovicz et al., 2023), highly regulated industries (Fremeth et al., 2016; Hadani & Schuler, 2013), public–private contracting and procurement (Bruce et al., 2019; Flammer, 2018; Lazzarini et al., 2022; Quélin et al., 2017). In these markets, firms may establish connections with elected politicians to secure superior financial returns (Faccio, 2006; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Jia & Mayer, 2017; Wei et al., 2023). Political connections materialize, for instance, via interpersonal connections (Goldman et al., 2013) or even the direct provision of contributions to political campaigns (Boas et al., 2014; Claessens et al., 2008). Extensive research has demonstrated a variety of mechanisms through which these connections accrue returns to firms (Hillman et al., 2004; Walker & Rea, 2014). They include politicians facilitating access to valuable resources (Hillman et al., 2004, 2009) and economic opportunities (Boas et al., 2014; Ferraz & Finan, 2008), or influencing regulatory decisions (Fremeth et al., 2016; Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014).

However, political connections do not automatically generate private returns (Hadani et al., 2017; Wei et al., 2023). The capacity of elected politicians to provide such benefits depends on a variety of conditions that shape if and how political influence is exercised (Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Bradley et al., 2016; Hadani et al., 2017; Jia, 2014; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Wei et al., 2023). Neglecting these contingencies effectively provides an incomplete understanding of the outcomes of corporate political investments (Wei et al., 2023). Therefore, examining the conditioning factors to the private financial returns provided by elected politicians remains an essential research question. This study addresses this challenge by studying a novel contingency to the returns created by elected politicians: their access to resources and government control through *unelected* staff.

While working “behind the scenes,” unelected officials are central to decision-making processes in the public sector. They possess technical expertise, control information, and manage the day-to-day implementation of processes and policies (Brehm & Gates, 1997; Meier & O’Toole,

2006), as well as act as gatekeepers for budget approvals, procurement processes, and regulatory enforcement (Montgomery & Nyhan, 2017; Palus & Yackee, 2016). Nonetheless, despite bureaucrats potentially preventing politicians from exerting discretionary control over the government (Brehm & Gates, 1997; Maskin & Tirole, 2004; Warren, 2012), recent evidence shows that unelected officials can themselves generate private returns for firms directly connected to them, precisely because they control access to information and decisions in governments while operating under weak public scrutiny (He, 2025). Building on this insight, this study explores how *unelected governments workers can also be enablers of returns created by elected politicians*.

The core argument of this paper departs from the premise that governments are complex organizations, and thus standalone elected politicians may often lack the expertise or direct control over public-sector outcomes. In this setting, accessing the government-specific experience and decision power held by unelected government staff is critical for an elected politician to shape decisions in ways that align with their interests. This paper advances that accessing government-specific knowledge and connections through experienced unelected staff (Rasul & Rogger, 2018) and obtaining decision power in the government via unelected staff in positions with decision power in the public bureaucracy (Junge, 2022; Tummers & Bekkers, 2014) are critical boundary conditions for elected politicians to create returns to targeted firms. Whereas the former allows politicians to draw on their knowledge and relationships to navigate the bureaucracy efficiently, the latter grants them the control to influence administrative outcomes. Notably, both characteristics of unelected officials can complement each other, thereby enhancing the elected politicians' ability to steer decision-making in accordance with their interests.

Empirically, the study examines local-level elections for mayors and public procurement contracts in Brazil, a setting characterized by high autonomy of municipal governments and private firms participation in electoral campaign financing. This paper uses administrative data on the electoral outcomes, political contributions by firms, and values disbursed in procurement contracts following the local-level elections in 2004, 2008, and 2012. Furthermore, the paper uses data about individuals working as political appointees in the government. Because these workers are

appointed by the elected politicians as unelected government staff, politicians have access to (and some degree of control over) them. Information about their experience and occupation in the government enables us to measure whether elected politicians have access to government-specific knowledge and obtain formal decision power within the bureaucracy through these unelected staff.

This study reports the results of regression discontinuity (RD) analyses in a close voting context (Arvate & Story, 2024; Coviello & Gagliarducci, 2017; Flammer, 2015). First, it uses non-parametric and parametric methods to estimate the baseline average additional returns created by marginally elected candidates relative to their runner-up candidates, which is estimated to be 2.85 times higher in terms of the value of public contracts awarded to their total pool of contributing firms. Then, it assesses the main proposed contingencies via split-sample analyses and a series of additional robustness tests. These results show that the additional returns provided by elected candidates not only increase, but effectively only materialize when elected candidates had high access to government-specific knowledge and decision power in the government via unelected staff. Insights from qualitative interviews with international experts on public procurement and former political appointees in our context align with the theorized mechanisms. Lastly, additional analyses rule out several competing explanations and that the results were circumscribed to “loyal” firms that only donated to the winning candidate.

This study has three main contributions to the literature on non-market strategy (Dorobantu et al., 2017; Flammer, 2018; Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014) and corporate political connections (Claessens et al., 2008; Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Hillman et al., 2004; Jia & Mayer, 2017; Wei et al., 2023). Firstly, it identifies unelected staff as a critical but overlooked boundary condition for the returns to corporate political connections created by elected politicians. This result advances nonmarket strategy theory by integrating the bureaucratic layer of the state into explanations of firm-government interactions. Secondly and relatedly, it delineates the indirect role of bureaucrats, complementing recent work that highlights their direct relationships with firms (He, 2025). Lastly, the study addresses the call for causal evidence on the returns of political connections by directly studying the political actors that provide returns to firms (Wei et al., 2023).

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Baseline: Elected Politicians as Sources of Returns to Private Firms

Strategic management research has increasingly turned its attention to studying the economic opportunities created by governments for private firms (Bonardi et al., 2006; Flammer, 2018; Fremeth et al., 2016; Inoue, 2020; Lazzarini et al., 2022; Teodorovicz et al., 2023). In these markets, firms frequently seek to establish connections with elected politicians to obtain favorable outcomes (Hillman et al., 2004, 2009; Katic & Hillman, 2023; Wei et al., 2023). Firms use a variety of methods to establish such ties, such as campaign contributions (Boas et al., 2014; Claessens et al., 2008), targeted lobbying (de Figueiredo & Silverman, 2006; Lambert, 2019), and appointments of former political actors to advisory roles (Albino-Pimentel, Anand, and Dussauge 2018; Byun, Frake, and Agarwal 2018; Byun, Raffiee, and Ganco 2019; Faccio 2006). Through those ties, firms expect to receive access to privileged information, obtain favorable regulatory and policy decisions, or receive public procurement contracts (Boas et al., 2014; Ferraz & Finan, 2008; Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014; Jia, 2014).

The dominant perspective in strategic management research is that elected politicians provide returns to connected firms (Bonardi et al., 2005; Hillman et al., 2009). Studies have shown, for instance, that elected politicians support firms in entering and operating in foreign markets (Albino-Pimentel et al. 2018; Albino-Pimentel, Dussauge, and Shaver 2018), protecting first-mover advantages (Frynas et al., 2006), obtaining favorable regulatory decisions (Fremeth et al., 2016; Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014; Lambert, 2019) and financing conditions (Claessens et al., 2008), and facilitating a firm's access to public procurement contracts (Boas et al., 2014; Ferraz & Finan, 2008). Because this relationship is well discussed in the literature (Hadani et al., 2017; Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et al., 2011), it is stated simply as a baseline proposition. This is the departure point for a theorizing focused on contingencies to such relationship.

Baseline Hypothesis (H0): Elected politicians provide additional returns to firms connected to them (vis-à-vis their non-elected counterparts).

Contingencies to the Expected Private Returns Provided by Political Actors

Despite early findings, an increasing stream of studies have started to challenge the idea of an unrestricted potential of elected politicians creating private returns to connected firms, rather advancing contingencies for these returns to accrue (de Figueiredo & Silverman, 2006; Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Wei et al., 2023).

At the macro-level, the private returns created by political actors depend on the institutional environment surrounding the elected politician, such as the level of transparency, accountability, and political scrutiny limiting their actions (Hung et al., 2018; Jia, 2014; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Schneider & Kunze, 2025), or the uncertainty and discretion in the policy environment (Bradley et al., 2016; Calomiris et al., 2010; Pham, 2019). Furthermore, these private returns can also depend on whether their connected firms operate in industries exposed to uncertainties originating from the political environment, such as heavily regulated industries (Hadani & Schuler, 2013), nascent industries (Frynas et al., 2006), and litigious industries (Hung et al., 2018).

At the micro-level, even characteristics of the firms in the political connections affect the intensity of the returns provided by an elected politician, such as whether their source of competitive advantage (Zhu & Chung, 2014), or their prior interactions with government officials (Albino-Pimentel et al., 2018; Bonardi et al., 2006; Borisov et al., 2016). Characteristics of elected politicians also limit their ability to reward firms. For instance, a politician's political power and position within the government (Faccio, 2006; Yan & Chang, 2018), experience (Eggers & Hainmueller, 2009), or even their connections to multiple firms (Heitz et al., 2021) will shape the returns they provide to connected firms.

Building on and advancing on this literature, which is only emerging (Wei et al., 2023), the next subsections develop predictions about a critical contingency to the returns provided by elected politicians which has yet to be fully examined in the literature: how access to specific groups of *unelected* government staff can enable *elected* politicians to provide returns to connected firms.

Unelected Staff as Enablers for Elected Politicians to Create Private Returns

Elected politicians must overcome several complexities when operating inside the government to support firms connected to them. These complexities may arise from the necessity to balance the expectations of various stakeholders, to navigate the bureaucratic apparatus, to understand the nuances of policymaking, and to negotiate with other government actors with different agendas. These complexities imply that the outcomes of political processes are causally ambiguous, hindering the ability of any single elected politician to learn precisely how to operate as a standalone agent. In such environment, accessing *unelected* government staff may support elected politicians in achieving their goals – including providing returns to connected firms.

Government staff operates “behind the scenes” in the public sector. Through their day-to-day operations, they develop expertise about how the government operates and become gatekeepers for decision-making (Baltrunaite, 2020; Romzek, 2000; Romzek & Utter, 1997), obtain and transfer information across different actors (McCrain, 2018), and shape important decisions such as policies, investments, and public procurement (Montgomery & Nyhan, 2017). Indeed, the importance of unelected staff within governments is well-known in political science (Palus & Yackee, 2016). While unelected staff can constrain discretion in policy and procurement decisions (Brehm & Gates, 1997; Maskin & Tirole, 2004; Warren, 2012), the reduced public scrutiny faced by government staff relative to elected officials also imply that unelected officials can become a source of returns for firms who invested in connecting with them (He, 2025).

The importance of unelected staff within the government and the possibility that these actors can provide direct returns to firms connected to them raise the possibility of unelected staff also acting on behalf of elected politicians to enable the latter group to achieve their goals, which potentially include rewarding their connected firms. Analogous to the case of the returns to lobbyists increasing if these individuals have connections to more powerful incumbent politicians (Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012), the returns created by politicians also depend on their access to unelected staff that provides them with *experience* and *decision power* within the government.

Experienced staff as a human capital resource for elected politicians. Within human capital theory, the knowledge and skills of an individual become a valuable human capital resource to an organization, and to its leaders, if those skills can be deployed in ways that enable them to achieve their goals (Ployhart et al., 2014; Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011; Ray et al., 2023). An analogous logic applies to the context of returns to political connections: amongst many goals, politicians may set an objective to provide returns to (at least a subset of) connected firms and rely on the knowledge that unelected staff accumulates via their experience working within the government to fulfill that aim (Rasul and Rogger 2018). Further, policymakers can also assess individuals as sources of human capital resources for them to achieve their goals (Teodorovicz et al., 2025). Thus, just as workers become more valuable to firms by accumulating “firm-specific” human capital – i.e., knowledge, skills, and abilities that uniquely enable them to be productive within their employer (Becker, 1962; Coff, 1997) – experienced unelected staff become more valuable to politicians by accumulating “government-specific” human capital that will support them in shaping government’s decisions in ways that align with the elected politician’s objectives.

Knowledge and skills about navigating the specific landscape of a government is a first source of government-specific human capital that staff accumulate over time. It may include knowledge about procurement guidelines, compliance checklists, budget execution timetables, and legal constraints. Such expertise equips them to identify feasible pathways for delivering political goals while maintaining administrative legitimacy. For example, staff with experience in procurement offices may draft bid specifications that fit a connected firm’s capabilities yet remain defensible under procurement law. However, accessing the tacit government-specific knowledge of experienced staff, which encompasses informal routines and unwritten norms usually rooted in individual experience (Bates, 2006; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), is potentially more critical for elected politicians to create targeted returns. Tacit knowledge is essential for government staff to navigate the public sector’s complex, collaborative decision-making environments (McAdam & McCreedy, 2000; Siciliano et al., 2021), especially given the multifaceted processes within public administrations (Jasimuddin & Zhang, 2011). Staff may know, for instance, which procurement

officers exercise broader discretion, which auditing agencies are slower to scrutinize types of contracts, or how to sequence contract awards to minimize political visibility.

In addition, experienced staff may be uniquely able to leverage social connections within a specific government. Social networks are important to political actors not only because information flows through them (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987; Ward et al., 2011), but also because they shape policy interpretation and decisions (Marsh & Smith, 2000; Provan & Kenis, 2007; Siciliano, 2015). Indeed, unelected staff may rely more on reciprocal ties than on status or even other's expertise when seeking advice and support (Siciliano, 2015; Siciliano et al., 2021). Over time, experienced staff may cultivate strong relationships within the political sphere, thus granting them the opportunity to navigate intricate governmental processes. These relationships may enable experienced staff to facilitate effective communication and negotiation between an elected politician and other stakeholders who may have stronger decision-power within the government. For instance, a senior aide with longstanding ties to officials in procurement or auditing offices may be able to expedite approvals, obtain early warning about regulatory changes, or secure discretion in favor of a connected firm.

The logic above leads to the following prediction:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Access to experienced staff will increase the returns that elected politicians provide to firms connected to them (vis-à-vis their non-elected counterparts).

Staff as a source of decision power over government decisions. Beyond experienced staff, the access to unelected staff with decision power within the bureaucracy can also determine the extent to which elected politicians are able to provide returns to connected firms. Decision power in the public sector grants officials the authority to allocate resources, interpret rules, and approve or veto projects, thereby shaping how policy objectives are implemented in practice. Such power allows unelected officials to adapt actions and resources to specific needs and circumstances (Niskanen, 1971). Consequently, access to such discretionary power via unelected staff is instrumental in aligning governmental actions with an elected politician's goals.

However, not all bureaucratic positions afford the same power to shape government outcomes. Decision power is hierarchically distributed: staff in managerial positions enjoy significantly greater authority to interpret, adapt, and implement policy decisions, while non-managerial staff operate within rigid procedural and technical boundaries (Junge, 2022; Tummers & Bekkers, 2014). At higher administrative levels, staff possess greater latitude to define strategic priorities, allocate budgets, and exercise interpretive flexibility in applying regulations (Young & Tanner, 2023). This stratified structure implies that elected politicians' capacity to deliver returns to connected firms depends critically on staff situated at higher echelons of the bureaucracy, and thus with more decision power over decisions within the government.

This logic mirrors findings in organizational research on managerial discretion and strategic decision-making in the private sector. Higher-level managers possess autonomy to respond to dynamic and uncertain environments (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Their discretion can enable them to balance competing objectives, integrate conflicting demands, and make strategic exceptions necessary for organizational adaptation. Similarly, discretion among unelected staff in higher-level managerial positions allows for flexible and politically responsive decision-making that can be mobilized to favor certain firms or projects. Without access to such decision-making power, elected politicians may face procedural resistance that inhibits their ability to deliver targeted benefits to connected firms. The capacity of elected politicians to generate returns for connected firms thus also depends on accessing unelected staff who hold positions with formal authority, that is, with decision power within the government bureaucracy. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Access to staff with decision power in the government will increase the returns that elected politicians provide to firms connected to them (vis-à-vis their non-elected counterparts).

The complementarity between experience of key unelected staff and obtaining decision power through unelected staff. The mechanisms described in the previous sections highlight two distinct yet potentially interdependent resources that enable elected politicians to provide private

returns to connected firms: staff experience and formal decision power. While each of these resources may independently enhance a politician's ability to influence governmental outcomes, their joint presence can magnify their combined effect.

Experience provides staff with the knowledge, skills, and relationships necessary to navigate the administrative system effectively. Decision power, in turn, grants them the authority to act upon such knowledge to shape outcomes. When elected politicians can access both experienced staff and staff with formal discretion over key governmental processes, they are able both to source knowledge from the first group and orchestrate actions via the second group.

Conceptually, the interaction between staff experience and decision power represents a classic case of resource complementarity (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). Politicians rely on both the expertise and discretionary power over decisions of their staff to convert political intent into actionable outcomes. Experience without authority may result in knowledge that cannot be operationalized, while authority without experience may yield discretion that is ineffectively exercised. Furthermore, the combination of access to government-specific human capital and discretionary power amplifies politicians' ability to operate under institutional or procedural constraints. For instance, a team with decision power and experience can leverage their understanding of the administrative system to design legally defensible paths that channel resources or opportunities toward private firms while maintaining formal compliance. Their accumulated tacit knowledge and social capital within the bureaucracy help minimize political risk, while their formal authority ensures that actions can be executed promptly and with credibility. Thus, when access to experienced staff and to staff with formal decision power are combined, the elected politician can effectively identify, justify, and implement the delivery of private returns to connected firms. This logic leads to the next and final hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Access to experienced staff and to staff with decision power in the government will be complementary in increasing the returns that elected politicians provide to firms connected to them (vis-à-vis their non-elected counterparts).

CONTEXT AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Local-level Elections for Executive Seats, Campaign Contributions, and the Market for Public Procurement Contracts in Brazil

This study analyses the market for public procurement contracts in Brazilian municipalities. It assesses the additional returns that elected candidates for the position of local mayor can provide for their pool of campaign contributing firms relative to runner-up candidates.

This setting is suitable for this research for several reasons. Firstly, public procurement occurs when a public authority (e.g., a government agency, a central or local government) engages in a market-type transaction to acquire goods and services from private firms. Hence, it is a market with significant participation of the public sector in shaping economic opportunities (Flammer, 2018). Key decision-makers in public procurement are often political actors. As a result, non-economic decision criteria, such as political pressure from elected politicians or private sector agents connected to politicians, can receive an even more prominent weight in public contracting (Coviello & Gagliarducci, 2017; Ferraz & Finan, 2008; Rundquist et al., 1996; Shepsle & Weingast, 1981). Campaign contributions thus become a non-market strategy to shape public procurement decisions (Boas et al., 2014).

Secondly, the public procurement market in Brazil is large and highly competitive. In total, the Brazilian government awards more than 160 thousand public contracts per year. This sum corresponds to 26.1% of government expenditures and 10.2% of Brazilian Gross Domestic Product (OECD, 2020). In addition, while local governments in Brazil must follow national laws when awarding public contracts, they have budget and spending autonomy from the federal and state government, creating opportunities for local politicians to influence procurement outcomes.

Thirdly, while, in theory, the process of awarding contracts in Brazil is fully based on the merits of the proposals, in practice, elected politicians can play an important role in the allocation of government contracts. Legally, allocation of public procurement contracts is regulated by the Public Procurement Act (Law 8,666/1993). That legislation establishes that, before searching for a supplier, public entities must provide a clear and detailed description of their needs. Every public

entity has its own contracting department or office, which formulates calls for proposals published in the official gazette. Firms subsequently submit their bids, which are evaluated by a public official or committee. The latter then makes the final decision based on the award procedure approved for the corresponding procurement process.

However, politicians can attempt to shape the procurement process, indirectly, to secure government contracts for targeted firms. Elected politicians can influence the allocation of contracts in Brazil in several ways, most of which runs through the activities of unelected staff within the government bureaucracy. For instance, there is a possibility of only inviting certain bidders or of setting technical criteria other than “the lowest price” to award contracts which gives a margin of discretion to unelected officials handling procurement decisions. Overbilling, minimally publicizing calls for proposals, and allowing fewer bidders than the minimum required are some of the irregular mechanisms in Brazilian procurement transactions (Ferraz & Finan, 2008). Besides irregular activities, local-government contracting is an administrative process that requires the approval of funds by unelected staff, including for contract renegotiations. For instance, large-scale infrastructure projects are often renegotiated due to changes required after initial execution or even due to extensions (Bajari et al., 2014), opening room for discretion.

Finally, elected mayors in local municipalities in Brazil do not personally conduct or have a direct control over public procurement decisions. Rather, agencies, departments, and state-owned companies are run and managed by unelected staff, and these individuals ultimately design and implement public procurement (Barbosa & Fiuza, 2025). Thus, given the high stakes of procurement transactions, the local-level autonomy on public procurement decisions, and the number of discretionary mechanisms for unelected staff to affect the procurement process, this context highlights the importance of elected politicians accessing the government-specific human capital and decision power of unelected staff to create private returns to their connected firms.

Dataset

The dataset combines information collected from various sources in the context of the 2004, 2008, and 2012 local elections (and following years). First, this study uses a unique database on the value

of government contracts awarded to private firms by the local executive branch in 1,536 municipalities (out of 5,565) during the terms following the abovementioned three election-cycles. This paper focuses on municipality-election pairs where data about the expenditure on local-government contracts per firm during the following election cycle were available, and where candidates for local executive sets effectively received campaign contributions by private firms.¹ These municipalities are diverse in various socioeconomic and geographical dimensions.²

Second, the dataset includes detailed information about candidates running for local executive positions in the 2004, 2008, and 2012 elections. These data originate from a large public-access administrative dataset managed by the *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral* (TSE, Superior Electoral Court), the highest institutional body of the Brazilian Electoral Justice. The authors obtained information about candidates' pre-election socioeconomic characteristics, election results (i.e., number of votes in each of the elections and whether the candidate was elected), party affiliations, party characteristics, and the coalition to which the party belonged in each election. Furthermore, the dataset also contains information on all campaign contributions made directly by firms to a candidate for a local executive position in the period leading up to each election. Every firm is identified by a unique tax identification number (CNPJ).³

Third, the authors collected, merged, and aggregated individual-level data about the career trajectory of unelected officials who were *politically appointed by the elected executive mayor* in local governments in the first year following up each focal election. This information allows the construction of variables about the unelected staff that politicians can access via appointments. The data is obtained via the RAIS (*Relação Anual de Informações Sociais*) dataset, a longitudinal restricted-access matched employer-employee administrative dataset (Menezes-Filho et al., 2008).

¹ The study does not consider values disbursed in the first year of a term, since expenditures in the year immediately following an election were likely approved during the electoral year by the incumbent mayor. The dataset covers the value of procurement contracts disbursed in the second through the fourth—and final—year of post-election terms.

² The municipalities are spread across 14 Brazilian states (out of 27), ranging from the poorest regions (e.g., Northeast region) to the richest areas in the country (e.g., South and Southeast regions).

³ CNPJ is a 14-digit number, where the first eight digits identify the company, and the others the branch or subsidiary. All contributions and contracts are aggregated by the first eight digits of the company's CNPJ. Importantly, 2012 was the last local election when contributions directly by firms were allowed in Brazil.

Obtaining information about appointees is important because these types of unelected officials are more likely to be accessible by elected politicians. Unlike civil servants – who obtain their position via undertaking a formal civil service examination and receive tenure after three years of service – political appointees obtain their positions by a direct political appointment, without having to go through a civil service exam, and they can be fired at-will (Barbosa & Ferreira, 2023). While political appointees represent 16.9% of the staff employed by local governments in the dataset, they may also hold important decision power within the government. Federal legislation gives elected officials discretion over the staffing of “confidential positions” (*cargos de confiança*), i.e., positions assessed to have significant responsibility or access to sensitive information (Colonnelli et al., 2020). The ability to appoint these unelected positions enables elected politicians to fill government positions with staff who share their priorities and commitments (Folke et al., 2011; Xu, 2018), thus granting elected politicians access to unelected staff who may be critical for politicians to execute tasks to achieve their goals (Barbosa & Ferreira, 2023; Colonnelli et al., 2020). Given these conditions and relative to civil servants,⁴ political appointees are a more accessible type of unelected staff through which elected politicians can affect public procurement decisions.

Because the empirical strategy compares returns created by marginally elected candidates against marginally runner-up candidates, the authors created a dataset at the candidate-level per election. The final dataset includes candidates that meet the following requirements. First, in alignment with prevailing literature using a regression discontinuity (RD) approach in electoral races (Arvate & Story, 2024; Coviello & Gagliarducci, 2017; Granzier et al., 2023), the sample focuses on elected and runner-up candidates for each focal election. Second, given the analytical approach to compare the value in public contracts obtained by firms that contributed to runner-up versus elected candidates, the sample retains elections where both the elected and the runner-up

⁴ Civil servants are less likely to be systematically working in favor of a politician as they are hired via relatively objective selection criteria. Local governments also employ civil servants, temporary workers who are usually hired to meet temporary and exceptional needs of public administrations as temporary teachers or nurses (Barbosa and Ferreira, 2023). This study does not consider temporary workers as political appointees.

candidates received at least one contribution from a private firm. Lastly, previously elected candidates could have already obtained experience on how to reward their contributing firms or redefined government processes to facilitate their capacity to provide such private returns (Eggers & Hainmueller, 2009). Including these candidates could thus bias the assessment of whether accessing experienced unelected staff and unelected staff with decision power are boundary conditions for elected candidates to provide additional returns to contributing firms relative to runner-up candidates. As a result, the final sample removes candidates from any local election where at least one candidate was running for re-election.

Variables

Dependent variables. The *total value of public contracts to contributing firms* measures the aggregated financial value of government contracts disbursed within the focal municipality to all firms that contributed to a candidate's election campaign during the ensuing electoral cycle. Since candidates may have received contributions from a different number of firms, the analyses also use the *value of public contracts per contributing firms* as a second dependent variable, which divides the total value of public contracts to contributing firms by the number of firms that contributed to the candidate. All specifications use the natural logarithm (\ln) of these variables. They represent the *ex post* gross reward that a candidate may provide to an aggregate pool of contributing firms, without making distributional assumptions across firms. Additional analyses engage with potential distribution across contributing firms by studying the extensive margin and the range of returns, as well as the returns to “loyal” versus “hedging” firms (i.e., firms that contribute only to elected candidates or to more than one candidate).

Independent variables. The first set of independent variables assess the electoral outcomes of each candidate. *Elected candidate* is a dummy variable that equals one if a candidate for a local-level executive position was elected, and zero otherwise. *Vote margin* represents the (positive/negative) distance between the share of votes that a candidate received within their local election and the share of votes that the candidate would have needed to be elected. This variable is symmetric

between elected and runner-up candidates and takes positive values if the candidate was elected and negative values if the candidate was the runner-up.

The second set of independent variables enables split-sample assessments of the additional returns provided by elected candidates depending on their access to human capital resources via political appointees. Using information on the career history of individuals appointed by elected candidates to work as political appointees in their government, the authors computed *experienced appointees* as the share of appointees with the equivalent to one full term of government-specific experience or longer (i.e., at least four years of experience in the government). One full term of experience means that an appointee would have obtained knowledge that extends beyond the new government and that matches the experience of a non-appointed civil servant who has recently obtained tenure. These political appointees may have obtained such experience by, for instance, having worked as an appointee in the executive branch of the local government under a previous administration. The analysis considers *high access to experienced appointees* if the local government had above median experienced appointees.

Furthermore, details about the occupational codes of these political appointees provide information about whether appointees provided high (or low) decision power in the government to the elected politician. Specifically, *decision power via appointees* is the fraction of total employees in the executive branch of the local government that is comprised of political appointees employed in high-level managerial occupations.⁵ The analysis considers *high decision power via appointees* if the local government had above median decision power via appointees.

Since the variables about access to unelected officials vary at the level of the municipality for each election, the split-sample estimates will represent the additional return that an elected candidate provided to contributing firms relative to their respective runner-up candidate.

⁵ We identified high-level managerial occupations by using occupational codes. Following the Brazilian Occupation Classification Typology (*Classificação Brasileira de Ocupações, CBO*) we used the occupational codes CBO-11 (*Membros Superior e Dirigentes do Poder Público*), CBO-12 (*Dirigentes de Empresas e Organizações*), and CBO-13 (*Diretores/Gerentes de Empresa de Serviço de Saúde, da Educação, ou de Serviços Culturais/Sociais/ Pessoais*)

Additional covariates. The study considers whether elected and runner-up candidates are similar across several characteristics. These include candidates' socioeconomic background, namely, *age*, *gender* (dummy variable equals 1 if the candidate was male, and zero otherwise), *educational background* (categorical variable indicating if the candidate had completed at most elementary school, high school, or higher education), *civil state* (categorical variable indicating if the candidate was married, single, divorced, or widower), and *reported wealth* (as reported pre-election). They also include variables associated with a candidate's campaign. These are the *share of total campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions*, the *average contribution per contributing firm*, the *share of firms' contributions from "loyal" firms* (i.e., firms that only donated to that candidate), and the *total campaign expenditure*.

The study also accounts for several characteristics of political parties. These are: the political party's political inclination (*left-wing party* is a dummy variable capturing if the political party is left-wing), *tradition* (*years since founding*), *size* (measured by *total number of candidates across legislative local elections*, and *total number of candidates in local elections statewide*), *financial prowess* (measured by *total campaign expenditure across legislative local elections*, and *local elections statewide*), *alliances* (*number of parties in the same coalition as the political party in local elections for the legislative and executive branches*, and dummy variables capturing if *the candidate's party is in the same political coalition of the incumbent mayor's party*, *the incumbent governor's party*, and *of the next governor's party*, and local political incumbency in other government spheres (dummy capturing if *the party elected at least one candidate for the legislative branch in the previous legislation election*).

Empirical Strategy

Regression Discontinuity in Local Elections with Multiple Candidates. The authors employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design to estimate the difference between the value in public contracts to contributing firms of elected candidates in comparison to runner-up candidates within the same municipality. This design exploits the electoral rule that dictates the assignment of positions in Brazilian election of mayors for local executive branches.

In classic applications of RD to electoral races (Eggers & Hainmueller, 2009; Lee et al., 2004), there are only two candidates in an electoral district, and the election rule dictates that a candidate wins by obtaining a vote share above or equal to the victory cutoff (which is 50% under simple majority rule). Local executive elections in Brazil, however, allow for candidates from multiple parties to run.⁶ The RD design must account for these institutional aspects of Brazilian local executive races, which is also frequent in other countries and at different levels of the government (Arvate & Story, 2024; Granzier et al., 2023). Considering this context, the literature defines the discontinuity by using the *vote margin* of each candidate in terms of how far they were from losing/winning the election.⁷

Formally, the vote margin of a candidate i in a local government l , denoted by M_{il} , determines the electoral outcome of that candidate. A candidate with $M_{il} \geq 0$ is assigned to the group of elected candidates ($T_i = 1$), whereas $M_{il} < 0$ implies assignments to the group of non-elected candidates ($T_i = 0$). The authors use this rule to apply a sharp RD design to estimate the effect of an electoral victory on the additional value of public contracts awarded to contributing firms of elected relative to runner-up candidates.

Local non-parametric and parametric approaches. The empirical analysis has two steps. First, it assesses the baseline hypothesis (H0) that being elected is causally associated with candidates providing superior post-election rewards to their pool of contributing firms. For that, it uses estimates the average additional return provided by marginally elected candidates to their pool of contributing firms *vis-à-vis* marginally runner-up candidates (β), which is defined by:

$$\beta = \lim_{m \downarrow 0} E[Y_i | M_{il} = m] - \lim_{m \uparrow 0} E[Y_i | M_{il} = m] = E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) | M_{il} = 0]$$

where $Y_i(1)$ and $Y_i(0)$ represent the value of public contracts to the pool of contributing firms (in ln) of candidate i when the candidate was elected versus when it was not elected, respectively.

⁶ In cities with fewer than 200,000 registered voters, elections have a single round, with the candidate receiving the most valid votes declared the winner. By contrast, in municipalities with 200,000 or more registered voters, a two-round system is applied. In these larger cities, a candidate must secure 50 percent of the votes plus one, excluding blank and null ballots, in the first round to be elected outright. If no candidate reaches this threshold, the two candidates with the highest number of votes advance to a runoff.

⁷ For municipalities where there was a second round, this implies using the electoral outcomes of the second round.

Second, it uses split-sample analyses to examine the boundary conditions created by the access to government-specific experience (hypothesis H1), discretionary control over government decisions (hypothesis H2), as well as their combination (hypothesis H3), via (unelected) appointees working in the local government. In the split-sample heterogeneity analyses, the authors re-estimate and compare the magnitude and precision of the estimated additional returns provided by elected politicians within each of the sub-samples.

All analyses report estimates of the parameter β computed via non-parametric (Calonico et al., 2014; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008) and parametric approaches (Flammer, 2015; Granzier et al., 2023). The non-parametric estimator for β is obtained by comparing two elements. The first element is the right-hand limit of the outcome variable Y_i as M_{il} goes to zero, which is obtained by the predicted value of Y_i at $M_{il} = 0$, estimated from a triangular-weighted local linear regression of Y_i on M_{il} using only data in the interval $M_{il} \in [0, 0 + h]$. Analogously, the second element is estimated using a triangular-weighted local linear regression of Y_i on M_{il} containing only data satisfying $M_{il} \in [0 - h, 0]$, which is the left-hand limit of Y_i as M_{il} goes to zero. The difference between these two terms is the estimated treatment effect β .

The parametric specification (estimated within a symmetric bandwidth h) is expressed as:

$$Y_{il} = \alpha + \beta \text{Elected}_{il} + \delta_1 M_{il} + \delta_2 M_{il} \times \text{Elected}_{il} + X'_{il} \theta + \lambda_s + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{il},$$

where Y_{il} denotes the logarithm of the total (or per-firm) value of public contracts awarded to contributing firms of candidate i in municipality l , Elected_{il} is a dummy equal to one for winning candidates, and M_{il} is the vote margin centered at zero; X_{il} includes predetermined candidate- and party-level covariates, while λ_s and γ_t denote state and year fixed effects, respectively. This parametric approach complements the local non-parametric estimations by improving efficiency and mitigating small imbalances in the observable characteristics of elected and runner-up candidates close to the election cut-off (Caughey & Sekhon, 2011; Granzier et al., 2023).

Throughout all analyses, the standard errors and the p-value are robustly (Calonico et al., 2014). Furthermore, the main analyses report estimates considering a symmetric bandwidth h computed via the mean squared error (MSE)-optimal bandwidth selection procedure (Calonico et

al., 2017). Following best practices in RD approaches (Arvate & Story, 2024; Flammer, 2015), the study assesses the sensitivity of the results to different bandwidth selection procedures, and to different polynomials in local and global specifications.

Sample and Descriptive Statistics

This final dataset contains information about the elected and runner-up candidates for 1,715 local executive elections distributed in years 2004 (94 elections), 2008 (326 elections), and 2012 (1,295 elections). Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the final sample.

<< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >>

The test of the baseline hypothesis (H0) uses the 3,430 observations, which contains information about the elected and the runner-up candidates for the abovementioned 1,715 local executive elections municipalities. The tests of the main hypotheses use subsamples of these elections based on whether, upon taking office, the elected candidates had high (or low) access to experienced unelected staff (H1), high (or low) decision power in the public bureaucracy obtained via unelected staff (H2), as well as their different combinations (H3).

Validity of the RD approach

Table 2 reports the results of tests about manipulation of electoral outcomes and about the similarity of elected and runner-up candidates (both close to the election threshold). It reports these tests in the full sample of candidates (column 1) and in each subsample of elections based on different combinations of high or low access to experienced appointees and to decision power in the government via appointees (columns 2-9). The subsample assessments are important to mitigate concerns about potential imbalances that emerge when studying heterogeneous effects while using an RD design (Marshall, 2023).

<< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >>

Panel A reports the p-value of the McCrary test (McCrary, 2008), which show that there is no discontinuity of the running variable around the election cut-off. Panel B reports the p-values associated with non-parametric mean-difference tests of preexisting characteristics of elected and runner-up candidates. All estimates use the MSE-optimal bandwidth and the main non-parametric

estimation process as the main analyses. The results in panel B show there is no systematic difference between elected and runner-up candidates within the optimal bandwidth around the vote margin across the full sample and in the subsamples.⁸ Furthermore, Tables A1-A3 in the online appendix show that the magnitude of the differences between marginally elected and runner-up candidates is also small in the full sample and in the subsamples. These results suggest that RD estimations would capture the causal effect of candidates being elected within each subsample. However, considering that results of RDD could be sensitive even to small imbalances (Marshall, 2023), the main results address these concerns by reporting parametric specifications that control for all the covariates listed on Table 2, as in Caughey and Sekhon (2011) and Granzier et al (2023).

RESULTS

Additional Returns Provided by Marginally Elected Candidates (Baseline Hypothesis H0)

Non-parametric graphical analyses. Figure 1 plots the non-parametric representation of the total value of public contracts to contributing firms against the vote margin for elected and runner-up candidates. The solid vertical line represents the threshold separating elected (positive vote margin) from runner-up (negative vote margin) candidates. The black dots are the estimated value of public contracts across all contributing firms per each of 50 bins of the vote margin on each side of threshold, and the lighter grey solid lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

<< INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE >>

Figure 1 confirms that there is a discontinuity on the value of public contracts awarded to the pool of firms contributing to elected (relative to runner-up) candidates around the vote margin threshold. In the online appendix (Figure A1), we show that a similar pattern occurs when

⁸ In 226 out of the 234 comparisons (26 characteristics across 9 differences samples), the tests failed to reject the null hypothesis of a difference between elected and runner-up candidates. Only one characteristic and in one subsample had a difference between elected and runner-up candidates with a p-value lower than 0.05: in the subsample of candidates running in elections where the elected candidate would have low discretionary control of the government via appointees but high access to experienced appointees (column 7). In this subsample, elected and runner-up candidates had 26.3% and 29.1% of their campaign contributions originating from firms, respectively (p-value = 0.037). The authors assess that such a difference is unlikely to affect the interpretation of the results because of its small magnitude (table A3 in the online appendix) and because it is not systematic across subsamples – effectively only occurring in that subsample. Furthermore, this subsample is only partially used to assess hypothesis H3 and not used to assess any of the other hypotheses H0-H2. The remaining seven out of 234 comparisons exhibit only a marginal difference (p-value in-between 0.05 and 0.1), are non-systematic across subsamples, and have a small magnitude.

considering the value of public contracts per contributing firms. These results align with the baseline hypothesis H0 that being elected – on average – causally enables candidates for executive positions to provide a higher value in terms of public contracts to their contributing firms.

Non-parametric and parametric analyses. Table 3 reports the local non-parametric and parametric estimations that test baseline hypothesis (H0). Columns 1 and 3 report the results from non-parametric estimators accounting for covariates and columns 2 to 4 report the parametric estimators. The point-estimate reported in column 1 is equivalent to the difference in the value in public contracts reported in Figure 1 at the point where the vote margin is close to zero.

<< INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE >>

Columns 1 and 2 show that the differences in the log of the total value of public contracts to contributing firms are positive and precisely estimated ($p = .019$ in column 1 and $p = .002$ in column 2). The results are analogous when estimating differences in the log of the value of public contracts per contributing firm ($p = .013$ and $p = .002$ in columns 3 and 4, respectively) Furthermore, the estimated parameters are relatively stable across specifications and for both dependent variables. The economic magnitude of the effect is also relevant. Considering the estimates in column 2, the results show that an elected candidate that wins an election increases by 1.347 the log-value of the public contracts awarded to their total pool of contributing firms when compared to runner-up candidates within the vote margin bandwidth. This increase corresponds to a total value in public contracts that is approximately 2.85 times higher than in the pool of firms that contributed to elected candidates than those that contributed to runner-up candidates.⁹ The analogous assessment of the value in public contracts per contributing firm is a 2.45 higher reward provided by elected versus runner-up candidates (considering the results in

⁹ The exact computation of the percentage change from natural logarithm specification is $\exp(\beta)-1$, where β is the average additional returns provided by marginally elected candidates vis-à-vis marginally runner-up candidates. The point estimates are within the range of some pre-existing results in the literature studying returns to private firms via public contracts. For instance, Boas et al., (2014) found that federal-level Brazilian congressmen provided a return of 14x the value of the contributions, whereas Goldman et al. (2013) found that connected firms had contracts that were 21% more valuable than non-connected firms in the US during republican governments, and Titl and Geys (2019), studying the Czech Republic, found that if the mean firm donated approximately \$1 more to a politician, it would expect a public contract that was \$100 more valuable.

column 4). The results are consistent elected candidates being able to provide returns via public procurement contracts, at least in aggregate, to the pool of firms “investing” in their campaigns.

Access to Key Unelected Staff as a Contingency to the Returns Provided by Elected Politicians
(Main Hypotheses H1-H3)

Non-parametric graphical analyses (hypotheses H1 and H2). Figure 2 reports graphical analyses that are analogous to those of Figure 1, but for four different samples of candidates based on the elected candidate’s access to experienced appointees and access to decision power in the local government via appointees. Panels A and B focus on the subsamples of candidates with low versus high access to experienced appointees, respectively. Panels C and D present a similar comparison, but splitting candidates based on their discretionary control of the government via appointees.

<< INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE >>

The results reported on Figure 2 show that the “jump” in the value of public contracts to the pool of contributing firms of elected candidates close to the vote margin cut-off is smaller in magnitude and it is within the 95% confidence interval in the subsamples of candidates with low access to experienced appointees or access to decision power in the local government via appointees (panels A and C, respectively). Alternatively, the graphical analyses in the subsamples represented in panels B and D show that the additional returns provided by elected candidates *vis-à-vis* runner-up candidates are higher and precisely estimated if the elected candidate has high access to experienced appointees or high access to decision power in the local government via appointees. Studying the value of public contracts per contributing firm leads to similar patterns (Figure A2 in the online Appendix). These results align with hypotheses H1 and H2.

Non-parametric and parametric analyses (hypotheses H1 and H2). Table 4 reports the tests of whether access to experienced appointees (hypothesis H1, panel A) and to decision power via appointees (hypothesis H2, panel B) create boundary conditions for elected candidates to create additional returns to their contributing firms. Each column presents the estimated differences between elected and runner-up candidates within the subsamples of low/high access to experienced appointees (panel A) or decision power via appointees (panel B). Each subsample considers the

MSE-optimal bandwidth. The specifications are analogous to those reported in Table 3. Columns 1-2 and 5-6 (3-4 and 7-8) report estimates of additional returns provided by elected candidates without (with) access to unelected staff that provides them with government-specific experience and decision power within the government.

<< INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE >>

The results in Panel A show that in the subsample of elections where elected candidates had high access to experienced appointees upon taking office, being elected increased the returns that candidates provided in the value of public contracts to their entire pool of contributing firms between 4.59 and 6.37 times higher than the value of the returns provided by runner-up candidates. In contrast, the analogous increase associated with a candidate being elected without follow-on access to the government-specific experience of political appointees was of 0.91 to 1.16 times the base return provided by runner-up candidates. Furthermore, while the additional returns provided by elected candidates were precisely estimated in the first subsample ($p=0.011$ and $p=0.001$, in columns 3 and 4, respectively), the estimates were outside the 95% confidence interval when studying elections where the elected candidate did not have high access to experienced staff ($p = 0.360$ and $p=0.222$, in columns 1 and 2, respectively). The analysis using the value of public contracts per contributing firms as the dependent variable (columns 5-8) led to similar interpretations. These results align with hypothesis H1, i.e., accessing experienced appointees is a boundary condition for elected candidates to create additional returns to their contributing firms.

Panel B reports a similar pattern of results when testing for the role obtaining decision power in the government via political appointees. The results of the split-sample analyses show a difference in the magnitude of the effect of being elected on the returns provided by candidates in elections where elected candidates had, versus did not have, high access to decision power via appointees. In the former case, being elected increased the returns provided by candidates by 3.45 to 4.76 times the base return provided by their marginally runner-up candidates. The magnitude of the analogous results considering politicians with low access to decision power via appointees was 0.62 and 0.75. As in Panel A, the additional returns of elected candidates with access to decision

power via appointees were precisely estimated ($p = .046$ and $p = .009$ for columns 3 and 4 in Panel B, respectively), whereas those from candidates without such access were not ($p = .518$ and $p = .330$ for columns 1 and 2, respectively). The results in columns 5-8 show similar magnitude and precision when studying the value of public contracts per contributing firm. This pattern of results aligns with hypothesis H2, i.e., accessing decision power in the government via appointees is a boundary condition for elected candidates to create targeted returns to contributing firms.

Non-parametric graphical analyses (hypothesis H3). Figure 3 reports analyses to assess hypothesis H3, about the complementarity of accessing government-specific knowledge and decision power in the government via appointees. Panels A through D focus on the different combinations of access to experienced appointees and decision power via appointees.

<< INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE >>

The results reported in Figure 3 show that being elected is associated with a large “jump” in the value of public contracts rewarded to contributing firms only when candidates had access to appointees that provided them with government-specific knowledge and decision power over the government (panel D). Figure A3 in the appendix shows similar results when studying the value of public procurement contracts per contributing firm. These results align with hypothesis H3.

Non-parametric and parametric analyses (hypothesis H3). Table 5 reports additional results that further align with hypothesis H3 about the complementarity between access to experienced appointees and to appointees with decision power in the government in terms of enabling elected candidates to provide returns to their contributing firms. Columns 1-6 reports subsample analyses considering the subsample of candidates without at least one of the resources. Columns 7-8 show the results in the sample of elections where the elected candidate had access to both resources. The results show that in the absence of any resource, the effect of being elected on the value of public contracts awarded to contributing firms is imprecise and small in magnitude (p -values ranging from .261 to .949, considering panel A). In comparison, the value of public contracts awarded to the contributing firms of elected candidates that had access to experienced appointees and appointees with decision power over the government was 12.26 times higher than

the base value awarded to contributing firms of the runner-up candidates ($p = 0.004$, in column 7, panel A). The results assessing the value of public contracts per contributing firm were similar.

<< INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE >>

These patterns reported here suggest that, in alignment with hypothesis H3, unelected officials reinforce an elected candidates' capacity to reward their contributing firms by providing government-specific knowledge and control over the government. Indeed, access to either form of unelected staff may be an insufficient condition for elected candidates to reward their contributing firms. In summary, the results show that while a marginal electoral victory is a stronger predictor of candidates providing superior returns to their contributing firms, obtaining decision power in the government through unelected officials and accessing their government-specific experience are joint boundary conditions for elected candidates to create returns to their contributing firms.

ROBUSTNESS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES

Robustness to RD approach

The online appendix reports a series of robustness tests to the RD analyses. First, tables A7 and A9 show that the results are not sensitive to alternative bandwidths selected via other optimal selection algorithms (Calonico et al., 2017), namely (1) the symmetric MSE bandwidth that minimizes the sum of the regression coefficients (MSE-SUM), (2) the symmetric bandwidth that minimizes the coverage error probability (CER), and (3) the symmetric bandwidth that minimizes the sum of the coverage error probability of the estimates' confidence interval (CER-SUM).¹⁰

Second, the estimates associated with the baseline hypothesis H0 and the estimates associated with the contingencies on accessing unelected staff owning valuable human resources - experience and decision power - (hypotheses H1-H3) are robust to alternative local and global specifications to the RD design (tables A10-A12).

¹⁰ Tables A4-A6 also show non-systematic imbalances of characteristics of elected and runner-up candidates across the nine sub-samples within the three alternative optimal bandwidths (14 out of the 702 comparisons with p-values lower than 0.05, all with small magnitude). The analyses use parametric regressions to mitigate these small differences.

Third, the authors also used the method proposed in Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrel, Palomba, and Titiunik (2025) to test and show that the differences in the returns provided by elected politicians that had both high access to experienced appointees and high decision power over the government via appointees were different from the returns of other elected politicians (p-values = .04, .07, and .09 comparing the coefficients in column 8 versus those in columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 5, Panel A).¹¹ This result reinforces the critical role of obtaining government-specific experience and decision power in the government via unelected officials jointly.

Fourth, closer vote shares in municipalities where there were more candidates competing in a focal election could be a threat to the empirical analysis as the number of candidates for executive elections may vary across municipalities due to differences in the local political landscape. As a result, the authors tested the robustness of the findings to an alternative operationalization of the running variable that considers the vote split between the elected and runner-up candidates ignoring any other candidate ranking third or lower in the election, thus assessing the vote margin based strictly on votes awarded to the top two candidates.¹² Tables A15-A18 report that the results are robust to such operationalization.

Alternative operationalizations of characteristics of the unelected staff

The online appendix also reports three separate analyses considering alternative operationalizations of the variables associated with unelected staff. First, tables A19–A21 report results analogous to those in the main text but using alternative variables to define subsamples of high versus low access to resources via unelected staff. Specifically, the alternative split-sample

¹¹ The differences in the returns of elected politicians with high versus low access to experienced appointees (or high versus low decision power via appointees) were moderately precisely estimated (p-value = .16, comparing the coefficient in columns 2 and 4 in Table 4, Panel A; p-value = .23, comparing the coefficient in columns 2 and 4 in Table 4, Panel B). The authors also reported the results of parametric specifications that interact the measures on access to key unelected staff with whether politicians were elected (tables A13-A14). The direction of the coefficients is consistent and aligned with the main split-sample results, although the additional sample requirements for attaining statistical power led to estimates with high confidence intervals (Gelman et al., 2020).

¹² Imagine an election where candidates A, B, and C, obtained 50 votes, 40 votes, and 10 votes, respectively. In the main operationalization of the running variable, candidates A (elected) and B (runner-up) would have 50% and 40% of the total votes and a vote margin of 10% and -10%, respectively. The alternative operationalization ignores candidate C and considers only the 90 votes awarded to the top two candidates. In it, candidates A and B would have 55.6% ($100 \cdot 50 / 90$) and 44.4% ($100 \cdot 40 / 90$) of the votes, and vote margins of 11.2% and -11.2%, respectively.

analyses use (a) the median split of the average experience of appointees, instead of the share of appointees with at least one term of experience, and (b) the median split of the share of top earners in the government (i.e., top-decile) who are also political appointees, instead of the share of high-ranked managers in the government who are also political appointees. The underlying assumption is that top-earning measure is that earning would be associated with individuals holding positions with control over government decisions, even if not formally designated as high-level managers (Cornwell et al., 2021). The results remained consistent throughout.

Second, the authors re-examined the value of accessing both government-specific experience and decision power via the same unelected staff. Unlike the main results testing hypotheses H1-H3 – where experienced appointees and high-level managers were treated separately – Tables A22–A23 assess appointees who combine both traits. Two split-sample approaches were used: (1) the median share of political appointees who were high-level managers with at least four years of experience, and (2) the median share of high-level managers with at least four years of experience who were political appointees. In both operationalizations, the additional value in public procurement contracts provided by elected candidates (relative to runner-ups) was at least twice as large when elected politicians had high access to these unelected staff. These results reaffirm that access to experienced appointees in influential positions is a key boundary condition for elected candidates to generate returns.

Lastly, the main analyses assume that candidates influence procurement once in office. Accordingly, variables measure access to human capital resources during the first year of the elected term. Yet, unobserved candidate traits might jointly affect their capacity to reward firms and to recruit or retain experienced appointees. To address this, the authors estimated results to assess the potential for elected candidates to obtain resources in the government via unelected officials. For that, the analyses use information about appointed staff working in the government in the election year. The rationale is that municipalities continue relying on appointees afterward, giving any elected candidate potential access to them. Tables A24–A26 replicate the main variables using appointee data from the election year.

The results in Table A25 align with H1 and H2. When assessing H3 (Table A26), only local governments lacking both experienced and high-level appointees during the election year showed no additional returns. In contrast, returns emerged when either type of resource (government-specific experience and decision power via unelected staff) was present, though without evidence of complementarity. This pattern reinforces the importance of unelected staff as boundary conditions and suggests that post-election appointments may be necessary for politicians to fully benefit from complementarities between staff's experience and decision power.

Overall, these robustness checks reinforce that the observed effects are not artifacts of bandwidth choice, model specification, or variable construction. Instead, they consistently point to the central role of access to key groups of unelected staff – here, those that provide elected officials with government-specific experience and decision power – in shaping the capacity of elected politicians to generate returns for their contributing firms.

Qualitative insights to assess reasoning in the Brazilian and international contexts

Beyond the main quantitative results, the research team conducted nine interviews to triangulate findings and provide insights into the plausibility of the theorized mechanism. The interviewees included three international experts in public procurement who have served as senior policymakers based in OECD countries, five current or former political appointees who worked as managers in different spheres of the Brazilian government, and one private-sector actor who interacted regularly as a player in the market for procurement contracts in Brazil. The interviews focused on the role of unelected staff in enabling elected politicians to transform their political intent into administrative action, including the allocation of procurement contracts. They were conducted between Oct/2024 and Sep/2025, with each lasting between 30 and 45 minutes. Importantly, these interviews should not be interpreted as tests of our theory, but rather as providing insight to assess whether the manuscript's reasoning extends to the Brazilian and international contexts. The summary below is based on interview notes, and additional examples are in online Appendix B..

Both international experts and Brazilian interviewees emphasized that experience inside the government equips unelected staff with tacit knowledge about how public bureaucracies work.

International experts described this experience as “*soft information impossible to learn from outside*,” encompassing an understanding of informal rules, key actors, and how to sequence approvals to achieve political goals. Brazilian appointees echoed this logic through concrete accounts: for instance, one former appointee working into a managerial position referred to as experience in the government as critical for appointees to learn “who to talk to” and how to anticipate political obstacles for actions that would align with the goals of elected politicians.

The interviews also underscored that hierarchical authority determines whether appointees can act on their experience. International experts noted that “*the higher your position, the more decision power you have*,” with high-ranked appointees being able to allocate resources and direct investment priorities, while career civil servants or junior staff having little latitude to deviate from procedure. Brazilian respondents provided similar examples: former and current secretaries and directors described how formal authority allowed them to approve expenditures, coordinate departments, and deliver the policies politicians had promised. One interviewee summarized, “*the job of an appointed official is to deliver what the politician promised*.” In contrast, lower-level appointees lack the discretionary decision power is essential for implementing political intent.

Finally, both sets of interviews emphasized that experience and decision-power reinforce one another. International experts noted that experienced staff without decision power “*know the rules but cannot act*,” whereas inexperienced superiors “*try to act without knowing how*.” Brazilian officials illustrated this complementarity vividly: those who combined deep procedural knowledge with formal authority could assume calculated risks, coordinate across agencies, and deliver rapid results. One secretary explained that experienced appointees know every rule – and when to bend it safely. Across contexts, the interviews suggest that when elected politicians gain access to unelected staff who are both seasoned and senior, they acquire the most effective means to convert their political goals, which we interpret as potentially being to create returns to connected firms.

Exploring Distributional Outcomes across Firms: Extensive Margin, Range, and Hedging

The main analyses examine whether elected candidates generate additional returns for their pool of contributing firms. Yet, elected officials may prioritize certain firms, especially under the

assumption that their access to important unelected staff is costly and they thus must balance benefiting connected firms with their other policy goals. Accordingly, the authors explored whether elected candidates provided returns to a larger share of contributing firms (“extensive margin”), changed the range of contract values, or varied returns by the firms’ contribution portfolios (e.g., single versus multiple candidates).

Extensive margin. Table A28 reports RD estimates comparing the likelihood and share of contributing firms receiving contracts. Access to government-specific human capital and decision power of unelected appointees played a critical role. When elected candidates had high access to decision power via appointees, they were 12.6 percentage points (p.p.) more likely to have a contributing firm obtaining a contract ($p = .021$) and had a 0.095 higher share of contributing firms receiving contracts ($p = .06$) relative to runner-up candidates. Results were similar but less precise for access to experienced appointees and statistically zero when neither resource was present. When elected candidates had access to both types of key unelected staff, the likelihood that a contributing firm receives a contract was 0.228 p.p. higher ($p < .001$) and the share of contributing firms receiving a contract was 0.109 higher ($p = .022$) than for runner-up candidates.

Range of returns. Table A29 examines whether election outcomes affect the minimum and maximum value of public contracts awarded to contributing firms. Consistent with the main results, elected candidates had both higher minimum and higher maximum contract values, specifically when they had high access to experienced appointees and those with decision power.

Hedging versus loyalty. Due to electoral uncertainty, firms may try to “hedge” their investments by contributing to multiple candidates (Christensen et al., 2022; Pástor & Veronesi, 2012; Pástor & Veronesi, 2013). Yet, visible campaign donations and limited political capacity may encourage candidates to reward only “loyal” firms that supported them exclusively. Tables A30–A35 confirm this: “loyal” firms benefited most, whereas “hedging” firms did not receive superior returns. Furthermore, these outcomes align with 87.5% of the firm-level contributions to candidates originating from firms that donated exclusively to a single candidate, while only 21.6% of the value in contracts were allocated to contributing firms that donated to both the elected

candidate and at least one other candidate who did not win the election. These findings suggest that “hedging” is not a prominent strategy in the context.

Firm-by-election analysis. The authors also used firm-by-election data to conduct additional robustness results. Table A36 shows that when elected candidates had access to government-specific human capital and decision power via unelected staff, contributing firms were more likely to obtain contracts and received higher average total contract values. Table A37 replicates these results using top- and bottom-contributing firms, showing that superior returns concentrated among top contributors and when elected candidates had access to key political appointees. These results suggest that elected candidates do not provide returns to all firms, but when they do, they require access to key groups of unelected officials.

Addressing alternative explanations

This section examines whether the main conclusions continue to hold when considering RD analyses in electoral settings may face threats to internal validity due to different characteristics affecting the outcomes of interest could also explain why elections remain close (Marshall, 2023).

Table A38 in the online appendix examines heterogeneities in the returns provided by elected candidates based on other party-level resources that might support the creation of returns, such as *party size, financial strength, tradition, local alliances, and incumbency*. Replicating the main RD approach, the analyses show no systematic heterogeneity linked to party size, financial power, or tradition. However, returns were higher when parties held local incumbency and required fewer alliances to elect candidates. Although these factors are not theorized here, the authors tested whether they confound the role of access to key unelected staff.

Tables A39 and A40 report split-sample analyses based on high versus low access to government-specific experience and human capital and decision power via political appointees within subsamples of parties with or without incumbency (A39) and with small or large coalitions (A40). Across all cases, the additional returns provided by elected candidates remained larger and more precisely estimated when they had access to the types of unelected staff studies in this paper.

Another possible explanation is party-level closeness to the state government. Municipalities often cooperate with state governments on large-scale projects, which could make experienced appointees appear as a byproduct of such partnerships. Yet, Tables A41 and A42 show that returns were higher in the absence of close ties to the state government, and that access to government-specific experience or high-decision power via appointees continued to drive differences in returns.

Although the results reported in this paper are not confounded by candidates' prior experience as mayors, since the sample excludes re-election races, Table A43 examines elections where incumbents sought reappointment. Although these elections show higher average returns, access to key groups of unelected staff still creates heterogeneity in the returns provided by elected candidates, in the same direction as in the main results of this paper.

Finally, key groups of unelected staff could be particularly relevant for elected politicians in executive positions, as these have a baseline degree of influence over public procurement. However, we show that even elected politicians for state-level legislative seats may provide higher values of public contracts to connected firms – albeit more likely due to indirect channels – when their political party has experienced members working in the state-level congress. These results are in online Appendix C. While these results are correlational, they are aligned with the reasoning of experienced unelected staff enabling politicians to provide returns to connected firms.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper theorizes and empirically tests the role of access to key unelected government staff as a boundary condition for elected politicians to create returns for firms connected to them. The analyses examined political campaign contributions and public procurement contracts in Brazilian municipalities and implemented parametric and non-parametric regression discontinuity designs to estimate the returns created by marginally elected mayors for their contributing firms. The results show that these returns depend not only on attaining office, but also on accessing government-specific experience and exerting decision power via key groups of unelected staff.

This study makes three main contributions to the literature on nonmarket strategy (Dorobantu et al., 2017; Flammer, 2018; Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014) and corporate political

connections (Claessens et al., 2008; Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Hillman et al., 2004; Jia & Mayer, 2017; Wei et al., 2023). Firstly, this paper demonstrates that access to human capital resources within the government – in the form of experienced and structurally influential unelected staff – is also fundamental. Elected politicians rarely operate as isolated decision-makers: they depend on the expertise, networks, and discretion of unelected staff to navigate the complex processes of the public administration. By uncovering this human capital dimension (Ployhart & Moliterno; Teodorovicz et al., 2024), the study extends nonmarket strategy theory to include the human capital resources within the bureaucratic apparatus, opening an important pathway for new research on the organizational and human-resource foundations within the public bureaucracy that enables corporate political connections to accrue returns. Secondly, building on recent findings about unelected staff being a direct source of discretion that can favor private firms (He, 2025), this study reveals the indirect role that unelected staff play: they enable elected politicians to reward contributing firms. In this sense, bureaucrats act also as co-producers of political influence. Lastly, this study has an empirical contribution of attending the recent call to advance empirical studies providing causal evidence on the returns that political actors create to connected firms and on expanding the level of analyses to beyond firm-level analyses (Wei et al., 2023).

Despite its contributions, this study has limitations that offer avenues for future research. First, although the results indicate that the experience and decision power of unelected staff are conditioning factors for political influence, and the qualitative insights align with the proposed theoretical mechanisms, the analyses do not assess the relative weight of knowledge or of the social network that experienced staff developed over time in terms of explaining the findings. An opportunity for future research is to provide a detailed account of how the expertise, authority, and mobility of unelected officials can provide a competitive edge to firms connected politicians. Another important limitation of this study is not measuring the micro-mechanisms underlying the returns created by political actors. This is a common caveat in the literature that examines how relational ties affect observable firm behavior and/or outcomes (Flammer, 2018). Future studies could further expand the literature on corporate political actions by using, for instance, survey-

based measures of trustworthiness in private firms by public authorities. In addition, returns to corporate political connections may depend on the trust and reciprocity in relationships between politicians, unelected officials, and public suppliers. As a result, the rotation of staff involved in public procurement may be a policy that can reduce political interference in the allocation of public contracts. An interesting research topic would be to assess whether practices such as staff rotation could become institutional contingencies to the returns to corporate political connections.

Furthermore, while we empirically explore the distributional outcomes to firms – such as by showing that loyal firms were the ones benefitting the most from returns – a future area for novel theorizing would be how firms may build capabilities to develop ties within the government based on whether unelected officials can support them. Examining how the interaction of firm-level characteristics and features of staff in the public bureaucracy shape the returns to corporate political connections is an important area of research. It would also be important to further examine the implication of the findings to firm-level non-market strategies, especially relative to “hedging” their investments across politicians or whether they invest in developing capabilities that would help them screen candidates and commit to one (or few) to maximize returns. Furthermore, in political systems where firms can choose between donating to a party versus specific candidates, or where they may support multiple candidates within the same party or coalition, new studies could reveal richer patterns of loyalty and coordination between firms and politicians.

Lastly, this study examines a context of imperfect transparency and accountability in public procurement. In such environments – which the interviews suggest to not be restricted to the Brazilian context – blurred boundaries between public and private interests enable politicians to use procurement strategically to reward allies. Future research could examine how when and how unelected staff become enablers (or detractors) of returns to corporate political connections across different institutional contexts with different levels of public procurement transparency.

This paper also offers relevant managerial and policy insights. For firms competing in public procurement markets, the findings suggest that campaign contributions are not universally effective strategies, and thus firms seeking to engage in political activity should thus consider

whether candidates will be able to mobilize bureaucratic resources once in office. For policymakers, the study highlights a governance vulnerability: bureaucratic structures designed to ensure technical continuity may, under certain conditions, facilitate the delivery of private returns to politically connected firms. Policies such as staff rotation, transparent disclosure of appointments, and procedural oversight could mitigate these risks by reducing the opportunities for politicians to exploit bureaucratic discretion for private advantage.

Ultimately, this study advances understanding of how elected politicians generate private returns to connected firms by integrating the bureaucratic dimension into theories of nonmarket strategy. By showing that access to experienced and powerful unelected staff is essential for translating political investments into economic rewards, it redefines political influence as a collective and organizational process rather than a purely personal one. More broadly, this study invites strategy scholars to reconceptualize the state as an organization endowed with its own structure and constraints which shape the value that firms derive from engaging in political activity.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the final sample of candidates of 1,715 local-level executive elections


	Obs.	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.
<i>Election results</i>					
Elected candidate	3430	0.500	0.500	0	1
Vote margin	3430	0.000	0.194	-0.964	0.964
<i>Candidate's return in public procurement contracts</i>					
Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)	3430	5.202	6.077	0.000	15.103
Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)	3430	4.621	5.424	0.000	15.103
<i>Access to key unelected staff (at the municipality-election level)</i>					
Experienced appointees (in fraction of appointees)	3430	0.349	0.252	0.000	1.000
Decision power via appointees (in fraction of government staff)	3430	0.037	0.059	0.000	0.606
<i>Candidate's characteristics</i>					
Age	3430	48.336	10.066	21.000	75.000
Gender (male)	3430	0.875	0.331	0	1
Educational background: elementary school	3430	0.144	0.351	0	1
Educational background: high school	3430	0.322	0.467	0	1
Educational background: higher education	3430	0.534	0.499	0	1
Civil state: married	3430	0.131	0.337	0	1
Civil state: single	3430	0.765	0.424	0	1
Civil state: divorced	3430	0.088	0.283	0	1
Civil state: widower	3430	0.015	0.122	0	1
Reported wealth (in BRL 000s) (ln)	3430	6.002	1.352	0.001	11.659
Share of campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions	3430	0.264	0.249	0.000	1.000
Average contribution per contributing firm (in BRL) (ln)	3430	8.912	1.485	1.307	14.637
Share of firms' contributions from firms that only donated to the candidate	3430	0.918	0.229	0.000	1.000
Total campaign expenditure (in BRL 000s) (ln)	3430	6.023	1.355	0.000	8.082
<i>Candidate's political party</i>					
Left-wing-party	3430	0.278	0.448	0	1
Years of existence	3430	24.392	7.522	2.000	50.000
Total campaign expenditure by all local party candidates (in BRL 000s) (ln)	3430	7.011	1.259	0.000	11.716
Total campaign expenditure by all party candidates statewide (in BRL 000s) (ln)	3430	12.697	0.919	7.991	14.376
Number of candidates in local legislative elections (ln)	3430	2.234	0.635	0.000	4.190
Number candidates across all local executive elections statewide (ln)	3430	4.509	0.920	0.693	5.974
Number of parties in coalition of local executive election (ln)	3430	1.628	0.580	0.000	3.091
Number of parties in coalition of local legislative election (ln)	3430	1.062	0.547	0.000	2.639
Party elected at least one candidate in previous local legislative election	3430	0.626	0.484	0	1
Incumbent mayor's party in coalition	3430	0.091	0.288	0	1
Incumbent governor's party in coalition	3430	0.407	0.491	0	1
Next governor's party in coalition	3430	0.393	0.488	0	1

Table 2. Tests for the validity of the regression discontinuity design

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	All	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Panel A: p-value of McCrary test									
p-value of McCrary test	.999	.998	.956	1.00	.998	1.00	.999	1.00	1.00
Panel B: p-value of non-parametric mean comparison test									
<i>Candidate's characteristics</i>									
Age	.433	.585	.583	.830	.102	.713	.928	.187	.448
Gender (male)	.191	.363	.344	.690	.058	.472	.522	.091	.504
Educational background: elementary school	.443	.408	.969	.953	.228	.777	.631	.144	.872
Educational background: high school	.585	.736	.254	.864	.661	.791	.859	.414	.191
Educational background: higher education	.291	.767	.266	.842	.199	.961	.853	.653	.253
Civil state: married	.367	.374	.763	.750	.192	.497	.612	.475	.605
Civil state: single	.517	.450	.815	.221	.776	.435	.387	.648	.818
Civil state: divorced	.061	.068	.360	.110	.146	.148	.601	.097	.507
Civil state: widower	.639	.129	.674	.115	.524	.108	.658	.578	.515
Reported wealth (in BRL 000s, ln)	.966	.606	.600	.344	.271	.133	.884	.153	.710
Share of campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions	.416	.568	.543	.218	.835	.958	.037	.409	.322
Average contribution per contributing firm (in BRL, ln)	.973	.974	.998	.645	.629	.388	.052	.387	.207
Share of firms' contributions from firms that only donated to the candidate	.834	.901	.852	.584	.985	.996	.239	.781	.724
Total campaign expenditure (in BRL 000s, ln)	.578	.909	.424	.617	.722	.844	.647	.852	.746
<i>Political party's characteristics</i>									
Left-wing-party	.353	.669	.339	.172	.844	.280	.556	.529	.946
Years of existence	.909	.987	.905	.617	.389	.363	.777	.273	.775
Total campaign expenditure by all local party candidates (in BRL 000s) (ln)	.212	.804	.138	.699	.212	.983	.585	.535	.237
Total campaign expenditure by all party candidates statewide (in BRL000s) (ln)	.232	.329	.497	.616	.241	.614	.795	.303	.429
Number of candidates in local legislative elections (ln)	.409	.444	.776	.555	.771	.487	.871	.977	.763
Number of candidates across all local executive elections statewide (ln)	.322	.141	.871	.670	.343	.256	.723	.437	.622
Number of parties in coalition of local executive election (ln)	.652	.532	.989	.656	.967	.851	.629	.911	.655
Number of parties in coalition of local legislative election (ln)	.932	.940	.943	.909	.964	.691	.427	.315	.688
Party elected at least one candidate in previous local legislative election	.797	.403	.660	.808	.582	.495	.182	.419	.993
Incumbent mayor's party in coalition	.279	.993	.095	.459	.564	.520	.053	.720	.688
Incumbent governor's party in coalition	.534	.683	.187	.980	.330	.880	.846	.686	.060
Next governor's party in coalition	.301	.340	.638	.733	.350	.794	.856	.588	.609
Total observations	3430	1716	1714	1714	1716	976	738	740	976
Effective observations	2418	1240	1230	1090	1134	632	434	398	710
Symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth of the running variable	[-.165, .165]	[-.157, .157]	[-.184, .184]	[-.139, .139]	[-.143, .143]	[-.141, .141]	[-.125, .125]	[-.097, .097]	[-.192, .192]

Notes: Panel A reports the p-value of the McCrary test (McCrary, 2008). Panel B reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth, which follow the specifications reported in Table 3 (column 1), Table 4 (columns 1 and 3 of Panels A and B), and Table 5 (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 of Panel A). All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Figure 1. Graphical analysis of baseline hypothesis (H0) – Returns provided by elected versus runner-up candidates.



Notes: The figure reports the graphical analyses from the RD design for the additional private returns provided by elected candidates for local-level executive elections vis-à-vis their runner-up counterparts in terms of total value of public procurement contracts to all their contributing firms. The dots represent the estimated value of public procurement contracts for firms that contributed to candidates in each of the 50 bins of the vote margin on each side of the cut-off. All estimates originate from local non-parametric regressions with a 1st order polynomial. The figure plots 95% confidence intervals. This figure plots all elections with vote margin below 30%.


Table 3. Test of baseline hypothesis (H0) – “Sanity” check of additional returns provided by elected versus non-elected candidates.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Dependent variables	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)	Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)	Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)
Elected candidate	1.157 [.019]	1.347 [.002]	1.089 [.013]	1.239 [.002]
Total observations	3430	3430	3430	3430
Effective observations	2418	2418	2468	2468
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.165,0.165]	[-0.165,0.165]	[-0.170,0.170]	[-0.170,0.170]
Estimation procedure	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes
Party's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes
State and year dummies	-	Yes	-	Yes


Notes: p-values in parenthesis use standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. The bandwidths were computed via a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for each respective dependent variable considering the non-parametric specification without control variables (columns 1 and 3, respectively). All columns report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear estimations. Columns [1] and [3] report a first-order local non-parametric results. Columns [2] and [4] report estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above and listed on Tables 1 and 2.

Figure 2. Graphical analyses about hypotheses H1 and H2 – Access to Key Groups of Unelected Government Staff as a Contingency


Panel A. Municipalities with LOW share of experienced appointees.




Panel B. Municipalities with HIGH share of experienced appointees.



Panel C. Municipalities with LOW decision power via appointees



Panel D. Municipalities with HIGH decision power via appointees



Notes: Each panel in this figure replicates – for the sub-samples indicated in their titles – the graphical analyses from the RD design for the additional private returns provided by elected candidates for local-level executive elections vis-à-vis their runner-up counterparts in terms of total value of public procurement contracts to all their contributing firms. The analyses are analogous to that reported in Figure 1.


Table 4. Results about hypotheses H1 and H2 – Access to Key Unelected Staff in Government as a Contingency

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Dependent variables	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)				Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)			
Panel A: Moderating Effects of Experienced Appointees (hypothesis H1)								
Sample: Experienced appointees	Low		High		Low		High	
Elected candidate	0.647 [.360]	0.772 [.222]	1.721 [.011]	1.998 [.001]	0.643 [.301]	0.745 [.183]	1.406 [.030]	1.615 [.004]
Total observations	1716	1716	1714	1714	1716	1716	1714	1714
Effective observations	1240	1240	1230	1230	1264	1264	1142	1142
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.159,0.159]	[-0.159,0.159]	[-0.184,0.184]	[-0.184,0.184]	[-0.167,0.167]	[-0.167,0.167]	[-0.156,0.156]	[-0.156,0.156]
Panel B: Moderating Effects of Decision Power via Appointees (hypothesis H2)								
Sample: Government presence of appointees with decision power	Low		High		Low		High	
Elected candidate	0.484 [.518]	0.619 [.330]	1.493 [.046]	1.751 [.009]	0.416 [.540]	0.509 [.380]	1.373 [.039]	1.601 [.008]
Total observations	1714	1714	1716	1716	1714	1714	1716	1716
Effective observations	1090	1090	1134	1134	1078	1078	1154	1154
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.139,0.139]	[-0.139,0.139]	[-0.143,0.143]	[-0.143,0.143]	[-0.136,0.136]	[-0.136,0.136]	[-0.147,0.147]	[-0.147,0.147]
Estimation procedure	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Party's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
State and year dummies	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes


Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. All local estimates use a sample within bandwidths referred above. The bandwidths were computed via a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for each respective dependent variable and subsample using the non-parametric specifications (reported in odd columns). All columns report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regressions. Odd columns report a first-order local non-parametric results. Even columns report estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above and listed on Tables 1 and 2.

Figure 3. Graphical analyses about hypothesis H3 – Complementarity Between Access to Experienced Unelected Staff and to Decision Power via Unelected Staff


Panel A. Municipalities with LOW share of experienced appointees and LOW decision power via appointees




Panel B. Municipalities with HIGH share of experienced appointees and LOW decision power via appointees



Panel C. Municipalities with HIGH share of experienced appointees and LOW decision power via appointees.



Panel D. Municipalities with HIGH share of experienced appointees and HIGH decision power via appointees



Notes: Each panel in this figure replicates – for the sub-samples indicated in their titles – the graphical analyses from the RD design for the additional private returns provided by elected candidates for local-level executive elections vis-à-vis their runner-up counterparts in terms of total value of public procurement contracts to all their contributing firms. The analyses are analogous to that reported in Figures 1 and 2.

Table 5. Results about hypothesis H3 – Complementarity Between Access to Experienced Unelected Staff and to Decision Power via Unelected Staff

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Experienced appointees		Low		High		Low		High
Decision power via appointees		Low		Low		High		High
Panel A: Dependent Variable - Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)								
Elected candidate	0.753 [.445]	0.915 [.261]	0.076 [.949]	0.177 [.859]	-0.412 [.773]	-0.074 [.955]	2.585 [.004]	2.872 [.000]
Total observations	976	976	738	738	740	740	976	976
Effective observations	632	632	434	434	398	398	710	710
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.143,0.143]	[-0.143,0.143]	[-0.126,0.126]	[-0.126,0.126]	[-0.099,0.099]	[-0.099,0.099]	[-0.192,0.192]	[-0.192,0.192]
Panel B: Dependent Variable - Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)								
Elected candidate	0.599 [.497]	0.738 [.317]	0.125 [.908]	0.161 [.860]	-0.260 [.840]	0.020 [.986]	2.295 [.003]	2.528 [.000]
Total observations	976	976	738	738	740	740	976	976
Effective observations	630	630	422	422	398	398	760	760
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.142,0.142]	[-0.142,0.142]	[-0.123,0.123]	[-0.123,0.123]	[-0.100,0.100]	[-0.1,0.1]	[-0.221,0.221]	[-0.221,0.221]
Estimation procedure	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Party's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
State and year dummies	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Panel A reports results about differences between marginally elected and runner-up candidates in the total value of public contracts to all their contributing firms. Panel B reports analogous results about the value of public contracts per contributing firm. All local estimates use samples within bandwidths referred above. The bandwidths were computed via a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for each respective dependent variable and subsample using the non-parametric specifications (reported in odd columns). All columns report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regressions. Odd columns report a first-order local non-parametric results. Even columns report estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above and listed on Tables 1 and 2

ONLINE APPENDIX

APPENDIX A ROBUSTNESS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES TO MAIN RESULTS

Graphical Analyses using the Value of Public Contracts per Contributing Firms as the Dependent Variable

Figures A1 to A3 replicate the analyses reported in Figures 1-3 in the main paper, but using the value of public contracts per contributing firm as the dependent variable, rather than the value of public contract to the pool of contributing firms.

<< INSERT FIGURES A1 TO A3 HERE >>

Descriptive Statistics by Elected and Runner-Up Candidates for Each Subsample (Tables A1-A3)

Tables A1 to A3 report the descriptive statistics for all subgroups of candidates used in the main analyses. They all show that, within their respective optimal bandwidths (considering the specification assessing difference in the value of public contracts to their pool of contributing firms), the characteristics of elected and runner up candidates are similar in magnitudes.

<< INSERT TABLES A1 TO A3 HERE >>

Robustness to RD approach (Tables A4-A18)

Tables A4 to A6 report the results comparing characteristics of elected and runner-up candidates with these optimal bandwidths. As in the main paper, there are very few instances of imbalances that are sparsely distributed in few subsamples and of low magnitude. Tables A7 to A9 report the main results assessing H0 to H3 (analogous to Tables 3 to 5 of the main paper). Tables A10-A12 show the results are not sensitive to difference choices of local or global parametric specifications. Tables A13-A14 show results using parametric specifications with interaction terms. Tables A15-18 shows that results are robust to an alternative operationalization of the running variable.

<< INSERT TABLES A4 TO A18 HERE >>

Robustness to alternative operationalizations of characteristics of unelected staff (Tables A19-A26)

Tables A19-A21 show that the main results are analogous to operationalizations of high (vs. low) access to unelected staff with government-specific experience, and high (vs. low) access to decision power in the government via unelected staff by using the median split of the average experience of appointees, instead of the share of appointees with at least one term of experience, and the median split of the share of top earners in the government (i.e., top-decile) who are also political appointees, instead of the share of high-ranked managers in the government who are also political appointees.

Tables A22-A23 assessed the results of a separate measure with accounts for the same political appointees having both government-specific experience and decision power in the government. The results show that returns by elected candidates concentrate in cases when the winner candidate had above median share of political appointees who were high-level managers with at least four years of experience, and above median share of high-level managers with at least four years of experience who were political appointees.

Tables A24-A26 use data about appointees in government during the election year, thus, before elected candidates appointing their staff. These measures assess the “potential” of an elected official to staff the government with their appointees. The results show that returns emerged when either type of resource (government-specific experience and decision power via unelected staff) was present, though without evidence of complementarity. This pattern reinforces the importance of unelected staff as boundary conditions and suggests that post-election appointments may be necessary for politicians to fully benefit from complementarities between staff’s experience and decision power.

<< INSERT TABLES A19 TO A26 HERE >>

Distribution of outcomes public contract outcomes across contributing firms (Tables A27-A37)

Table A28 examines whether elected politicians are more likely than runner-ups to award at least one contract to their contributing firms, as well as have a higher share of contributing firms receiving contracts. The results show that contributing firms of elected politicians are significantly more likely to receive contracts—particularly when those politicians have access to experienced and high-ranking unelected staff.

Table A29 analyzes the minimum and maximum contract values per contributing firm. It shows that elected politicians provide both higher minimum and higher maximum contract values to contributors, again conditional on high access to experienced unelected officials and attaining high decision power in the government via unelected officials.

Tables A30-A35 report results testing whether the positive political returns identified in the study are driven by “hedging” firms—those donating to multiple candidates—or “loyal” firms—those contributing exclusively to one candidate. The results indicate that the political returns we observe are concentrated among loyal contributors. Importantly, these results align with the fact that the vast majority of contributions by firms in our setting (87.5%) are from loyal contributors, not hedging ones (pp. 31 in the revised manuscript).

Tables A36–A37 present analyses at the firm-by-election level, testing whether the probability and total value of contracts awarded to each firm depend on whether the firm contributed to the winning or losing candidate. The results confirm that contributing firms of elected politicians are significantly more likely to receive contracts and their total value in public contracts is higher. Furthermore, they show that when differentiating between top- and bottom-contributing firms, superior returns concentrate among top contributors. Nevertheless, these additional returns occur mainly when elected candidates had access to the key forms of unelected staff studied in the manuscript.

<< INSERT TABLES A27 TO A37 HERE >>

Addressing alternative explanations (Tables A38-A43)

Table A38, replicate the main regression discontinuity (RD) approach and show that there is no systematic heterogeneity in the returns provided by elected candidates associated with party size, financial power, or tradition. However, we indeed found that returns were higher for parties with local incumbency and for those that required fewer alliances to elect their candidates.


Motivated by the analyses above, we separately examined the relationship between access to key groups of unelected officials across subsamples of candidates whose parties had (or did not have) incumbency (Table A39) and were in small or large coalitions (Table A40). Across all cases, the results remain consistent with our main findings: the additional returns provided by elected candidates are larger and more precisely estimated when they have access to unelected officials with government-specific experience and when these appointed staff have decision power in the government.

We further examined whether party-level closeness to the state government might confound the results. Municipalities often collaborate with state governments on large-scale projects, which could make experienced appointees appear as a byproduct of such partnerships rather than as an independent human capital resource. As shown in Tables A41 and A42, access to experienced or high-ranking unelected officials continues to be associated with differences in returns across these parties with or without ties with the state government.

Finally, beyond focusing the main analyses on elections without incumbent mayors that are running for re-election, the analyses reported in Table A43 examine elections in which incumbent mayors sought reappointment. As expected, incumbents provide higher average returns to contributing firms, reflecting their prior experience and established networks. However, the moderating role of access to key unelected staff remains statistically and substantively significant and operates in the same direction as in the main analyses.


<< INSERT TABLES A38 TO A43 HERE >>

Figure A1. Graphical analysis of baseline hypothesis (H0) – Returns provided by elected versus runner-up candidates in terms of the value of public contract per contributing firm.




Notes: The figure reports the graphical analyses from the RD design for the additional private returns provided by elected candidates for local-level executive elections vis-à-vis their runner-up counterparts in terms of value of public procurement contracts per contributing firm. The dots represent the estimated value of public procurement contracts for firms that contributed to candidates in each of the 50 bins of the vote margin on each side of the cut-off. All estimates originate from local non-parametric regressions with a 1st order polynomial. The figure also plots 95% confidence interval associated to each local non-parametric estimation. This figure plots all elections with vote margin below 30%.

Figure A2. Graphical analyses about hypotheses H1 and H2 using the value of public contract per contributing firm as the dependent variable



Notes: Each panel in this figure replicates – for the sub-samples indicated in their titles – the graphical analyses from the RD design for the additional private returns provided by elected candidates for local-level executive elections vis-à-vis their runner-up counterparts in terms of value of public procurement contracts per contributing firm. The analyses are analogous to that reported in Figure A1.

Figure A3. Graphical analyses about hypothesis H3 using the value of public contract per contributing firm as the dependent variable



Notes: Each panel in this figure replicates – for the sub-samples indicated in their titles – the graphical analyses from the RD design for the additional private returns provided by elected candidates for local-level executive elections vis-à-vis their runner-up counterparts in terms of the value of public procurement contracts per contributing firm. The analyses are analogous to that reported in Figure A2.

Table A1. Descriptive statistics by elected and runner-up candidates in Tables 1 and 3 in the main text

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	Mean per group			
Sample (based on bandwidth of the running variable)	All	[-0.165,0.165] bandwidth		
	Elected	Runner -up	Elected	Runner -up
<i>Election results</i>				
Elected candidate	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.000
Vote margin	0.138	-0.138	0.070	-0.070
<i>Candidate's return in public procurement contracts</i>				
Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)	6.182	4.222	6.072	4.268
Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)	5.477	3.765	5.421	3.808
<i>Candidate's characteristics</i>				
Age	48.097	48.576	48.188	48.542
Gender (male)	0.891	0.859	0.893	0.880
Educational background: elementary school	0.143	0.145	0.152	0.156
Educational background: high school	0.319	0.325	0.323	0.328
Educational background: higher education	0.537	0.530	0.525	0.516
Civil state: married	0.128	0.133	0.121	0.132
Civil state: single	0.774	0.756	0.782	0.765
Civil state: divorced	0.080	0.096	0.079	0.091
Civil state: widower	0.016	0.015	0.017	0.012
Reported wealth (in BRL 000s) (ln)	6.033	5.971	6.024	5.969
Share of campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions	0.261	0.268	0.250	0.262
Average contribution per contributing firm (in BRL) (ln)	8.958	8.866	8.871	8.852
Share of firms' contributions from firms that only donated to the candidate	0.920	0.916	0.925	0.924
Total campaign expenditure (in BRL 000s) (ln)	6.049	5.997	6.008	5.975
<i>Candidate's political party</i>				
Left-wing-party	0.280	0.275	0.270	0.268
Years of existence	24.405	24.38	24.208	24.433
Total campaign expenditure by all local party candidates (in BRL 000s) (ln)	7.042	6.979	6.956	6.981
Total campaign expenditure by all party candidates statewide (in BRL 000s) (ln)	12.699	12.695	12.645	12.669
Number of candidates in local legislative elections (ln)	2.275	2.194	2.228	2.205
Number candidates across all local executive elections statewide (ln)	4.517	4.5	4.494	4.517
Number of parties in coalition of local executive election (ln)	1.695	1.561	1.647	1.586
Number of parties in coalition of local legislative election (ln)	1.071	1.053	1.086	1.077
Party elected at least one candidate in previous local legislative election	0.638	0.613	0.634	0.631
Incumbent mayor's party in coalition	0.110	0.073	0.103	0.093
Incumbent governor's party in coalition	0.418	0.396	0.412	0.407
Next governor's party in coalition	0.409	0.377	0.404	0.383
Observations	1715	1715	1209	1209

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the mean levels of the variables used in this study across the elected and runner-up candidates for 1,706 local-level executive elections distributed in years 2004, 2008, and 2012. Columns 3-4 report the analogous mean values considering only the subsample of elected and runner-up candidates for the 1,160 elections where the running variable was within a [-0.165, 0.165] bandwidth, which was computed via symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for the total value of public contracts granted to contributing firms considering the specification reported in column 1 of Table 3.

Table A2. Descriptive statistics by elected and runner-up candidates in the subsamples used in Table 4 of the main text

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Sample: Experienced appointees	Low		High		All		All	
Sample: Decision power via appointees	All		All		Low		High	
Sample: Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.159,0.159]		[-0.184,0.184]		[-0.139,0.139]		[-0.143,0.143]	
	Mean per group							
	Elected	Runner-up	Elected	Runner-up	Elected	Runner-up	Elected	Runner-up
<i>Election results</i>								
Elected candidate	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.000
Vote margin	0.070	-0.070	0.074	-0.074	0.061	-0.061	0.064	-0.064
<i>Candidate's return in public procurement contracts</i>								
Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)	5.742	4.428	6.358	4.061	6.019	4.344	6.316	4.164
Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)	5.137	3.977	5.655	3.595	5.368	3.859	5.667	3.730
<i>Candidate's characteristics</i>								
Age	48.197	48.518	48.169	48.600	48.367	48.426	48.143	48.303
Gender (male)	0.879	0.879	0.906	0.875	0.892	0.894	0.889	0.869
Educational background: elementary school	0.155	0.194	0.138	0.115	0.156	0.158	0.159	0.155
Educational background: high school	0.319	0.305	0.330	0.356	0.316	0.316	0.326	0.360
Educational background: higher education	0.526	0.502	0.532	0.528	0.528	0.527	0.515	0.485
Civil state: married	0.131	0.137	0.107	0.127	0.145	0.128	0.095	0.143
Civil state: single	0.761	0.760	0.800	0.764	0.760	0.771	0.802	0.753
Civil state: divorced	0.094	0.095	0.072	0.091	0.083	0.088	0.079	0.090
Civil state: widower	0.015	0.008	0.021	0.018	0.013	0.013	0.023	0.014
Reported wealth (in BRL 000s) (ln)	6.038	5.930	5.995	5.984	5.995	5.927	6.041	5.976
Share of campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions	0.251	0.277	0.251	0.245	0.262	0.294	0.233	0.235
Average contribution per contributing firm (in BRL) (ln)	8.787	8.890	8.972	8.791	8.929	8.977	8.768	8.717
Share of firms' contributions from firms that only donated to the candidate	0.926	0.915	0.918	0.927	0.926	0.931	0.928	0.919
Total campaign expenditure (in BRL 000s) (ln)	6.018	6.004	6.004	5.941	6.021	5.995	6.014	5.984

Note: the table continues in the next page.

Table A2 [cont.]. Descriptive statistics by elected and runner-up candidates in the subsamples used in Table 4 of the main text

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Sample: Experienced appointees		Low		High		All		All
Sample: Decision power via appointees		All		All		Low		High
Sample: Bandwidth of the running variable		[-0.159,0.159]		[-0.184,0.184]		[-0.139,0.139]		[-0.143,0.143]
	Mean per group							
	Elected	Runner-up	Elected	Runner-up	Elected	Runner-up	Elected	Runner-up
<i>Candidate's political party</i>								
Left-wing-party	0.269	0.237	0.262	0.299	0.268	0.284	0.257	0.263
Years of existence	24.284	23.769	24.068	25.182	24.143	24.538	24.215	24.295
Total campaign expenditure by all local party candidates (in BRL 000s) (ln)	6.899	6.929	7.016	7.035	6.953	7.014	6.922	6.940
Total campaign expenditure by all party candidates statewide (in BRL 000s) (ln)	12.542	12.552	12.757	12.786	12.692	12.725	12.569	12.592
Number of candidates in local legislative elections (ln)	2.190	2.191	2.264	2.218	2.221	2.240	2.200	2.170
Number candidates across all local executive elections statewide (ln)	4.436	4.493	4.553	4.536	4.536	4.561	4.439	4.463
Number of parties in coalition of local executive election (ln)	1.609	1.573	1.691	1.598	1.632	1.595	1.638	1.562
Number of parties in coalition of local legislative election (ln)	1.098	1.062	1.070	1.088	1.066	1.057	1.114	1.104
Party elected at least one candidate in previous local legislative election	0.610	0.653	0.662	0.603	0.651	0.639	0.621	0.631
Incumbent mayor's party in coalition	0.126	0.111	0.076	0.072	0.105	0.101	0.101	0.093
Incumbent governor's party in coalition	0.402	0.421	0.426	0.389	0.402	0.418	0.409	0.404
Next governor's party in coalition	0.405	0.384	0.405	0.379	0.398	0.382	0.411	0.379
Observations	620	620	615	615	545	545	567	567

Note: this table reports the mean levels of the variables used in this study across the elected and runner-up candidates for the subsamples referred to in the table. All bandwidths were computed via symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for the total value of public contracts granted to contributing firms considering the specification reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 4 in the main text.

Table A3. Descriptive statistics by elected and runner-up candidates in the subsamples used in Table 5 of the main text

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Sample: Experienced appointees	Low		High		Low		High	
Sample: Decision power via appointees	Low		Low		High		High	
Sample: Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.143,0.143]		[-0.126,0.126]		[-0.099,0.099]		[-0.192,0.192]	
	Mean per group							
	Elected	Runner-up	Elected	Runner-up	Elected	Runner-up	Elected	Runner-up
<i>Election results</i>								
Elected candidate	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.000
Vote margin	0.063	-0.063	0.056	-0.056	0.049	-0.049	0.077	-0.077
<i>Candidate's return in public procurement contracts</i>								
Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)	5.906	4.647	5.960	3.837	5.944	4.135	6.593	4.136
Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)	5.272	4.159	5.331	3.355	5.348	3.717	5.877	3.677
<i>Candidate's characteristics</i>								
Age	48.472	48.377	48.152	48.742	48.337	48.925	48.470	48.372
Gender (male)	0.867	0.880	0.922	0.912	0.879	0.889	0.890	0.859
Educational background: elementary school	0.155	0.177	0.161	0.138	0.156	0.201	0.141	0.107
Educational background: high school	0.313	0.313	0.318	0.327	0.302	0.296	0.332	0.394
Educational background: higher education	0.532	0.509	0.521	0.535	0.543	0.503	0.527	0.499
Civil state: married	0.149	0.152	0.147	0.092	0.101	0.111	0.085	0.152
Civil state: single	0.744	0.747	0.779	0.806	0.774	0.769	0.814	0.749
Civil state: divorced	0.092	0.092	0.065	0.083	0.116	0.116	0.070	0.082
Civil state: widower	0.016	0.009	0.009	0.018	0.010	0.005	0.031	0.017
Reported wealth (in BRL 000s) (ln)	6.012	5.864	5.955	5.983	5.960	5.954	6.010	5.970
Share of campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions	0.253	0.292	0.263	0.291	0.236	0.256	0.238	0.215
Average contribution per contributing firm (in BRL) (ln)	8.828	8.936	8.997	8.978	8.686	8.830	8.883	8.625
Share of firms' contributions from firms that only donated to the candidate	0.926	0.920	0.927	0.948	0.913	0.897	0.919	0.919
Total campaign expenditure (in BRL 000s) (ln)	5.970	5.917	6.063	6.093	6.094	6.111	5.972	5.881

Note: the table continues in the next page.

Table A3 [cont.]. Descriptive statistics by elected and runner-up candidates in the subsamples used in Table 5 of the main text

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Sample: Experienced appointees		Low		High		Low		High
Sample: Decision power via appointees		Low		Low		High		High
Sample: Bandwidth of the running variable		[-0.143,0.143]		[-0.126,0.126]		[-0.099,0.099]		[-0.192,0.192]
	Mean per group							
	Elected	Runner-up	Elected	Runner-up	Elected	Runner-up	Elected	Runner-up
<i>Candidate's political party</i>								
Left-wing-party	0.269	0.237	0.258	0.355	0.261	0.261	0.259	0.276
Years of existence	24.149	24.095	23.940	25.230	24.261	23.653	24.000	25.197
Total campaign expenditure by all local party candidates (in BRL 000s) (ln)	6.899	6.923	6.986	7.117	6.918	6.922	6.969	6.952
Total campaign expenditure by all party candidates statewide (in BRL 000s) (ln)	12.605	12.637	12.803	12.836	12.371	12.405	12.727	12.748
Number of candidates in local legislative elections (ln)	2.172	2.221	2.280	2.254	2.171	2.162	2.237	2.180
Number candidates across all local executive elections statewide (ln)	4.484	4.578	4.606	4.524	4.296	4.375	4.536	4.534
Number of parties in coalition of local executive election (ln)	1.600	1.565	1.674	1.623	1.575	1.565	1.682	1.566
Number of parties in coalition of local legislative election (ln)	1.089	1.078	1.035	1.017	1.097	1.053	1.096	1.140
Party elected at least one candidate in previous local legislative election	0.658	0.661	0.636	0.604	0.563	0.628	0.668	0.606
Incumbent mayor's party in coalition	0.130	0.104	0.065	0.101	0.106	0.161	0.082	0.059
Incumbent governor's party in coalition	0.399	0.427	0.410	0.392	0.422	0.392	0.437	0.380
Next governor's party in coalition	0.418	0.383	0.378	0.364	0.412	0.362	0.417	0.386
Observations	316	316	217	217	199	199	355	355

Note: this table reports the mean levels of the variables used in this study across the elected and runner-up candidates for the subsamples referred to in the table. All bandwidths were computed via symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for the total value of public contracts granted to contributing firms considering the specification reported in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 of Table 5 in the main text.

Table A4. Robustness to similarity of candidates around the vote margin cut off for optimal symmetric MSE-SUM optimal bandwidth (p-value of non-parametric mean comparison test of characteristics of elected versus runner-up candidates)

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	All	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Experienced appointees			
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
<i>Candidate's characteristics</i>									
Age	0.343	0.622	0.478	0.818	0.095	0.708	0.925	0.135	0.424
Gender (male)	0.252	0.334	0.361	0.756	0.057	0.556	0.517	0.052	0.466
Educational background: elementary school	0.358	0.419	0.692	0.971	0.210	0.783	0.623	0.117	0.920
Educational background: high school	0.672	0.762	0.382	0.893	0.678	0.900	0.852	0.374	0.225
Educational background: higher education	0.294	0.754	0.267	0.881	0.194	0.941	0.853	0.654	0.216
Civil state: married	0.245	0.419	0.631	0.819	0.174	0.568	0.628	0.462	0.386
Civil state: single	0.496	0.468	0.873	0.215	0.783	0.440	0.401	0.660	0.594
Civil state: divorced	0.027	0.093	0.333	0.123	0.127	0.187	0.612	0.099	0.561
Civil state: widower	0.593	0.140	0.717	0.128	0.535	0.123	0.652	0.830	0.528
Reported wealth (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.886	0.581	0.586	0.348	0.240	0.139	0.896	0.141	0.649
Share of campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions	0.438	0.527	0.622	0.222	0.824	0.959	0.037	0.335	0.273
Average contribution per contributing firm (in BRL) (ln)	0.972	0.913	0.956	0.661	0.583	0.414	0.052	0.287	0.157
Share of firms' contributions from firms that only donated to the candidate	0.740	0.913	0.774	0.570	0.968	0.994	0.239	0.788	0.746
Total campaign expenditure (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.537	0.942	0.461	0.626	0.710	0.896	0.657	0.901	0.729

Note: the table continues in the next page.

Table A4 [cont.]. Robustness to similarity of candidates around the vote margin cut off for optimal symmetric MSE-SUM optimal bandwidth (p-value of non-parametric mean comparison test of characteristics of elected versus runner-up candidates)

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	All	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
<i>Candidate's political party</i>									
Left-wing-party	0.415	0.641	0.461	0.161	0.814	0.307	0.567	0.527	0.856
Years of existence	0.743	0.943	0.786	0.539	0.367	0.324	0.772	0.233	0.797
Total campaign expenditure by all local party candidates (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.238	0.782	0.158	0.675	0.208	0.983	0.586	0.601	0.211
Total campaign expenditure by all party candidates statewide (in BRL000s) (ln)	0.233	0.315	0.453	0.607	0.237	0.591	0.789	0.353	0.419
Number of candidates in local legislative elections (ln)	0.522	0.391	0.771	0.528	0.790	0.443	0.865	0.959	0.747
Number candidates across all local executive elections statewide (ln)	0.331	0.122	0.959	0.668	0.353	0.233	0.729	0.437	0.586
Number of parties in coalition of local executive election (ln)	0.739	0.491	0.951	0.595	0.992	0.772	0.634	0.703	0.664
Number of parties in coalition of local legislative election (ln)	0.889	0.938	0.832	0.913	0.899	0.707	0.418	0.510	0.782
Party elected at least one candidate in previous local legislative election	0.824	0.415	0.576	0.867	0.549	0.531	0.176	0.405	0.896
Incumbent mayor's party in coalition	0.388	0.951	0.136	0.481	0.701	0.465	0.053	0.815	0.766
Incumbent governor's party in coalition	0.476	0.679	0.214	0.960	0.276	0.893	0.843	0.705	0.066
Next governor's party in coalition	0.388	0.306	0.691	0.723	0.394	0.803	0.851	0.409	0.714
Total observations	3430	1716	1714	1714	1716	976	738	740	976
Effective observations	2196	1272	1110	1122	1070	662	432	468	648
Symmetric MSE-SUM optimal bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.138, 0.138]	[-0.168, 0.168]	[-0.146, 0.146]	[-0.149, 0.149]	[-0.132, 0.132]	[-0.155, 0.155]	[-0.125, 0.125]	[-0.119, 0.119]	[-0.158, 0.158]

Notes: This table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE bandwidth that minimizes the sum of the regression coefficients (MSE-SUM), which was calculated considering the total value of public contracts granted to contributing firms. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A5. Robustness to similarity of candidates around the vote margin cut off for optimal symmetric CER-optimal bandwidth (p-value of non-parametric mean comparison test of characteristics of elected versus runner-up candidates)

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	All	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Experienced appointees			
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
<i>Candidate's characteristics</i>									
Age	0.439	0.724	0.447	0.548	0.113	0.525	0.894	0.255	0.388
Gender (male)	0.339	0.752	0.310	0.477	0.085	0.285	0.740	0.173	0.459
Educational background: elementary school	0.318	0.436	0.582	0.950	0.231	0.679	0.671	0.213	0.816
Educational background: high school	0.553	0.931	0.437	0.578	0.688	0.376	0.816	0.700	0.244
Educational background: higher education	0.207	0.522	0.259	0.578	0.212	0.591	0.923	0.495	0.199
Civil state: married	0.149	0.217	0.535	0.391	0.165	0.319	0.973	0.506	0.297
Civil state: single	0.545	0.316	0.992	0.303	0.727	0.329	0.703	0.757	0.567
Civil state: divorced	0.018	0.009	0.383	0.066	0.139	0.032	0.838	0.116	0.490
Civil state: widower	0.540	0.089	0.740	0.084	0.487	0.110	0.401	0.725	0.551
Reported wealth (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.948	0.726	0.601	0.229	0.251	0.156	0.726	0.083	0.614
Share of campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions	0.484	0.499	0.705	0.144	0.553	0.846	0.017	0.407	0.252
Average contribution per contributing firm (in BRL) (ln)	0.767	0.894	0.892	0.657	0.263	0.332	0.049	0.460	0.127
Share of firms' contributions from firms that only donated to the candidate	0.743	0.854	0.750	0.737	0.900	0.971	0.402	0.891	0.845
Total campaign expenditure (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.497	0.624	0.530	0.696	0.594	0.607	0.750	0.744	0.693

Note: the table continues in the next page.

Table A5 [cont.]. Robustness to similarity of candidates around the vote margin cut off for optimal symmetric CER-optimal bandwidth (p-value of non-parametric mean comparison test of characteristics of elected versus runner-up candidates)

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	All	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
<i>Candidate's political party</i>									
Left-wing-party	0.544	0.533	0.618	0.304	0.739	0.182	0.960	0.722	0.857
Years of existence	0.513	0.661	0.666	0.899	0.419	0.660	0.572	0.432	0.760
Total campaign expenditure by all local party candidates (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.240	0.673	0.187	0.871	0.198	0.985	0.877	0.693	0.222
Total campaign expenditure by all party candidates statewide (in BRL000s) (ln)	0.255	0.415	0.430	0.682	0.224	0.831	0.614	0.241	0.422
Number of candidates in local legislative elections (ln)	0.554	0.575	0.765	0.386	0.975	0.503	0.604	0.902	0.783
Number candidates across all local executive elections statewide (ln)	0.442	0.327	0.897	0.806	0.418	0.597	0.941	0.308	0.598
Number of parties in coalition of local executive election (ln)	0.993	0.979	0.972	0.965	0.833	0.774	0.751	0.921	0.709
Number of parties in coalition of local legislative election (ln)	0.631	0.851	0.737	0.678	0.555	0.733	0.308	0.267	0.814
Party elected at least one candidate in previous local legislative election	0.864	0.230	0.469	0.764	0.738	0.399	0.207	0.568	0.867
Incumbent mayor's party in coalition	0.415	0.948	0.185	0.222	0.906	0.874	0.034	0.449	0.896
Incumbent governor's party in coalition	0.368	0.839	0.193	0.705	0.105	0.938	0.716	0.880	0.067
Next governor's party in coalition	0.530	0.562	0.744	0.614	0.713	0.827	0.629	0.855	0.776
Total observations	3430	1716	1714	1714	1716	976	738	740	976
Effective observations	1866	954	1004	860	852	510	358	308	600
Symmetric MSE-SUM optimal bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.110, 0.110]	[-0.110, 0.110]	[-0.127, 0.127]	[-0.096, 0.096]	[-0.098, 0.098]	[-0.102, 0.102]	[-0.091, 0.091]	[-0.071, 0.071]	[-0.136, 0.136]

Notes: This table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric bandwidth that minimizes the coverage error probability (CER), which was calculated considering the total value of public contracts granted to contributing firms. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A6. Robustness to similarity of candidates around the vote margin cut off for optimal symmetric CER-SUM-optimal bandwidth (p-value of non-parametric mean comparison test of characteristics of elected versus runner-up candidates)

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	All	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low	High		
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
<i>Candidate's characteristics</i>									
Age	0.607	0.658	0.486	0.617	0.127	0.563	0.886	0.235	0.347
Gender (male)	0.506	0.704	0.304	0.515	0.114	0.294	0.759	0.132	0.383
Educational background: elementary school	0.381	0.410	0.549	0.944	0.268	0.684	0.677	0.184	0.702
Educational background: high school	0.479	0.997	0.489	0.609	0.643	0.429	0.804	0.551	0.276
Educational background: higher education	0.201	0.553	0.278	0.603	0.214	0.653	0.940	0.580	0.188
Civil state: married	0.128	0.225	0.344	0.428	0.197	0.327	0.963	0.515	0.240
Civil state: single	0.596	0.330	0.724	0.289	0.746	0.367	0.705	0.633	0.491
Civil state: divorced	0.020	0.011	0.493	0.068	0.160	0.043	0.839	0.092	0.490
Civil state: widower	0.559	0.087	0.709	0.084	0.488	0.104	0.391	0.649	0.499
Reported wealth (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.995	0.729	0.798	0.244	0.225	0.140	0.708	0.122	0.600
Share of campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions	0.495	0.487	0.805	0.157	0.554	0.868	0.017	0.400	0.173
Average contribution per contributing firm (in BRL) (ln)	0.576	0.946	0.667	0.641	0.237	0.342	0.050	0.425	0.068
Share of firms' contributions from firms that only donated to the candidate	0.800	0.865	0.798	0.689	0.913	0.963	0.418	0.834	0.889
Total campaign expenditure (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.544	0.662	0.734	0.666	0.579	0.646	0.728	0.819	0.631

Note: the table continues in the next page.

Table A6 [cont.]. Robustness to similarity of candidates around the vote margin cut off for optimal symmetric CER-SUM-optimal bandwidth (p-value of non-parametric mean comparison test of characteristics of elected versus runner-up candidates)

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	All	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
<i>Candidate's political party</i>									
Left-wing-party	0.641	0.541	0.916	0.261	0.720	0.185	0.952	0.587	0.964
Years of existence	0.503	0.697	0.603	0.985	0.478	0.591	0.567	0.354	0.743
Total campaign expenditure by all local party candidates (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.335	0.704	0.271	0.826	0.227	0.970	0.892	0.605	0.238
Total campaign expenditure by all party candidates statewide (in BRL000s) (ln)	0.226	0.406	0.401	0.681	0.205	0.783	0.604	0.258	0.450
Number of candidates in local legislative elections (ln)	0.497	0.589	0.782	0.467	0.925	0.546	0.591	0.930	0.876
Number candidates across all local executive elections statewide (ln)	0.427	0.297	0.838	0.806	0.391	0.531	0.952	0.383	0.666
Number of parties in coalition of local executive election (ln)	0.823	0.922	0.993	0.924	0.858	0.857	0.758	0.939	0.686
Number of parties in coalition of local legislative election (ln)	0.423	0.915	0.584	0.751	0.502	0.687	0.304	0.254	0.931
Party elected at least one candidate in previous local legislative election	0.977	0.230	0.291	0.746	0.828	0.392	0.217	0.433	0.915
Incumbent mayor's party in coalition	0.317	0.895	0.204	0.248	0.914	0.801	0.034	0.561	0.954
Incumbent governor's party in coalition	0.345	0.848	0.125	0.802	0.073	0.996	0.713	0.849	0.040
Next governor's party in coalition	0.536	0.506	0.729	0.661	0.745	0.830	0.626	0.721	0.877
Total observations	3430	1716	1714	1714	1716	976	738	740	976
Effective observations	1608	992	856	898	780	530	356	354	522
Symmetric MSE-SUM optimal bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.092, 0.092]	[-0.116, 0.116]	[-0.101, 0.101]	[-0.103, 0.103]	[-0.091, 0.091]	[-0.110, 0.110]	[-0.090, 0.090]	[-0.086, 0.086]	[-0.112, 0.112]

Notes: This table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric bandwidth that minimizes the sum of the coverage error probability of the confidence interval of the estimates (CER-SUM), which was calculated considering the total value of public contracts granted to contributing firms. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A7. Robustness to sanity check of additional returns provided by elected versus runner-up candidates (hypothesis H0) using different optimal bandwidth-selection algorithms.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)			Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)		
Elected candidate	1.155 [0.015]	1.077 [0.041]	1.112 [0.054]	1.026 [0.017]	0.936 [0.047]	0.981 [0.060]
Total observations	3430	3430	3430	3430	3430	3430
Effective observations	2196	1866	1608	2206	1908	1620
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.138,0.138]	[-0.110,0.110]	[-0.092,0.092]	[-0.139,0.139]	[-0.113,0.113]	[-0.092,0.092]
Bandwidth selection algorithm	MSE-SUM-optimal	CER-optimal	CER-SUM-optimal	MSE-SUM-optimal	CER-optimal	CER-SUM-optimal
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. All estimates use a sample within the respective bandwidths indicated above. The bandwidths were computed via MSE-SUM, CER, or CER-SUM-optimal bandwidth algorithms for the respective dependent variable considering a non-parametric specification without control variables. All columns report the results of a triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regressions. All columns report estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above. Candidates' and parties' characteristics are the same listed on Tables 1 and 2 in the main text.

Table A8. Robustness to assessment about hypotheses H1 and H2 (moderating effects of appointees in the government) using different optimal bandwidth-selection algorithms.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]	[12]
Dependent variables	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)						Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)					
Panel A: Moderating Effect of Experienced Appointees (hypothesis H1)												
Sample: Experienced appointees	Low			High			Low			High		
Elected candidate	0.877 [0.154]	0.381 [0.613]	0.397 [0.588]	1.753 [0.006]	1.643 [0.015]	1.648 [0.026]	0.810 [0.140]	0.321 [0.630]	0.344 [0.598]	1.556 [0.007]	1.451 [0.027]	1.442 [0.032]
Total obs.	1716	1716	1716	1714	1714	1714	1716	1716	1716	1714	1714	1714
Effective obs.	1272	954	992	1110	1004	856	1290	988	1026	1112	902	858
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.168, 0.168]	[-0.11, 0.11]	[-0.116, 0.116]	[-0.146, 0.146]	[-0.127, 0.127]	[-0.101, 0.101]	[-0.174, 0.174]	[-0.115, 0.115]	[-0.12, 0.12]	[-0.147, 0.147]	[-0.107, 0.107]	[-0.102, 0.102]
Panel B: Moderating Effect of Presence of Appointees with Decision-Making Power (hypothesis H2)												
Sample: Decision power via appointees	Low			High			Low			High		
Elected candidate	0.666 [0.284]	0.594 [0.422]	0.598 [0.404]	1.676 [0.016]	1.517 [0.062]	1.580 [0.062]	0.558 [0.324]	0.448 [0.507]	0.475 [0.468]	1.504 [0.018]	1.392 [0.057]	1.485 [0.055]
Total obs.	1714	1714	1714	1716	1716	1716	1714	1714	1714	1716	1716	1716
Effective obs.	1122	860	898	1070	852	780	1108	836	886	1070	870	780
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.149, 0.149]	[-0.096, 0.096]	[-0.103, 0.103]	[-0.132, 0.132]	[-0.098, 0.098]	[-0.091, 0.091]	[-0.144, 0.144]	[-0.094, 0.094]	[-0.099, 0.099]	[-0.131, 0.131]	[-0.101, 0.101]	[-0.091, 0.091]
Bandwidth selection algorithm	MSE-SUM-optimal	CER-optimal	CER-SUM-optimal	MSE-SUM-optimal	CER-optimal	CER-SUM-optimal	MSE-SUM-optimal	CER-optimal	CER-SUM-optimal	MSE-SUM-optimal	CER-optimal	CER-SUM-optimal
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. All estimates use a sample within the respective bandwidths indicated above. The bandwidths were computed via MSE-SUM, CER, or CER-SUM-optimal bandwidth algorithms for the respective dependent variable considering a non-parametric specification without control variables. All columns report the results of a triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regressions. All columns report estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above. Candidates' and parties' characteristics are the same listed on Tables 1 and 2 in the main text.

Table A9. Robustness to assessment about hypothesis H3 (complementarity between experienced appointees and Decision power via appointees in the government) using different optimal bandwidth-selection algorithms.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]	[12]
Experienced appointees		Low			High			Low			High	
Presence of appointees with decision power		Low			Low			High			High	
Panel A: Dependent Variable - Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)												
Elected candidate	0.960 [0.227]	0.816 [0.381]	0.791 [0.382]	0.168 [0.867]	-0.042 [0.970]	-0.057 [0.960]	0.042 [0.972]	0.299 [0.844]	0.055 [0.969]	2.759 [0.000]	2.624 [0.002]	2.562 [0.004]
Total obs.	976	976	976	738	738	738	740	740	740	976	976	976
Effective obs.	662	510	530	432	358	356	468	308	354	648	600	522
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.155, 0.155]	[-0.102, 0.102]	[-0.11, 0.11]	[-0.125, 0.125]	[-0.091, 0.091]	[-0.09, 0.09]	[-0.119, 0.119]	[-0.071, 0.071]	[-0.086, 0.086]	[-0.158, 0.158]	[-0.136, 0.136]	[-0.112, 0.112]
Panel B: Dependent Variable - Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)												
Elected candidate	0.792 [0.268]	0.656 [0.439]	0.624 [0.444]	0.161 [0.859]	-0.115 [0.910]	-0.114 [0.911]	0.152 [0.885]	0.457 [0.739]	0.154 [0.902]	2.445 [0.001]	2.440 [0.001]	2.280 [0.005]
Total obs.	976	976	976	738	738	738	740	740	740	976	976	976
Effective obs.	666	506	532	424	346	348	476	310	354	648	646	522
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.156, 0.156]	[-0.1, 0.1]	[-0.111, 0.111]	[-0.123, 0.123]	[-0.089, 0.089]	[-0.089, 0.089]	[-0.122, 0.122]	[-0.072, 0.072]	[-0.088, 0.088]	[-0.158, 0.158]	[-0.157, 0.157]	[-0.112, 0.112]
Bandwidth selection algorithm	MSE-SUM-optimal	CER-optimal	CER-SUM-optimal	MSE-SUM-optimal	CER-optimal	CER-SUM-optimal	MSE-SUM-optimal	CER-optimal	CER-SUM-optimal	MSE-SUM-optimal	CER-optimal	CER-SUM-optimal
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. All estimates use a sample within the respective bandwidths indicated above. The bandwidths were computed via MSE-SUM, CER, or CER-SUM-optimal bandwidth algorithms for the respective dependent variable considering a non-parametric specification without control variables. All columns report the results of a triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regressions. All columns report estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above. Candidates' and parties' characteristics are the same listed on Tables 1 and 2 in the main text.

Table A10. Robustness to sanity check of additional returns provided by elected versus runner-up candidates (hypothesis H0) using different polynomials and global specifications

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)			Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)		
Elected candidate	0.874 [0.178]	1.688 [0.000]	1.349 [0.007]	0.726 [0.211]	1.520 [0.000]	1.226 [0.007]
Total observations	3430	3430	3430	3430	3430	3430
Effective observations	2418	-	-	2468	-	-
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.165,0.165]	Global	Global	[-0.170,0.170]	Global	Global
Polynomial	2nd order	3rd order	4th order	2nd order	3rd order	4th order
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. All estimates use a sample within the respective bandwidths indicated above. The bandwidths were computed via the MSE-optimal bandwidth selection algorithm for the respective dependent variable considering a non-parametric specification without control variables. Columns 1 and 4 report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear parametric regressions using a second-order polynomial on the running variable and controlling for the covariates indicated above. The remaining columns report the results of global polynomial regressions in the entire sample, using high-order polynomials on the running variable and controlling for the covariates, as indicated above. Candidates' and parties' characteristics are the same listed on Tables 1 and 2 in the main text.

Table A11. Robustness to the assessment about hypotheses H1 and H2 (moderating effects of appointees in the government) using different polynomials and global specifications

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]	[12]
Dependent variables	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)						Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)					
Panel A: Moderating Effects of Experienced Appointees (hypothesis H1)												
Sample: Experienced appointees	Low			High			Low			High		
Elected candidate	0.141 [0.882]	1.016 [0.096]	0.906 [0.213]	1.422 [0.090]	2.334 [0.000]	1.889 [0.007]	0.075 [0.929]	0.878 [0.111]	0.810 [0.218]	1.357 [0.097]	2.130 [0.000]	1.712 [0.007]
Total obs.	1716	1716	1716	1714	1714	1714	1716	1716	1716	1714	1714	1714
Effective obs.	1240	-	-	1230	-	-	1264	-	-	1142	-	-
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.159, 0.159]	Global	Global	[-0.184, 0.184]	Global	Global	[-0.167, 0.167]	Global	Global	[-0.156, 0.156]	Global	Global
Panel B: Moderating Effects of Government Presence of Appointees with Decision-Making Power (hypothesis H2)												
Sample: Decision power via appointees	Low			High			Low			High		
Elected candidate	0.712 [0.444]	1.233 [0.033]	0.653 [0.342]	1.457 [0.152]	2.152 [0.000]	2.253 [0.002]	0.598 [0.480]	1.112 [0.033]	0.608 [0.326]	1.343 [0.143]	1.947 [0.000]	2.035 [0.003]
Total obs.	1714	1714	1714	1716	1716	1716	1714	1714	1714	1716	1716	1716
Effective obs.	1090	-	-	1134	-	-	1078	-	-	1154	-	-
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.139, 0.139]	Global	Global	[-0.143, 0.143]	Global	Global	[-0.136, 0.136]	Global	Global	[-0.147, 0.147]	Global	Global
Polynomial	2nd order	3rd order	4th order	2nd order	3rd order	4th order	2nd order	3rd order	4th order	2nd order	3rd order	4th order
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. All estimates use a sample within the respective bandwidths indicated above. The bandwidths were computed via the MSE-optimal bandwidth selection algorithm for the respective dependent variable considering a non-parametric specification without control variables. Columns 1, 4, 7, and 10 report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear parametric regressions using a second-order polynomial on the running variable and controlling for the covariates indicated above. The remaining columns report the results of global polynomial regression in the entire sample, using high-order polynomials on the running variable and controlling for the covariates, as indicated above. Candidates' and parties' characteristics are the same listed on Tables 1 and 2 in the main text.

Table A12. Robustness to the assessment about hypothesis H3 (complementarity between experienced appointees and presence of appointed with decision power in the government) using different polynomials and global specifications

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]	[12]
Experienced appointees		Low			High			Low			High	
Decision power via appointees		Low			Low			High			High	
Panel A: Dependent Variable - Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)												
Elected candidate	0.847 [0.480]	0.936 [0.232]	0.833 [0.366]	0.405 [0.784]	1.367 [0.123]	0.315 [0.770]	0.647 [0.759]	1.456 [0.158]	1.101 [0.409]	2.434 [0.021]	2.793 [0.000]	2.954 [0.002]
Total obs.	976	976	976	738	738	738	740	740	740	976	976	976
Effective obs.	632	-	-	434	-	-	398	-	-	710	-	-
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.143, 0.143]	Global	Global	[-0.126, 0.126]	Global	Global	[-0.099, 0.099]	Global	Global	[-0.192, 0.192]	Global	Global
Panel B: Dependent Variable - Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)												
Elected candidate	0.704 [0.518]	0.787 [0.266]	0.706 [0.396]	0.316 [0.814]	1.287 [0.105]	0.378 [0.696]	0.831 [0.661]	1.331 [0.154]	1.076 [0.374]	2.389 [0.008]	2.543 [0.000]	2.633 [0.002]
Total obs.	976	976	976	738	738	738	740	740	740	976	976	976
Effective obs.	630	-	-	422	-	-	400	-	-	760	-	-
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.142, 0.142]	Global	Global	[-0.123, 0.123]	Global	Global	[-0.100, 0.100]	Global	Global	[-0.221, 0.221]	Global	Global
Polynomial	2nd order	3rd order	4th order	2nd order	3rd order	4th order	2nd order	3rd order	4th order	2nd order	3rd order	4th order
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. All estimates use a sample within the respective bandwidths indicated above. The bandwidths were computed via the MSE-optimal bandwidth selection algorithm for the respective dependent variable considering a non-parametric specification without control variables. Columns 1, 4, 7, and 10 report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear parametric regressions using a second-order polynomial on the running variable and controlling for the covariates indicated above. The remaining columns report the results of global polynomial regression in the entire sample, using high-order polynomials on the running variable and controlling for the covariates, as indicated above. Candidates' and parties' characteristics are the same listed on Tables 1 and 2 in the main text.

Table A13. Parametric specification with interaction terms – Returns in terms of the total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)

	[1]	[2]	[3]
	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)		
Elected candidate	0.882 [0.084]	1.121 [0.025]	0.811 [0.165]
High experienced appointees	-0.108 [0.749]		-0.395 [0.404]
High decision power via appointees		-0.513 [0.131]	-0.863 [0.074]
High experienced appointees X High decision power via appointees			0.703 [0.297]
Elected candidate X High experienced appointees	0.921 [0.059]		0.685 [0.323]
Elected candidate X High decision power via appointees		0.465 [0.341]	0.172 [0.806]
Elected candidate X High experienced appointees X High decision power via appointees			0.384 [0.697]
Total observations	3,430	3,430	3,430
Effective observations	2,418	2,418	2,418
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.165,0.165]	[-0.165,0.165]	[-0.165,0.165]
Polynomial	1st order	1st order	1st order
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis use standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. All estimates use a sample within the respective bandwidths indicated above. The bandwidths were computed via the MSE-optimal bandwidth selection algorithm for the respective dependent variable considering a non-parametric specification without control variables. Candidates' and parties' characteristics are the same listed on Tables 1 and 2 in the main text. All specifications control for a first order polynomial of the running variable interacted with the elected dummy.

Table A14. Parametric specification with interaction terms – Returns in terms of the value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)

	[1]	[2]	[3]
	Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)		
Elected candidate	0.790 [0.084]	1.038 [0.020]	0.722 [0.167]
High experienced appointees	-0.139 [0.647]		-0.380 [0.367]
High decision power via appointees		-0.482 [0.115]	-0.776 [0.074]
High experienced appointees X High decision power via appointees			0.602 [0.318]
Elected candidate X High experienced appointees	0.890 [0.043]		0.699 [0.260]
Elected candidate X High decision power via appointees		0.414 [0.345]	0.163 [0.795]
Elected candidate X High experienced appointees X High decision power via appointees			0.306 [0.729]
Total observations	3,430	3,430	3,430
Effective observations	2,468	2,468	2,468
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.170,0.170]	[-0.170,0.170]	[-0.170,0.170]
Polynomial	1st order	1st order	1st order
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis use standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. All estimates use a sample within the respective bandwidths indicated above. The bandwidths were computed via the MSE-optimal bandwidth selection algorithm for the respective dependent variable considering a non-parametric specification without control variables. Candidates' and parties' characteristics are the same listed on Tables 1 and 2 in the main text. All specifications control for a first order polynomial of the running variable interacted with the elected dummy.

Table A15. Tests for the validity of the regression discontinuity design using an alternative operationalization of the running variable considering only the votes awarded to the top-2 candidates.

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	All	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
p-value of non-parametric mean comparison test of characteristics of elected versus non-elected candidates									
<i>Candidate's characteristics</i>									
Age	0.269	0.599	0.304	0.959	0.094	0.711	0.647	0.116	0.370
Gender (male)	0.465	0.537	0.562	0.668	0.134	0.422	0.585	0.075	0.753
Educational background: elementary school	0.309	0.504	0.521	0.975	0.199	0.683	0.582	0.181	0.854
Educational background: high school	0.778	0.872	0.658	0.970	0.770	0.704	0.733	0.568	0.344
Educational background: higher education	0.322	0.732	0.381	0.955	0.224	0.946	0.935	0.562	0.299
Civil state: married	0.235	0.358	0.676	0.799	0.213	0.446	0.564	0.418	0.443
Civil state: single	0.501	0.467	0.806	0.226	0.811	0.426	0.370	0.893	0.765
Civil state: divorced	0.026	0.062	0.326	0.114	0.153	0.101	0.594	0.138	0.440
Civil state: widower	0.566	0.136	0.774	0.156	0.579	0.127	0.727	0.895	0.580
Reported wealth (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.629	0.709	0.407	0.628	0.255	0.175	0.431	0.085	0.651
Share of campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions	0.268	0.312	0.562	0.123	0.891	0.755	0.022	0.412	0.341
Average contribution per contributing firm (in BRL) (ln)	0.808	0.714	0.984	0.478	0.640	0.528	0.046	0.372	0.202
Share of firms' contributions from firms that only donated to the candidate	0.972	0.962	0.899	0.714	0.899	0.918	0.281	0.849	0.758
Total campaign expenditure (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.425	0.775	0.445	0.621	0.523	0.729	0.660	0.750	0.515

Note: the table continues in the next page.

Table A15 [cont.]. Tests for the validity of the regression discontinuity design using an alternative operationalization of the running variable considering only the votes awarded to the top-2 candidates.

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	All	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
p-value of non-parametric mean comparison test of characteristics of elected versus non-elected candidates									
<i>Candidate's political party/coalition</i>									
Left-wing-party	0.793	0.610	0.965	0.348	0.709	0.420	0.743	0.825	0.787
Years of existence	0.481	0.871	0.616	0.644	0.270	0.474	0.836	0.266	0.774
Total campaign expenditure by all local party candidates (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.176	0.750	0.142	0.694	0.119	0.917	0.671	0.478	0.147
Total campaign expenditure by all party candidates statewide (in BRL000s) (ln)	0.254	0.399	0.394	0.699	0.210	0.690	0.868	0.315	0.340
Number of candidates in local legislative elections (ln)	0.404	0.442	0.655	0.457	0.637	0.463	0.816	0.691	0.665
Number candidates across all local executive elections statewide (ln)	0.354	0.188	0.855	0.792	0.305	0.356	0.633	0.392	0.458
Number of parties in coalition of local executive election (ln)	0.933	0.765	0.870	0.531	0.720	0.791	0.256	0.945	0.424
Number of parties in coalition of local legislative election (ln)	0.918	0.947	0.951	0.919	0.822	0.878	0.950	0.308	0.834
Party elected at least one candidate in previous local legislative election	0.809	0.382	0.592	0.966	0.605	0.563	0.433	0.324	0.914
Incumbent mayor's party in coalition	0.310	0.974	0.137	0.619	0.462	0.347	0.031	0.410	0.738
Incumbent governor's party in coalition	0.285	0.770	0.106	0.904	0.096	0.926	0.759	0.825	0.026
Next governor's party in coalition	0.483	0.395	0.700	0.644	0.634	0.842	0.611	0.797	0.686
Total observations	3430	1716	1714	1714	1716	976	738	740	976
Effective observations	2098	1198	1060	1124	1046	620	464	390	644
Symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.07, 0.07]	[-0.081, 0.081]	[-0.074, 0.074]	[-0.08, 0.08]	[-0.069, 0.069]	[-0.076, 0.076]	[-0.076, 0.076]	[-0.055, 0.055]	[-0.089, 0.089]

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. The running variable is the vote margin calculated exclusively using the number of votes awarded to the top-2 candidates (elected and runner-up). All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth, which was calculated considering the total value of public contracts granted to contributing firms, following the specifications reported in Table A16 (column 1), Table A17 (columns 1 and 3, panels A and B), and Table A18 (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 of Panel A). All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A16. Robustness to the assessment of baseline hypothesis (H0) using an alternative operationalization of the running variable considering only the votes awarded to the top-2 candidates.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Dependent variables	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)		Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)	
Elected candidate	0.958 [0.084]	1.155 [0.019]	0.872 [0.080]	1.026 [0.021]
Total observations	3430	3430	3430	3430
Effective observations	2098	2098	2116	2116
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.07,0.07]	[-0.07,0.07]	[-0.07,0.07]	[-0.07,0.07]
Estimation procedure	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes
Party's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes
State and year dummies	-	Yes	-	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. All local estimates use a sample within the bandwidth referred above. The running variable is the vote margin calculated exclusively using the number of votes awarded to the top-2 candidates (elected and runner-up). The bandwidths were computed via a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for each respective dependent variable considering the non-parametric specification without control variables (columns 1 and 3, respectively). All columns report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear estimations. Columns [1] and [3] report a first-order local non-parametric results. Columns [2] and [4] report estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above and listed on Tables 1 and 2.

Table A17. Robustness to the assessment of the hypotheses H1 and H2 using an alternative operationalization of the running variable considering only the votes awarded to the top-2 candidates.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Dependent variables	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)				Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)			
Panel A: Moderating Effects of Experienced Appointees (hypothesis H1)								
Sample: Experienced appointees	Low		High		Low		High	
Elected candidate	0.679 [0.350]	0.770 [0.236]	1.383 [0.070]	1.682 [0.010]	0.570 [0.392]	0.628 [0.295]	1.276 [0.062]	1.506 [0.011]
Total observations	1716	1716	1714	1714	1716	1716	1714	1714
Effective observations	1198	1198	1060	1060	1166	1166	1068	1068
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.081,0.081]	[-0.081,0.081]	[-0.074,0.074]	[-0.074,0.074]	[-0.079,0.079]	[-0.079,0.079]	[-0.076,0.076]	[-0.076,0.076]
Panel B: Moderating Effects of Decision-Making Power via Appointees (hypothesis H2)								
Sample: Decision power via appointees	Low		High		Low		High	
Elected candidate	0.586 [0.424]	0.693 [0.270]	1.371 [0.085]	1.650 [0.021]	0.531 [0.427]	0.584 [0.310]	1.231 [0.086]	1.472 [0.023]
Total observations	1714	1714	1716	1716	1714	1714	1716	1716
Effective observations	1124	1124	1046	1046	1096	1096	1054	1054
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.08,0.08]	[-0.08,0.08]	[-0.069,0.069]	[-0.069,0.069]	[-0.076,0.076]	[-0.076,0.076]	[-0.07,0.07]	[-0.07,0.07]
Estimation procedure	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Party's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
State and year dummies	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. All local estimates use a sample within bandwidths referred above. The running variable is the vote margin calculated exclusively using the number of votes awarded to the top-2 candidates (elected and runner-up). The bandwidths were computed via a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for each respective dependent variable and subsample using the non-parametric specifications (reported in odd columns). All columns report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regressions. Odd columns report a first-order local non-parametric results. Even columns report estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above and listed on Tables 1 and 2.

Table A18. Robustness to the assessment of the hypothesis H3 using an alternative operationalization of the running variable considering only the votes awarded to the top-2 candidates.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Experienced appointees		Low		High		Low		High
Decision power via appointees		Low		Low		High		High
Panel A: Dependent Variable - Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)								
Elected candidate	0.823 [0.410]	0.980 [0.238]	0.210 [0.853]	0.315 [0.744]	-0.199 [0.890]	0.128 [0.923]	2.327 [0.014]	2.656 [0.001]
Total observations	976	976	738	738	740	740	976	976
Effective observations	620	620	464	464	390	390	644	644
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.076,0.076]	[-0.076,0.076]	[-0.076,0.076]	[-0.076,0.076]	[-0.055,0.055]	[-0.055,0.055]	[-0.089,0.089]	[-0.089,0.089]
Panel B: Dependent Variable - Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)								
Elected candidate	0.686 [0.444]	0.816 [0.279]	0.338 [0.737]	0.416 [0.628]	-0.090 [0.945]	0.181 [0.881]	2.074 [0.014]	2.373 [0.001]
Total observations	976	976	738	738	740	740	976	976
Effective observations	618	618	472	472	390	390	658	658
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.075,0.075]	[-0.075,0.075]	[-0.079,0.079]	[-0.079,0.079]	[-0.055,0.055]	[-0.055,0.055]	[-0.093,0.093]	[-0.093,0.093]
Estimation procedure	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Party's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
State and year dummies	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. The running variable is the vote margin calculated exclusively using the number of votes awarded to the top-2 candidates (elected and runner-up). Panel A reports results about differences between marginally elected and runner-up candidates in the total value of public contracts to all their contributing firms. Panel B reports analogous results about the value of public contracts per contributing firm. All local estimates use samples within bandwidths referred above. The bandwidths were computed via a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for each respective dependent variable and subsample using the non-parametric specifications (reported in odd columns). All columns report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regressions. Odd columns report a first-order local non-parametric results. Even columns report estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above and listed on Tables 1 and 2

Table A19. Tests for the validity of the regression discontinuity design using alternative operationalizations of the variables assessing access to experienced appointees and to discretionary government control via appointees

Sample of candidates for mayor elections (based on alternative operationalizations of these variables)	All	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
p-value of non-parametric mean comparison test of characteristics of elected versus non-elected candidates									
<i>Candidate's characteristics</i>									
Age	0.673	0.506	0.950	0.188	0.620	0.861	0.793	0.451	0.673
Gender (male)	0.261	0.718	0.152	0.735	0.122	0.876	0.700	0.899	0.261
Educational background: elementary school	0.769	0.376	0.658	0.439	0.871	0.610	0.714	0.983	0.769
Educational background: high school	0.865	0.323	0.557	0.949	0.593	0.300	0.932	0.515	0.865
Educational background: higher education	0.955	0.120	0.400	0.526	0.689	0.193	0.827	0.516	0.955
Civil state: married	0.499	0.306	0.343	0.499	0.243	0.833	0.811	0.237	0.499
Civil state: single	0.537	0.705	0.099	0.507	0.844	0.053	0.433	0.247	0.537
Civil state: divorced	0.152	0.074	0.001	0.978	0.168	0.011	0.556	0.808	0.152
Civil state: widower	0.317	0.919	0.103	0.731	0.334	0.131	0.477	0.338	0.317
Reported wealth (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.631	0.635	0.735	0.628	0.253	0.493	0.938	0.769	0.631
Share of campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions	0.112	0.596	0.502	0.678	0.528	0.447	0.091	0.333	0.112
Average contribution per contributing firm (in BRL) (ln)	0.446	0.450	0.642	0.647	0.813	0.650	0.707	0.176	0.446
Share of firms' contributions from firms that only donated to the candidate	0.961	0.715	0.625	0.935	0.921	0.501	0.981	0.925	0.961
Total campaign expenditure (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.926	0.266	0.806	0.463	0.511	0.461	0.705	0.554	0.926

Note: the table continues in the next page.

Table A19 [cont.]. Tests for the validity of the regression discontinuity design using alternative operationalizations of the variables assessing access to experienced appointees and to discretionary government control via appointees

Sample of candidates for mayor elections (based on alternative operationalizations of these variables)	All	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
p-value of non-parametric mean comparison test of characteristics of elected versus non-elected candidates									
<i>Candidate's political party/coalition</i>									
Left-wing-party	0.528	0.471	0.642	0.536	0.156	0.259	0.481	0.076	0.528
Years of existence	0.404	0.688	0.670	0.374	0.805	0.568	0.298	0.677	0.404
Total campaign expenditure by all local party candidates (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.626	0.177	0.974	0.087	0.792	0.982	0.365	0.079	0.626
Total campaign expenditure by all party candidates statewide (in BRL000s) (ln)	0.226	0.636	0.397	0.417	0.327	0.904	0.419	0.747	0.226
Number of candidates in local legislative elections (ln)	0.623	0.665	0.483	0.814	0.200	0.932	0.739	0.651	0.623
Number candidates across all local executive elections statewide (ln)	0.135	0.891	0.545	0.449	0.314	0.850	0.259	0.822	0.135
Number of parties in coalition of local executive election (ln)	0.773	0.646	0.085	0.278	0.358	0.122	0.288	0.456	0.773
Number of parties in coalition of local legislative election (ln)	0.890	0.937	0.171	0.110	0.370	0.363	0.353	0.290	0.890
Party elected at least one candidate in previous local legislative election	0.867	0.736	0.954	0.801	0.543	0.417	0.304	0.603	0.867
Incumbent mayor's party in coalition	0.479	0.767	0.114	0.007	0.138	0.763	0.025	0.223	0.479
Incumbent governor's party in coalition	0.744	0.492	0.342	0.967	0.555	0.647	0.798	0.337	0.744
Next governor's party in coalition	0.279	0.832	0.675	0.388	0.602	0.898	0.352	0.859	0.279
Total observations	1532	1898	1714	1716	690	1024	842	874	1532
Effective observations	954	1224	1068	1158	530	562	436	654	954
Symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.123, 0.123]	[-0.15, 0.15]	[-0.136, 0.136]	[-0.145, 0.145]	[-0.203, 0.203]	[-0.112, 0.112]	[-0.092, 0.092]	[-0.212, 0.212]	[-0.123, 0.123]

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. High versus low access to experienced appointees is assessed using the median-split in terms of the average experience in the government across all appointees. High versus low access to discretionary government control via appointees is assessed using the median-split of the proportion of political appointees in the highest decile of the wage distribution within the local government. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth, which was calculated considering the total value of public contracts granted to contributing firms, following the specifications reported in Table A16 (column 1), Table A17 (columns 1 and 3, panels A and B), and Table A18 (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 of Panel A). All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A20. Robustness to the assessment of the hypotheses H1 and H2 using alternative operationalizations of the variables assessing access to experienced appointees and to discretionary government control via appointees

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Dependent variables	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)				Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)			
Panel A: Moderating Effects of Experienced Appointees (hypothesis H1)								
Experienced appointees	Low		High		Low		High	
Elected candidate	0.137 [0.871]	0.270 [0.721]	1.572 [0.024]	1.758 [0.004]	0.147 [0.847]	0.241 [0.725]	1.368 [0.032]	1.513 [0.007]
Total observations	1532	1532	1898	1898	1532	1532	1898	1898
Effective observations	954	954	1224	1224	954	954	1202	1202
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.123,0.123]	[-0.123,0.123]	[-0.15,0.15]	[-0.15,0.15]	[-0.123,0.123]	[-0.123,0.123]	[-0.143,0.143]	[-0.143,0.143]
Panel B: Moderating Effects of Decision-Making Power via Appointees (hypothesis H2)								
Decision power via appointees	Low		High		Low		High	
Elected candidate	0.708 [0.349]	0.644 [0.324]	1.256 [0.090]	1.433 [0.030]	0.542 [0.435]	0.450 [0.455]	1.217 [0.067]	1.344 [0.024]
Total observations	1714	1714	1716	1716	1714	1714	1716	1716
Effective observations	1068	1068	1158	1158	1022	1022	1172	1172
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.136,0.136]	[-0.136,0.136]	[-0.145,0.145]	[-0.145,0.145]	[-0.128,0.128]	[-0.128,0.128]	[-0.15,0.15]	[-0.15,0.15]
Estimation procedure	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Party's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
State and year dummies	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. High versus low access to experienced appointees is assessed using the median-split in terms of the average experience in the government across all appointees. High versus low access to discretionary government control via appointees is assessed using the median-split of the proportion of political appointees in the highest decile of the wage distribution within the local government. All local estimates use a sample within bandwidths referred above. The bandwidths were computed via a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for each respective dependent variable and subsample using the non-parametric specifications (reported in odd columns). All columns report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regressions. Odd columns report a first-order local non-parametric results. Even columns report estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above and listed on Tables 1 and 2.

Table A21. Robustness to the assessment of the hypothesis H3 using alternative operationalizations of the variables assessing access to experienced appointees and to discretionary government control via appointees

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Experienced appointees		Low		High		Low		High
Decision power via appointees		Low		Low		High		High
Panel A: Dependent Variable - Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)								
Elected candidate	1.096 [0.275]	1.276 [0.137]	0.646 [0.541]	0.680 [0.449]	-0.852 [0.516]	-0.868 [0.448]	2.506 [0.006]	2.752 [0.000]
Total observations	690	690	1024	1024	842	842	874	874
Effective observations	530	530	562	562	436	436	654	654
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.203,0.203]	[-0.203,0.203]	[-0.112,0.112]	[-0.112,0.112]	[-0.092,0.092]	[-0.092,0.092]	[-0.212,0.212]	[-0.212,0.212]
Panel B: Dependent Variable - Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)								
Elected candidate	0.881 [0.343]	1.048 [0.189]	0.541 [0.573]	0.542 [0.509]	-0.581 [0.624]	-0.671 [0.519]	2.313 [0.007]	2.492 [0.001]
Total observations	690	690	1024	1024	842	842	874	874
Effective observations	504	504	548	548	436	436	628	628
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.184,0.184]	[-0.184,0.184]	[-0.108,0.108]	[-0.108,0.108]	[-0.094,0.094]	[-0.094,0.094]	[-0.197,0.197]	[-0.197,0.197]
Estimation procedure	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Party's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
State and year dummies	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. High versus low access to experienced appointees is assessed using the median-split in terms of the average experience in the government across all appointees. High versus low access to discretionary government control via appointees is assessed using the median-split of the proportion of political appointees in the highest decile of the wage distribution within the local government. Panel A reports results about differences between marginally elected and runner-up candidates in the total value of public contracts to all their contributing firms. Panel B reports analogous results about the value of public contracts per contributing firm. All local estimates use samples within bandwidths referred above. The bandwidths were computed via a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for each respective dependent variable and subsample using the non-parametric specifications (reported in odd columns). All columns report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regressions. Odd columns report a first-order local non-parametric results. Even columns report estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above and listed on Tables 1 and 2

Table A22. Tests for the validity of the regression discontinuity design using experience of appointed candidates with discretionary control over the government

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Experienced appointees with high-level managerial positions in government		Appointees amongst experienced and high-level managers	
	Low	High	Low	High
<i>Candidate's characteristics</i>				
Age	0.638	0.505	0.714	0.716
Gender (male)	0.575	0.142	0.899	0.050
Educational background: elementary school	0.989	0.306	0.875	0.602
Educational background: high school	0.584	0.876	0.583	0.151
Educational background: higher education	0.622	0.378	0.702	0.087
Civil state: married	0.424	0.664	0.326	0.770
Civil state: single	0.664	0.665	0.686	0.558
Civil state: divorced	0.216	0.185	0.098	0.498
Civil state: widower	0.194	0.625	0.386	0.785
Reported wealth (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.798	0.791	0.912	0.780
Share of campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions	0.205	0.919	0.676	0.281
Average contribution per contributing firm (in BRL) (ln)	0.566	0.658	0.739	0.994
Share of firms' contributions from firms that only donated to the candidate	0.365	0.691	0.626	0.807
Total campaign expenditure (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.738	0.656	0.864	0.362

Note: the table continues in the next page.

Table A22 [cont.]. Tests for the validity of the regression discontinuity design using experience of appointed candidates with discretionary control over the government

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Experienced appointees with high-level managerial positions in government		Appointees amongst experienced and high-level managers	
	Low	High	Low	High
<i>Candidate's political party/coalition</i>				
Left-wing-party	0.565	0.410	0.841	0.141
Years of existence	0.372	0.395	0.813	0.996
Total campaign expenditure by all local party candidates (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.831	0.108	0.506	0.213
Total campaign expenditure by all party candidates statewide (in BRL000s) (ln)	0.371	0.431	0.217	0.624
Number of candidates in local legislative elections (ln)	0.572	0.526	0.758	0.283
Number candidates across all local executive elections statewide (ln)	0.210	0.870	0.033	0.500
Number of parties in coalition of local executive election (ln)	0.259	0.696	0.234	0.703
Number of parties in coalition of local legislative election (ln)	0.664	0.819	0.719	0.796
Party elected at least one candidate in previous local legislative election	0.721	0.925	0.789	0.865
Incumbent mayor's party in coalition	0.878	0.149	0.579	0.167
Incumbent governor's party in coalition	0.629	0.750	0.226	0.834
Next governor's party in coalition	0.800	0.193	0.747	0.214
Total observations	1716	1714	1716	1714
Effective observations	1272	1188	1334	1322
Symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.181,0.181]	[-0.157,0.157]	[-0.198,0.198]	[-0.201,0.201]

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. High versus low access to experienced appointees with high-level managerial positions in government is assessed using the median-split of the proportion of government staff comprised of political appointees that have at least 4 years of government-specific experience and occupy a high-level managerial position. High versus low access to appointees amongst those experienced and high-level managers is assessed using the median-split of the proportion of experienced and high-level managers that is comprised of political appointees. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth, which was calculated considering the total value of public contracts granted to contributing firms, following the specifications reported in Table A23 (columns 1 and 3, panels A and B). All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A23. Robustness to the assessment of the value of the experience of appointed candidates with decision power in the government

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Dependent variables	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)				Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)			
Panel A: Moderating Effects of Experienced appointees with High-level Managerial Positions in Government								
Sample: Experienced appointees with high-level managerial positions in government	Low		High		Low		High	
Elected candidate	0.762 [0.258]	0.916 [0.115]	1.523 [0.033]	1.786 [0.005]	0.709 [0.244]	0.816 [0.124]	1.717 [0.003]	1.921 [0.000]
Total observations	1716	1716	1714	1714	1716	1716	1714	1714
Effective observations	1272	1272	1188	1188	1260	1260	1316	1316
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.181, 0.181]	[-0.181, 0.181]	[-0.157, 0.157]	[-0.157, 0.157]	[-0.177, 0.177]	[-0.177, 0.177]	[-0.2, 0.2]	[-0.2, 0.2]
Panel B: Moderating Effects of Appointees Amongst Experienced and High-level Managers								
Sample: Appointees amongst experienced and high-level managers	Low		High		Low		High	
Elected candidate	0.742 [0.251]	0.983 [0.084]	1.976 [0.002]	2.209 [0.000]	0.681 [0.244]	0.876 [0.092]	1.494 [0.021]	1.644 [0.004]
Total observations	1716	1716	1714	1714	1716	1716	1714	1714
Effective observations	1334	1334	1322	1322	1330	1330	1162	1162
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.198, 0.198]	[-0.198, 0.198]	[-0.201, 0.201]	[-0.201, 0.201]	[-0.196, 0.196]	[-0.196, 0.196]	[-0.152, 0.152]	[-0.152, 0.152]
Estimation procedure	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Party's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
State and year dummies	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. High versus low access to experienced appointees with high-level managerial positions in government is assessed using the median-split of the proportion of government staff comprised of political appointees that have at least 4 years of government-specific experience and occupy a high-level managerial position. High versus low access to appointees amongst those experienced and high-level managers is assessed using the median-split of the proportion of experienced and high-level managers that is comprised of political appointees. All local estimates use a sample within bandwidths referred above. The bandwidths were computed via a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for each respective dependent variable and subsample using the non-parametric specifications (reported in odd columns). All columns report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regressions. Odd columns report a first-order local non-parametric results. Even columns report estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above and listed on Tables 1 and 2.

Table A24. Tests for the validity of the regression discontinuity design using measures of human capital resources assessed in the election year

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	All	Experienced appointees in election year		Decision power via appointees in election year		Decision power via appointees in election year			
		Low	High	Low	High	Experienced appointees in election year		Low	High
						Low	High		
<i>Candidate's characteristics</i>									
Age	0.433	0.364	0.762	0.838	0.186	0.541	0.167	0.518	0.168
Gender (male)	0.191	0.443	0.013	0.594	0.024	0.106	0.234	0.350	0.030
Educational background: elementary school	0.443	0.828	0.168	0.670	0.568	0.831	0.711	0.455	0.161
Educational background: high school	0.585	0.877	0.518	0.922	0.455	0.883	0.447	0.575	0.780
Educational background: higher education	0.291	0.987	0.118	0.688	0.273	0.982	0.339	0.996	0.214
Civil state: married	0.367	0.088	0.800	0.387	0.776	0.052	0.465	0.707	0.371
Civil state: single	0.517	0.490	0.925	0.362	0.963	0.732	0.223	0.415	0.477
Civil state: divorced	0.061	0.021	0.437	0.030	0.642	0.034	0.132	0.480	0.853
Civil state: widower	0.639	0.321	0.419	0.299	0.894	0.162	0.517	0.861	0.562
Reported wealth (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.966	0.938	0.998	0.341	0.388	0.991	0.044	0.851	0.140
Share of campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions	0.416	0.058	0.347	0.227	0.900	0.306	0.493	0.078	0.101
Average contribution per contributing firm (in BRL) (ln)	0.973	0.916	0.942	0.885	0.946	0.755	0.434	0.688	0.659
Share of firms' contributions from firms that only donated to the candidate	0.834	0.821	0.846	0.214	0.500	0.495	0.156	0.740	0.591
Total campaign expenditure (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.578	0.952	0.395	0.895	0.475	0.938	0.903	0.815	0.302

Note: the table continues in the next page.

Table A24 [cont.]. Tests for the validity of the regression discontinuity design using measures of human capital resources assessed in the election year

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	All	Experienced appointees in election year		Decision power via appointees in election year		Decision power via appointees in election year			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Experienced appointees in election year			
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
<i>Candidate's political party</i>									
Left-wing-party	0.353	0.681	0.131	0.194	0.889	0.955	0.074	0.579	0.561
Years of existence	0.909	0.830	0.654	0.299	0.331	0.538	0.844	0.462	0.505
Total campaign expenditure by all local party candidates (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.212	0.532	0.290	0.629	0.211	0.982	0.841	0.510	0.257
Total campaign expenditure by all party candidates statewide (in BRL000s) (ln)	0.232	0.430	0.416	0.560	0.263	0.807	0.656	0.302	0.501
Number of candidates in local legislative elections (ln)	0.409	0.493	0.894	0.561	0.545	0.689	0.850	0.655	0.751
Number candidates across all local executive elections statewide (ln)	0.322	0.409	0.718	0.557	0.421	0.533	0.795	0.592	0.515
Number of parties in coalition of local executive election (ln)	0.652	0.855	0.792	0.186	0.532	0.457	0.383	0.635	0.679
Number of parties in coalition of local legislative election (ln)	0.932	0.945	0.754	0.959	0.897	0.886	0.771	0.714	0.559
Party elected at least one candidate in previous local legislative election	0.797	0.683	0.911	0.649	0.939	0.598	0.791	0.977	0.964
Incumbent mayor's party in coalition	0.279	0.987	0.186	0.299	0.588	0.783	0.011	0.386	0.870
Incumbent governor's party in coalition	0.534	0.701	0.534	0.582	0.747	0.398	0.814	0.506	0.364
Next governor's party in coalition	0.301	0.269	0.983	0.518	0.416	0.300	0.380	0.634	0.537
Total observations	3430	1708	1722	1708	1722	1048	660	660	1062
Effective observations	2418	1086	1140	1214	1232	644	436	476	706
Symmetric MSE-SUM optimal bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.165, 0.165]	[-0.129, 0.129]	[-0.151, 0.151]	[-0.168, 0.168]	[-0.168, 0.168]	[-0.129, 0.129]	[-0.15, 0.15]	[-0.155, 0.155]	[-0.152, 0.152]

Notes: This table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth, which was calculated considering the total value of public contracts granted to contributing firms. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A25. Robustness to the assessment of the hypotheses H1 and H2 using operationalizations of the variables assessing access to experienced appointees and to discretionary government control via appointees as measured in the election year

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)				Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)			
Panel A: Moderating Effects of Experienced Appointees in Election Year								
Experienced staff in election year	Low		High		Low		High	
Elected candidate	0.325 [0.673]	0.668 [0.309]	1.670 [0.017]	1.767 [0.005]	0.318 [0.647]	0.590 [0.323]	1.621 [0.006]	1.704 [0.001]
Total observations	1708	1708	1722	1722	1708	1708	1722	1722
Effective observations	1086	1086	1232	1232	1086	1086	1334	1334
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.129, 0.129]	[-, 0.129]	[-, 0.168]	[-, 0.168]	[-, 0.128]	[-, 0.128]	[-, 0.195]	[-, 0.195]
Panel B: Moderating Effects of Government Presence of Appointees with Decision-Making Power in Election Year								
Decision power via appointees in election year	Low		High		Low		High	
Elected candidate	0.667 [0.336]	0.826 [0.160]	1.256 [0.090]	1.433 [0.030]	0.544 [0.394]	0.634 [0.244]	1.217 [0.067]	1.344 [0.024]
Total observations	1708	1708	1716	1716	1708	1708	1716	1716
Effective observations	1214	1214	1158	1158	1176	1176	1172	1172
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.168, 0.168]	[-0.168, 0.168]	[-0.145, 0.145]	[-0.145, 0.145]	[-0.159, 0.159]	[-0.159, 0.159]	[-0.15, 0.15]	[-0.15, 0.15]
	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric
Estimation procedure	c							
Candidate's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Party's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Municipality and year dummies	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Split-samples based on government officials employed in the year of the election. The bandwidths were computed via a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for each respective dependent variable and subsample using the non-parametric specifications (reported in odd columns). All columns report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regressions. Odd columns report a first-order local non-parametric results. Even columns report estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above and listed on Tables 1 and 2.

Table A26. Robustness to the assessment of hypothesis H3 using operationalizations of the variables assessing access to experienced appointees and to discretionary government control via appointees as measured in the election year

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
	Decision power via appointees in election year							
	Low				High			
	Experience of appointees in election year				Experience of appointees in election year			
	Low		High		Low		High	
	Panel A: Dependent Variable - Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)							
Elected candidate	-0.471 [0.628]	-0.401 [0.605]	1.813 [0.140]	1.603 [0.117]	1.636 [0.167]	2.251 [0.029]	1.516 [0.099]	1.446 [0.071]
Total observations	1048	1048	660	660	660	660	1062	1062
Effective observations	644	644	436	436	476	476	706	706
Bandwidth of the running variable	[- 0.129,0.129]	[- 0.129,0.129]	[- 0.15,0.15]	[- 0.15,0.15]	[- 0.155,0.155]	[- 0.155,0.155]	[- 0.152,0.152]	[- 0.152,0.152]
	Panel B: Dependent Variable - Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)							
Elected candidate	-0.446 [0.611]	-0.420 [0.552]	1.757 [0.094]	1.538 [0.081]	1.569 [0.138]	2.084 [0.024]	1.315 [0.109]	1.280 [0.078]
Total observations	1048	1048	660	660	660	660	1062	1062
Effective observations	644	644	454	454	476	476	712	712
Bandwidth of the running variable	[- 0.129,0.129]	[- 0.129,0.129]	[- 0.16,0.16]	[- 0.16,0.16]	[- 0.155,0.155]	[- 0.155,0.155]	[- 0.156,0.156]	[- 0.156,0.156]
Estimation procedure	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric	Local non-parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Party's characteristics	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
State and year dummies	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Split-samples based on government officials employed in the year of the election. The bandwidths were computed via a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for each respective dependent variable and subsample using the non-parametric specifications (reported in odd columns). All columns report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regressions. Odd columns report a first-order local non-parametric results.

Table A27. Descriptive statistics (mean) of extensive margin and range of returns across candidates

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Full sample	Experienced staff		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Experienced staff			
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
<i>at least one contributing firm received a contract</i>									
Runner-up candidates	0.380	0.389	0.370	0.383	0.376	0.398	0.363	0.378	0.375
Elected candidates	0.508	0.491	0.525	0.496	0.520	0.492	0.501	0.489	0.543
All candidates	0.444	0.440	0.447	0.439	0.448	0.445	0.432	0.434	0.459
<i>share of contributing firms receiving a contract</i>									
Runner-up candidates	0.194	0.206	0.181	0.195	0.192	0.214	0.170	0.196	0.189
Elected candidates	0.253	0.254	0.251	0.243	0.263	0.250	0.232	0.259	0.266
All candidates	0.223	0.230	0.216	0.219	0.227	0.232	0.201	0.228	0.227
<i>minimum value of public contracts to a contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)</i>									
Runner-up candidates	3.644	3.799	3.489	3.654	3.635	3.847	3.397	3.735	3.559
Elected candidates	5.160	5.005	5.314	5.094	5.225	5.052	5.151	4.944	5.438
All candidates	4.402	4.402	4.402	4.374	4.430	4.450	4.274	4.340	4.498
<i>maximum value of public contracts to a contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)</i>									
Runner-up candidates	4.244	4.309	4.179	4.287	4.200	4.415	4.118	4.169	4.225
Elected candidates	6.204	5.895	6.513	6.090	6.317	5.944	6.283	5.830	6.686
All candidates	5.224	5.102	5.346	5.189	5.259	5.180	5.200	4.999	5.455

Note: the values are the average levels of each variable within the samples of runner-up candidates, elected candidates, and all candidates.

Table A28. Assessment of the extensive margin of returns provided by elected candidates relative to runner-up candidates

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Full sample	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Panel A: Dependent variable - at least one contributing firm received a contract									
Elected candidate	0.0728	0.0215	0.126	0.0179	0.126	0.0508	-0.0342	-0.0667	0.228
	[0.052]	[0.687]	[0.014]	[0.732]	[0.021]	[0.448]	[0.681]	[0.537]	[0.000]
<i>Effective observations</i>	2370	1210	1140	1108	1178	632	438	402	710
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.157, 0.157]	[-0.156, 0.156]	[-0.155, 0.155]	[-0.144, 0.144]	[-0.152, 0.152]	[-0.142, 0.142]	[-0.128, 0.128]	[-0.102, 0.102]	[-0.193, 0.193]
Panel B: Dependent variable - share of contributing firms receiving a contract									
Elected candidate	0.0311	0.00683	0.0538	-0.0182	0.095	-0.0165	-0.00876	0.037	0.109
	[0.262]	[0.852]	[0.161]	[0.622]	[0.006]	[0.727]	[0.869]	[0.579]	[0.022]
<i>Effective observations</i>	2148	1206	1032	1008	1346	610	438	484	646
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.134, 0.134]	[-0.156, 0.156]	[-0.133, 0.133]	[-0.124, 0.124]	[-0.199, 0.199]	[-0.132, 0.132]	[-0.13, 0.13]	[-0.128, 0.128]	[-0.155, 0.155]
Total observations	3430	1716	1714	1714	1716	976	738	740	976
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. The dependent variables used are as indicated in Panels A and B. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A29. Assessment of the range of potential returns provided by elected candidates relative to runner-up candidates

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Full sample	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Panel A: Dependent variable - minimum value of public contracts to a contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	0.914	0.695	1.501	0.387	1.504	0.645	0.14	-0.296	2.509
	[0.028]	[0.175]	[0.007]	[0.492]	[0.010]	[0.367]	[0.873]	[0.802]	[0.000]
<i>Effective observations</i>	2226	1386	1088	1076	1176	628	422	400	668
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.141, 0.141]	[-0.199, 0.199]	[-0.141, 0.141]	[-0.135, 0.135]	[-0.151, 0.151]	[-0.139, 0.139]	[-0.123, 0.123]	[-0.1, 0.1]	[-0.169, 0.169]
Panel B: Dependent variable - maximum value of public contracts to a contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	1.311	0.678	1.888	0.603	1.701	0.855	0.217	-0.106	2.821
	[0.003]	[0.296]	[0.002]	[0.346]	[0.013]	[0.296]	[0.829]	[0.936]	[0.000]
<i>Effective observations</i>	2398	1190	1172	1090	1130	632	432	400	694
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.163, 0.163]	[-0.153, 0.153]	[-0.167, 0.167]	[-0.139, 0.139]	[-0.141, 0.141]	[-0.143, 0.143]	[-0.125, 0.125]	[-0.101, 0.101]	[-0.181, 0.181]
Total observations	3430	1716	1714	1714	1716	976	738	740	976
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. The dependent variables used are as indicated in Panels A and B. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A30. Assessment of the potential intensity of returns provided by elected candidates relative to runner-up candidates to "loyal" firms

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Full sample	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Panel A: Dependent variable - total value of public contracts to "loyal" contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	0.982	0.368	1.744	0.577	1.731	0.448	0.344	0.319	2.752
	[0.051]	[0.595]	[0.007]	[0.335]	[0.015]	[0.585]	[0.723]	[0.817]	[0.001]
<i>Effective observations</i>	1974	1070	1068	1166	1014	604	448	366	624
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.126, 0.126]	[-0.14, 0.14]	[-0.148, 0.148]	[-0.173, 0.173]	[-0.13, 0.13]	[-0.149, 0.149]	[-0.139, 0.139]	[-0.098, 0.098]	[-0.164, 0.164]
Panel B: Dependent variable - value of public contracts per "loyal" contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	0.898	0.308	1.643	0.452	1.61	0.329	0.363	0.363	2.545
	[0.049]	[0.625]	[0.004]	[0.416]	[0.013]	[0.659]	[0.680]	[0.773]	[0.000]
<i>Effective observations</i>	1992	1068	1092	1118	1022	598	444	368	636
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.128, 0.128]	[-0.139, 0.139]	[-0.154, 0.154]	[-0.16, 0.16]	[-0.133, 0.133]	[-0.145, 0.145]	[-0.137, 0.137]	[-0.099, 0.099]	[-0.172, 0.172]
Total observations	3234	1604	1630	1616	1618	908	708	696	922
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent variables use information about firms that donated only to the winning candidate or only to losing candidates.

TABLE A31. Assessment of the extensive margin of returns provided by elected candidates relative to runner-up candidates to "loyal" firms

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Full sample	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Panel A: Dependent variable - at least one "loyal" contributing firm received a contract									
Elected candidate	0.0589	0.011	0.13	0.00784	0.119	0.0245	-0.0242	-0.0365	0.216
	[0.142]	[0.846]	[0.008]	[0.881]	[0.039]	[0.720]	[0.768]	[0.751]	[0.001]
<i>Effective observations</i>	2122	1106	1188	1092	1062	600	450	374	672
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.141, 0.141]	[-0.15, 0.15]	[-0.19, 0.19]	[-0.154, 0.154]	[-0.14, 0.14]	[-0.146, 0.146]	[-0.14, 0.14]	[-0.102, 0.102]	[-0.193, 0.193]
Panel B: Dependent variable - share of "loyal" contributing firms receiving a contract									
Elected candidate	0.0313	-0.00691	0.059	-0.0169	0.076	-0.0396	0.0192	0.0265	0.104
	[0.237]	[0.859]	[0.109]	[0.634]	[0.054]	[0.410]	[0.699]	[0.716]	[0.030]
<i>Effective observations</i>	2192	1100	1032	1004	1134	560	462	452	614
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.151, 0.151]	[-0.149, 0.149]	[-0.139, 0.139]	[-0.132, 0.132]	[-0.157, 0.157]	[-0.126, 0.126]	[-0.144, 0.144]	[-0.126, 0.126]	[-0.153, 0.153]
Total observations	3234	1604	1630	1616	1618	908	708	696	922
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent variables use information about firms that donated only to the winning candidate or only to losing candidates.

TABLE A32. Assessment of the range of returns provided by elected candidates relative to runner-up candidates to "loyal" firms

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Full sample	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Panel A: Dependent variable - minimum value of public contracts to a "loyal" contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	0.940	0.191	1.694	0.331	1.687	0.317	0.360	0.146	2.724
	[0.029]	[0.760]	[0.002]	[0.552]	[0.005]	[0.663]	[0.674]	[0.906]	[0.000]
<i>Effective observations</i>	2104	1074	1088	1062	1092	594	442	374	658
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.14, 0.14]	[-0.14, 0.14]	[-0.153, 0.153]	[-0.146, 0.146]	[-0.146, 0.146]	[-0.142, 0.142]	[-0.135, 0.135]	[-0.102, 0.102]	[-0.186, 0.186]
Panel B: Dependent variable - maximum value of public contracts to a "loyal" contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	0.961	0.357	1.751	0.575	1.702	0.4	0.383	0.273	2.736
	[0.060]	[0.608]	[0.007]	[0.341]	[0.018]	[0.630]	[0.696]	[0.844]	[0.001]
<i>Effective observations</i>	1966	1078	1066	1166	1010	604	444	372	618
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.125, 0.125]	[-0.142, 0.142]	[-0.146, 0.146]	[-0.173, 0.173]	[-0.129, 0.129]	[-0.149, 0.149]	[-0.138, 0.138]	[-0.1, 0.1]	[-0.16, 0.16]
Total observations	3234	1604	1630	1616	1618	908	708	696	922
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent variables use information about firms that donated only to the winning candidate or only to losing candidates.

Table A33. Assessment of the potential intensity of returns provided by elected candidates relative to runner-up candidates to "hedging" firms

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Full sample	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Experienced appointees			
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Panel A: Dependent variable - total value of public contracts to "hedging" contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	0.312	0.782	0.517	1.386	0.822	2.636	-3.204	-0.438	1.542
	[0.743]	[0.272]	[0.718]	[0.189]	[0.510]	[0.005]	[0.035]	[0.710]	[0.256]
<i>Effective observations</i>	310	150	172	136	168	82	60	74	110
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.116, 0.116]	[-0.101, 0.101]	[-0.137, 0.137]	[-0.096, 0.096]	[-0.127, 0.127]	[-0.107, 0.107]	[-0.112, 0.112]	[-0.116, 0.116]	[-0.147, 0.147]
Panel B: Dependent variable - value of public contracts per "hedging" contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	0.207	0.731	0.313	1.253	0.679	2.58	-2.98	-0.641	1.222
	[0.820]	[0.222]	[0.822]	[0.188]	[0.575]	[0.002]	[0.035]	[0.549]	[0.349]
<i>Effective observations</i>	304	148	172	134	168	82	58	72	110
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.115, 0.115]	[-0.093, 0.093]	[-0.137, 0.137]	[-0.094, 0.094]	[-0.127, 0.127]	[-0.101, 0.101]	[-0.104, 0.104]	[-0.11, 0.11]	[-0.152, 0.152]
Total observations	600	288	312	304	296	174	130	114	182
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent variables use information about firms that donated both to the winning and to at least one losing candidate.

Table A34. Assessment of the extension margin of returns provided by elected candidates relative to runner-up candidates to "hedging" firms

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Full sample	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Experienced appointees			
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Panel A: Dependent variable - at least one "hedging" contributing firm received a contract									
Elected candidate	0.0285	0.0588	0.0569	0.114	0.0853	0.205	-0.263	-0.0497	0.173
	[0.723]	[0.351]	[0.607]	[0.174]	[0.431]	[0.007]	[0.028]	[0.698]	[0.135]
<i>Effective observations</i>	316	156	202	136	168	82	62	78	110
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.12, 0.12]	[-0.108, 0.108]	[-0.162, 0.162]	[-0.098, 0.098]	[-0.126, 0.126]	[-0.107, 0.107]	[-0.122, 0.122]	[-0.126, 0.126]	[-0.144, 0.144]
Panel B: Dependent variable - share of "hedging" contributing firms receiving a contract									
Elected candidate	-0.019	0.0233	-0.0522	0.043	0.0106	0.167	-0.211	-0.107	0.0159
	[0.773]	[0.571]	[0.617]	[0.390]	[0.907]	[0.000]	[0.004]	[0.220]	[0.866]
<i>Effective observations</i>	326	136	174	130	176	72	56	70	132
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.124, 0.124]	[-0.085, 0.085]	[-0.139, 0.139]	[-0.09, 0.09]	[-0.133, 0.133]	[-0.084, 0.084]	[-0.097, 0.097]	[-0.105, 0.105]	[-0.183, 0.183]
Total observations	600	288	312	304	296	174	130	114	182
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent variables use information about firms that donated both to the winning and to at least one losing candidate.

Table A35. Assessment of the range of returns provided by elected candidates relative to runner-up candidates to "hedging" firms

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Full sample	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Panel A: Dependent variable - minimum value of public contracts to a "hedging" contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	0.185	0.672	0.395	1.337	0.723	3.017	-3.427	-0.444	1.301
	[0.843]	[0.289]	[0.757]	[0.181]	[0.568]	[0.000]	[0.022]	[0.709]	[0.342]
<i>Effective observations</i>	312	148	208	132	170	80	62	72	110
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.117, 0.117]	[-0.095, 0.095]	[-0.167, 0.167]	[-0.092, 0.092]	[-0.128, 0.128]	[-0.1, 0.1]	[-0.121, 0.121]	[-0.111, 0.111]	[-0.149, 0.149]
Panel B: Dependent variable - maximum value of public contracts to a "hedging" contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	0.298	0.832	0.523	1.451	0.859	2.774	-3.365	-0.308	1.576
	[0.760]	[0.264]	[0.724]	[0.178]	[0.501]	[0.004]	[0.032]	[0.806]	[0.250]
<i>Effective observations</i>	310	150	166	132	172	82	60	74	112
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.116, 0.116]	[-0.1, 0.1]	[-0.135, 0.135]	[-0.094, 0.094]	[-0.128, 0.128]	[-0.105, 0.105]	[-0.108, 0.108]	[-0.116, 0.116]	[-0.154, 0.154]
Total observations	600	288	312	304	296	174	130	114	182
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent variables use information about firms that donated both to the winning and to at least one losing candidate.

Table A36. Estimates using firm-election-level data considering only firms that donated to a single candidate within an election

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Full sample	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Panel A: Dependent variable - received a local procurement control									
Elected candidate	0.045	0.037	0.059	0.004	0.055	0.013	0.032	-0.014	0.081
	[0.053]	[0.256]	[0.058]	[0.915]	[0.107]	[0.772]	[0.514]	[0.838]	[0.056]
Panel B: Dependent variable - total value in local public contracts (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	0.678	0.487	0.878	0.14	0.82	0.223	0.507	-0.0353	1.109
	[0.015]	[0.201]	[0.022]	[0.72]	[0.042]	[0.678]	[0.369]	[0.966]	[0.022]
Observations	8407	3808	4692	3943	3644	2163	1515	1085	2649
Bandwidth of the running variable	[-0.165, 0.165]	[-0.157, 0.157]	[-0.184, 0.184]	[-0.139, 0.139]	[-0.143, 0.143]	[-0.141, 0.141]	[-0.125, 0.125]	[-0.097, 0.097]	[-0.192, 0.192]
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contributions covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using standard errors clustered at the election level. Aside from the main covariates as described in the main text, this specification adds the two following covariates related to firm-level contributions: the share of a candidate's contributions attributed to the focal firm and the total contribution of the focal firm to that candidate (in ln).

Table A37. Assessment of the returns provided by elected candidates to the top-contributing and bottom-contributing firms

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Full sample	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Panel A: total value in contracts to the top-contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	0.348	-0.746	1.465	0.160	0.657	-0.123	1.184	-1.037	1.973
	[0.576]	[0.417]	[0.044]	[0.819]	[0.476]	[0.896]	[0.183]	[0.563]	[0.045]
<i>Observations</i>	1586	774	812	838	748	450	388	324	424
<i>Effective observations</i>	890	436	560	552	432	280	282	160	296
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.115, 0.115]	[-0.101, 0.101]	[-0.169, 0.169]	[-0.135, 0.135]	[-0.124, 0.124]	[-0.115, 0.115]	[-0.186, 0.186]	[-0.088, 0.088]	[-0.19, 0.19]
Panel B: Dependent variable - total value in contracts to the bottom-contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	0.536	0.949	-0.00935	1.371	-0.728	1.351	1.009	-0.614	-1.465
	[0.297]	[0.227]	[0.990]	[0.050]	[0.411]	[0.155]	[0.227]	[0.634]	[0.198]
<i>Observations</i>	1586	774	812	838	748	450	388	324	424
<i>Effective observations</i>	1130	512	484	562	432	284	312	210	186
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.162, 0.162]	[-0.126, 0.126]	[-0.136, 0.136]	[-0.139, 0.139]	[-0.124, 0.124]	[-0.121, 0.121]	[-0.231, 0.231]	[-0.129, 0.129]	[-0.104, 0.104]
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A38. Additional analyses - heterogeneities based on party-level characteristics considering elected and runner-up with similar party-level characteristics

Sample of parties	Number of candidates across all local executive elections statewide		Total campaign expenditure by all party candidates statewide (in BRL000s)		Years of existence		Party elected at least one candidate in previous local legislative election		Number of parties in the coalition for local executive election	
	Below median	Above median	Below median	Above median	Below median	Above median	No	Yes	Below median	Above median
	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	0.250	-0.008	0.372	0.360	0.481	1.426	0.564	2.127	1.722	0.783
	[0.765]	[0.993]	[0.601]	[0.680]	[0.638]	[0.112]	[0.418]	[0.095]	[0.070]	[0.297]
<i>Observations</i>	968	1014	1202	1194	578	978	1354	490	876	984
<i>Effective observations</i>	618	604	814	710	394	586	922	300	482	720
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.13, 0.13]	[-0.117, 0.117]	[-0.168, 0.168]	[-0.116, 0.116]	[-0.149, 0.149]	[-0.123, 0.123]	[-0.147, 0.147]	[-0.133, 0.133]	[-0.111, 0.111]	[-0.145, 0.145]
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A39. Additional analyses - heterogeneities based on party-level incumbency across different subsamples of access to human capital resources

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
					Low		High	
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Dependent variable - total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)								
Panel A: Parties without incumbency in the local legislative chamber								
Elected candidate	2.671	1.867	0.572	5.379	0.227	-0.890	4.479	5.885
	[0.147]	[0.250]	[0.714]	[0.000]	[0.895]	[0.581]	[0.014]	[0.000]
<i>Total observations</i>	240	250	214	276	112	102	128	148
<i>Effective observations</i>	144	154	146	158	72	70	62	96
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.142, 0.142]	[-0.131, 0.131]	[-0.167, 0.167]	[-0.116, 0.116]	[-0.174, 0.174]	[-0.145, 0.145]	[-0.091, 0.091]	[-0.156, 0.156]
Panel B: Parties with incumbency in the local legislative chamber								
Elected candidate	-0.999	1.161	-0.774	1.583	-1.208	-1.401	-1.25	2.274
	[0.364]	[0.180]	[0.383]	[0.145]	[0.322]	[0.273]	[0.464]	[0.051]
<i>Total observations</i>	650	704	694	660	392	302	258	402
<i>Effective observations</i>	426	478	448	410	250	180	140	250
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.127, 0.127]	[-0.163, 0.163]	[-0.146, 0.146]	[-0.119, 0.119]	[-0.132, 0.132]	[-0.136, 0.136]	[-0.094, 0.094]	[-0.128, 0.128]
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A40. Additional analyses - heterogeneities based on party-level local alliances across different subsamples of access to human capital resources

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
					Low		High	
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Dependent variable - total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)								
Panel A: Parties with below median number of other parties in the coalition for the executive election								
Elected candidate	-0.076	1.268	-1.124	2.285	-0.408	-1.159	1.778	3.573
	[0.942]	[0.236]	[0.286]	[0.035]	[0.747]	[0.432]	[0.204]	[0.002]
<i>Total observations</i>	542	442	514	470	324	190	218	252
<i>Effective observations</i>	370	306	306	348	202	136	136	178
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.126, 0.126]	[-0.131, 0.131]	[-0.112, 0.112]	[-0.135, 0.135]	[-0.121, 0.121]	[-0.173, 0.173]	[-0.1, 0.1]	[-0.125, 0.125]
Panel B: Parties with above median number of other parties in the coalition for the executive election								
Elected candidate	1.514	1.922	1.295	2.46	4.151	-0.641	-4.051	4.286
	[0.294]	[0.125]	[0.303]	[0.046]	[0.026]	[0.634]	[0.002]	[0.009]
<i>Total observations</i>	410	466	452	424	234	218	176	248
<i>Effective observations</i>	226	260	252	274	134	140	76	132
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.103, 0.103]	[-0.124, 0.124]	[-0.107, 0.107]	[-0.15, 0.15]	[-0.111, 0.111]	[-0.143, 0.143]	[-0.07, 0.07]	[-0.133, 0.133]
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A41. Additional analyses - heterogeneities based on connection with incumbent state-level executive government across different subsamples of access to human capital resources

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	All	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Dependent variable - total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Panel A: Party of the incumbent state governor not in the coalition of the elected candidate's party									
Elected candidate	1.478	1.021	2.691	0.871	1.844	0.106	1.537	0.392	3.189
	[0.012]	[0.158]	[0.000]	[0.263]	[0.029]	[0.914]	[0.180]	[0.805]	[0.000]
<i>Total observations</i>	1996	1000	996	1024	972	582	442	418	554
<i>Effective observations</i>	1344	830	702	678	648	372	300	216	368
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.145, 0.145]	[-0.206, 0.206]	[-0.179, 0.179]	[-0.153, 0.153]	[-0.136, 0.136]	[-0.136, 0.136]	[-0.168, 0.168]	[-0.09, 0.09]	[-0.155, 0.155]
Panel B: Party of the incumbent state governor in the coalition of the elected candidate's party									
Elected candidate	0.833	0.185	1.165	0.052	1.170	1.866	-1.777	-0.743	2.674
	[0.240]	[0.869]	[0.237]	[0.959]	[0.236]	[0.138]	[0.143]	[0.689]	[0.018]
<i>Total observations</i>	1434	716	718	690	744	394	296	322	422
<i>Effective observations</i>	958	418	460	426	502	260	172	154	316
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.154, 0.154]	[-0.12, 0.12]	[-0.147, 0.147]	[-0.132, 0.132]	[-0.156, 0.156]	[-0.154, 0.154]	[-0.122, 0.122]	[-0.092, 0.092]	[-0.204, 0.204]
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A42. Additional analyses - heterogeneities based on connection with next state-level executive government across different subsamples of access to human capital resources

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	All	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Dependent variable - total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Panel A: Party of the next state governor not in the coalition of the elected candidate's party									
Elected candidate	1.744	0.832	2.743	1.677	1.920	1.743	1.506	-0.943	3.020
	[0.003]	[0.323]	[0.000]	[0.024]	[0.023]	[0.085]	[0.176]	[0.522]	[0.006]
<i>Total observations</i>	2026	1006	1020	1026	1000	570	456	436	564
<i>Effective observations</i>	1364	686	708	716	708	368	300	236	348
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.15, 0.15]	[-0.148, 0.148]	[-0.171, 0.171]	[-0.163, 0.163]	[-0.158, 0.158]	[-0.141, 0.141]	[-0.145, 0.145]	[-0.1, 0.1]	[-0.137, 0.137]
Panel B: Party of the next state governor in the coalition of the elected candidate's party									
Elected candidate	-0.691	-0.177	-0.396	-1.533	-0.152	-0.593	-2.681	0.384	0.474
	[0.342]	[0.852]	[0.668]	[0.124]	[0.877]	[0.610]	[0.043]	[0.824]	[0.669]
<i>Total observations</i>	1404	710	694	688	716	406	282	304	412
<i>Effective observations</i>	870	474	442	408	448	264	174	162	274
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	[-0.133, 0.133]	[-0.146, 0.146]	[-0.147, 0.147]	[-0.127, 0.127]	[-0.133, 0.133]	[-0.145, 0.145]	[-0.14, 0.14]	[-0.097, 0.097]	[-0.157, 0.157]
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A43. Additional analyses - results in elections where a candidate was running for reappointment

Sample of candidates for mayor elections	All	Experienced appointees		Decision power via appointees		Decision power via appointees			
						Low		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Panel A: Dependent variable - total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	2.058	1.177	2.382	0.866	2.875	0.166	1.449	1.255	3.437
	[0.009]	[0.287]	[0.024]	[0.402]	[0.008]	[0.895]	[0.317]	[0.417]	[0.006]
<i>Total observations</i>	1292	646	646	648	644	378	270	268	376
<i>Effective observations</i>	848	416	394	440	422	268	170	152	238
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	<i>[-0.165, 0.165]</i>	<i>[-0.141, 0.141]</i>	<i>[-0.175, 0.175]</i>	<i>[-0.176, 0.176]</i>	<i>[-0.165, 0.165]</i>	<i>[-0.172, 0.172]</i>	<i>[-0.173, 0.173]</i>	<i>[-0.103, 0.103]</i>	<i>[-0.196, 0.196]</i>
Panel B: Dependent variable - value of public contracts per contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)									
Elected candidate	1.901	1.129	2.230	0.635	2.822	0.039	1.134	1.342	3.272
	[0.007]	[0.253]	[0.018]	[0.487]	[0.004]	[0.972]	[0.375]	[0.343]	[0.004]
<i>Total observations</i>	1292	646	646	648	644	378	270	268	376
<i>Effective observations</i>	856	418	394	440	424	266	170	152	238
<i>Bandwidth of the running variable</i>	<i>[-0.167, 0.167]</i>	<i>[-0.143, 0.143]</i>	<i>[-0.175, 0.175]</i>	<i>[-0.176, 0.176]</i>	<i>[-0.169, 0.169]</i>	<i>[-0.171, 0.171]</i>	<i>[-0.174, 0.174]</i>	<i>[-0.103, 0.103]</i>	<i>[-0.197, 0.197]</i>
Estimation procedure	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric	Local parametric
Candidate's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party's characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State and year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports the p-values of non-parametric balance tests comparing the characteristics of marginally elected candidates to the characteristics of marginally non-elected candidates. Each column portrays results considering the samples indicated in the table. All estimates use samples within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth considering a non-parametric specification. All p-values are calculated using triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regression-discontinuity estimations with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A44. Correlation table

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
[1] Elected candidate	-			
[2] Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (BRL 000s) (ln)	0.161	-		
[3] Value of public contracts per contributing firm (BRL 000s) (ln)	0.158	0.994	-	
[4] Experienced appointees (in fraction of appointees)	0.000	0.018	0.013	-
[5] Discretionary control via appointees (in fraction of government staff)	0.000	0.004	0.005	0.099
[6] Age	-0.024	-0.001	-0.002	0.033
[7] Gender (male)	0.049	0.013	0.011	0.019
[8] Educational background: elementary school	-0.003	-0.055	-0.046	-0.060
[9] Educational background: high school	-0.006	-0.044	-0.035	0.027
[10] Educational background: higher education	0.007	0.079	0.064	0.015
[11] Civil state: married	-0.007	-0.021	-0.021	-0.027
[12] Civil state: single	0.021	0.016	0.016	0.016
[13] Civil state: divorced	-0.027	-0.001	0.000	-0.006
[14] Civil state: widower	0.005	-0.002	-0.001	0.027
[15] Reported wealth (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.023	0.002	-0.007	0.011
[16] Share of campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions	-0.015	0.111	0.078	-0.020
[17] Average contribution per contributing firm (in BRL) (ln)	0.031	0.075	0.044	0.035
[18] Share of firms' contributions from firms that only donated to the candidate	0.008	-0.043	-0.041	0.007
[19] Total campaign expenditure (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.019	0.031	0.020	0.022
[20] Left-wing-party	0.007	0.022	0.015	0.045
[21] Years of existence	0.002	-0.014	-0.017	0.058
[22] Total campaign expenditure by all local party candidates (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.025	0.147	0.110	0.078
[23] Total campaign expenditure by all party candidates statewide (in BRL 000s) (ln)	0.002	0.003	-0.006	0.123
[24] Number of candidates in local legislative elections (ln)	0.064	0.127	0.098	0.078
[25] Number candidates across all local executive elections statewide (ln)	0.009	-0.010	-0.015	0.045
[26] Number of parties in coalition of local executive election (ln)	0.116	0.078	0.059	0.059
[27] Number of parties in coalition of local legislative election (ln)	0.016	-0.016	-0.008	-0.004
[28] Party elected at least one candidate in previous local legislative election	0.026	0.023	0.015	-0.002
[29] Incumbent mayor's party in coalition	0.064	0.085	0.082	-0.069
[30] Incumbent governor's party in coalition	0.023	-0.006	-0.006	-0.007
[31] Next governor's party in coalition	0.033	-0.001	-0.003	0.001

Note: the table continues in the next page

Table A44. Correlation table (cont.)

	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]	[12]	[13]	[14]	[15]	[16]	[17]	[18]	[19]
[5]	-														
[6]	-0.002	-													
[7]	0.007	0.035	-												
[8]	0.004	0.139	0.085	-											
[9]	0.036	-0.091	0.053	-0.282	-										
[10]	-0.035	-0.012	-0.104	-0.438	-0.737	-									
[11]	-0.008	-0.307	-0.047	-0.033	-0.002	0.026	-								
[12]	0.001	0.160	0.096	0.011	0.009	-0.013	-0.700	-							
[13]	0.004	0.077	-0.023	0.019	-0.014	0.000	-0.120	-0.561	-						
[14]	0.014	0.116	-0.133	0.010	0.012	-0.018	-0.048	-0.224	-0.039	-					
[15]	0.002	0.258	0.101	-0.006	-0.078	0.077	-0.117	0.092	-0.007	0.016	-				
[16]	-0.060	-0.017	0.005	-0.050	-0.005	0.038	0.002	-0.034	0.059	-0.031	-0.012	-			
[17]	-0.049	0.038	0.012	-0.109	-0.046	0.119	-0.022	-0.018	0.061	-0.017	0.141	0.624	-		
[18]	0.000	-0.015	-0.020	0.042	0.025	-0.053	0.010	-0.012	-0.002	0.016	-0.007	-0.063	-0.095	-	
[19]	0.008	0.082	0.009	-0.070	-0.031	0.086	-0.031	0.013	0.028	0.007	0.118	0.088	0.247	0.001	-
[20]	-0.001	-0.041	0.028	-0.067	-0.031	0.077	0.055	-0.039	0.000	-0.013	-0.072	0.009	0.039	0.008	0.034
[21]	0.031	0.023	0.020	-0.039	-0.009	0.036	0.019	-0.006	-0.011	-0.007	0.019	-0.034	0.010	-0.018	0.022
[22]	-0.030	0.058	0.014	-0.151	-0.077	0.180	-0.026	0.009	0.035	-0.030	0.185	0.100	0.400	-0.059	0.502
[23]	-0.064	0.086	0.059	-0.050	-0.040	0.073	-0.014	0.015	-0.001	-0.011	0.047	-0.017	-0.013	-0.082	-0.029
[24]	-0.041	0.065	0.042	-0.109	-0.086	0.158	-0.052	0.021	0.032	0.001	0.098	0.078	0.229	-0.102	0.136
[25]	-0.052	0.072	0.068	-0.008	-0.042	0.046	-0.035	0.034	-0.005	-0.006	0.052	0.018	-0.019	-0.061	-0.068
[26]	0.026	0.029	0.012	-0.075	-0.041	0.091	-0.005	-0.001	0.009	-0.002	0.114	0.047	0.253	0.024	0.226
[27]	0.056	-0.036	-0.020	0.029	0.014	-0.032	0.050	-0.025	-0.016	-0.006	0.008	-0.044	-0.007	0.078	0.043
[28]	-0.051	0.062	0.006	-0.010	-0.007	0.013	-0.015	0.016	-0.002	-0.008	0.011	-0.025	0.006	-0.013	-0.026
[29]	-0.023	-0.043	0.010	0.000	-0.019	0.018	0.012	-0.009	0.009	-0.023	-0.008	0.062	0.026	0.002	-0.016
[30]	0.010	0.019	0.001	0.040	-0.013	-0.015	0.001	0.009	-0.021	0.014	0.035	0.008	0.033	0.036	0.012
[31]	0.022	0.007	-0.004	-0.006	-0.013	0.015	0.002	0.001	-0.004	-0.002	0.011	0.004	0.027	0.017	-0.001

Note: the table continues in the next page

Table A44. Correlation table (cont.)

	[20]	[21]	[22]	[23]	[24]	[25]	[26]	[27]	[28]	[29]	[30]
[20]	-										
[21]	0.330	-									
[22]	0.115	0.111	-								
[23]	0.172	0.273	0.100	-							
[24]	0.098	0.119	0.551	0.305	-						
[25]	0.039	0.198	0.021	0.769	0.296	-					
[26]	-0.001	0.028	0.263	0.020	0.026	-0.080	-				
[27]	0.007	-0.020	-0.100	-0.214	-0.416	-0.238	0.409	-			
[28]	0.003	0.086	0.081	0.182	0.205	0.221	-0.014	-0.114	-		
[29]	0.014	-0.113	-0.026	-0.060	0.023	0.075	-0.074	-0.069	0.011	-	
[30]	-0.015	-0.026	-0.009	0.098	-0.044	0.178	0.180	0.105	0.111	0.018	-
[31]	0.095	0.023	0.001	0.070	-0.039	0.112	0.140	0.107	0.068	0.002	0.480

APPENDIX B

ADDITIONAL DETAILS TO INTERVIEWS WITH EXPERTS

To complement the quantitative analyses, we conducted nine semi-structured interviews between October 2024 and September 2025. Each conversation lasted between 30 and 45 minutes and focused on understanding how unelected officials – specifically political appointees – enable elected politicians to achieve their objectives, including through public procurement processes. The interviews covered both Brazilian and international contexts, allowing for a comparative perspective on the mechanisms theorized in the manuscript. All interviewees were anonymized, and passages are referenced in the text using neutral identifiers. Six respondents were based in Brazil and had direct experience within municipal, state, or federal administrations or as private-sector actors interacting closely with them, while three were international experts with extensive careers in public procurement, regulatory reform, or fiscal policy.

The Brazilian interviewees included five former or current senior officials in the federal, state and municipal governments. One respondent was a private-sector executive in a philanthropic institution who regularly interacts with technical staff in public health agencies. The three international experts had held senior positions in or advised multilateral and European institutions: one was a legal scholar and procurement specialist; another was an economist and former policymaker in a Ministry of Finance; and the third worked at a multilateral organization, being the specialist in public-private partnerships, procurement, and regulatory issues. Together, these nine interviews provided a rich cross-national view of how bureaucratic experience and decision-making authority jointly determine whether politicians can convert political intent into administrative action.

Across all conversations, the two interdependent mechanisms theorized emerged consistently. The first is that appointees with prior experience inside government accumulate a distinctive form of government-specific human capital – a combination of procedural knowledge, tacit understanding, and relational capital – that allows them to navigate bureaucratic systems efficiently and to anticipate obstacles to political initiatives. The second is that appointees in higher

hierarchical positions possess formal decision power within the government apparatus, giving them the discretion to translate that knowledge into action. When these two features co-exist, the politician gains the capacity to “make things happen,” as several respondents phrased it, by steering administrative decisions in ways that align with political or electoral goals.

The interviews revealed that experience in government provides a kind of embedded knowledge that is not codified in laws or manuals. A former secretary in São Paulo recalled that, when she first entered government, “nobody would give me information.” She quickly realized that she needed to learn both formal rules and informal routines – the unwritten understandings about who holds influence, how to sequence approvals, and which legal boundaries could be stretched without breaking the law. Over time, she learned “where the loopholes are” and described her role as “finding ways to make what the politician wants happen while staying formally compliant.” Her experience taught her not only how to interpret the rules but also how to anticipate the reactions of technical departments and auditing agencies, allowing her to execute projects on behalf of the politician despite initial resistance from the bureaucracy.

Similar insights emerged in the international interviews. A procurement expert explained that experienced bureaucrats “know which auditing offices are slower to scrutinize, which procurement committees are flexible, and how to sequence the steps to meet a political deadline.” He called this “soft information impossible to learn from outside,” emphasizing that long-tenured staff develop an intuitive understanding of bureaucratic timing and risk management that new entrants cannot replicate. Another international interviewee made a similar observation: appointees who had been in office for several years “know how to play the game.” By this he meant that they know which technical parameters can be adjusted to make a project politically viable, such as demand forecasts, pricing assumptions, or scheduling choices, while keeping the process formally defensible. The third international interviewee described a similar learning process from within: he recounted that after several months in office, he had an “a-ha moment” when he realized that he could “stop being played by the administration and start playing along the administration.” Once he understood the

sequence of authorizations, he was able to direct civil servants rather than being constrained by them, an ability that stemmed entirely from his acquired experience inside the bureaucracy.

Experience also builds networks of trust within government, which interviewees repeatedly emphasized as crucial for implementation. A former national-level Brazilian appointee explained that “projects only move when you have someone you trust in another department.” Years of working within the public administration allow appointees to develop these interpersonal ties, which help them secure faster approvals or discretionary adjustments. A private-sector executive confirmed this from his own vantage point: “Experienced bureaucrats know who the real decision-makers are, and that makes all the difference. With them, things move; without them, everything stalls.” Such relationships, cultivated over repeated interactions, reduce uncertainty and facilitate coordination, effectively transforming the administrative network into a political asset.

While experience provides knowledge and access, hierarchical position determines whether such knowledge can be put into practice. In Brazil, senior appointees described their ability to “make things happen” as stemming from the authority embedded in their formal roles. As one secretary explained, “Governors want answers in real time. If I don’t have the authority to approve and mobilize teams, nothing happens.” Authority gives appointees the power to interpret rules, allocate resources, and coordinate across departments—all functions that enable the politician’s goals to be realized. International respondents echoed this perspective. The Italian expert observed that “the higher your position, the more decision power you have—you can decide whether to buy or not to buy, not just how to buy.” In contrast, career civil servants, he noted, “follow the rules to avoid indictment,” whereas appointees in managerial roles act as “mediators” who take calculated risks to implement political will.

This distinction between experience and authority becomes particularly consequential when both are combined. Experienced but low-ranking staff “know what to do but cannot act,” while high-ranking but inexperienced appointees “act without knowing how,” as several respondents phrased it. A Brazilian interviewee described the most effective staffers as those who “know every rule—and when to bend it safely.” Such individuals can take calculated risks to deliver rapid results

while maintaining formal compliance. An international interviewee similarly remarked that when a politician surrounds themselves with appointees who are both seasoned and senior, “negotiations are shorter—they reduce the transaction costs of delivering favors or policies.” In his words, “it’s the same business, but with fewer intermediaries,” since the politician no longer has to rely on informal exchanges with multiple bureaucratic actors to achieve a desired outcome.

The interviews also underscored the role of career incentives in aligning experienced appointees with political objectives. As one international interviewee explained: when a high-ranking appointee’s promotion depends on the government in charge, “he will use his strength to advantage his political patrons.” By contrast, those planning a transition to the private sector “seek efficiency and results,” using their experience to enhance their managerial credentials rather than to serve political ends. These divergent incentive structures illustrate how human capital within the bureaucracy can be politically deployed depending on career trajectories and the nature of appointment.

Taken together, the qualitative material paints a consistent picture across national and institutional contexts. Experience provides the tacit, relational, and procedural knowledge that allows appointees to navigate the complexity of government systems; hierarchical authority gives them the formal discretion to act upon that knowledge; and when both are present, elected politicians can effectively convert political intent into administrative action. As one Brazilian official summarized, “experienced and high-ranking staff know how the system works and can make things happen.” This combination—of knowing and deciding—appears to be the critical organizational resource that enables politicians to deliver targeted returns to connected firms or to fulfill political promises more generally.

APPENDIX C

RETURNS TO CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES ELECTED FOR STATE-LEVEL LEGISLATIVE SEATS IN THE 2006 ELECTIONS

Why study returns provided by candidates to state-level legislative seats?

While political candidates finance their electoral campaigns using public and private funds, public funding mainly target candidates to executive positions, such as state governors or president (Boas et al. 2014). As a result, candidates for the legislative seats rely more heavily in private funding to support their campaigns. Indeed, public and party-level resources correspond to a small fraction of the total official resources used by candidates for legislative seats during their electoral campaigns.¹³ The limited amount of public/party funds available for legislative races, along with the intense competition for legislative seats, motivate candidates to engage in extensive fundraising from private donors – thus creating opportunities and incentives for candidates to form connections with firms. Since Brazilian legislation allowed firm donations until 2016, candidates developed capabilities for raising money from firms, which was the most significant source of funding for their campaigns.¹⁴ ¹⁵ Such context provides an way to assess the external validity of the findings reported in the main text.

Importantly, politicians in the legislative power in Brazil have no direct control over public procurement decisions. As a result, they could shape procurement outcomes via indirect mechanisms such as promoting interactions between connected firms and members of contracting offices or using their legislative power to pressure decisions-makers in the executive power. This context magnifies the potential role of unelected officials in shaping procurement outcomes.

¹³ Bourdoukan, Adla Youssef. 2009. “O Bolso e a Urna: Financiamento Político em Perspectiva Comparada.” PhD Dissertation, University of São Paulo, São Paulo.

¹⁴ In the 2006 elections, firm donations accounted for 36 percent of the total fundraising by state legislators, followed by individual donations and self-funding, which amounted to 23 percent each.

¹⁵ Samuels, David. 2001. “Does Money Matter? Credible Commitments and Campaign Finance in New Democracies: Theory and Evidence from Brazil.” *Comparative Politics* 34(1):23–42.

Dataset

The datasets about elections and public procurement outcomes are analogous to those used in the main text but focused on the context of the 2006 general election (and following years from 2007 to 2010) in eight Brazilian states. This single-election is a limitation of the data that was available to the authors – particularly related to the public procurement outcomes.

First, we use a unique and manually collected dataset on the total value of state-government contracts awarded to private firms in eight Brazilian states (out of 27) during the years following the 2006 general elections (2008-2010). This paper focuses on this subsample because these were the only states that publicly reported expenditures in state-government contracts awarded per firm. These eight states are also diverse in various socioeconomic dimensions. Furthermore, the analyses do not consider state-government disbursements made in 2007 since these expenditures were likely approved in 2006, by the then incumbent government.

Second, just as in the main text, the dataset includes detailed information about firm-level contributions to candidates for state-level legislative positions in the 2006 general elections. These data originate from a large public-access administrative dataset managed by the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE, Superior Electoral Court), the highest institutional body of the Brazilian Electoral Justice. For the period leading up to the 2006 general elections and for the eight focal states, the dataset contains information on all political contributions made directly by firms to a candidate for a state-level legislative position. Every firm is identified by a unique tax identification number (CNPJ). Using additional public datasets released by the TSE, the authors collected information about candidate's pre-election socioeconomic characteristics, election results (i.e., number of votes in the 2006 general elections and whether the candidate was elected), party affiliations, and the political coalition to which the party was associated in 2006.

Defining the vote margin for state-level elections for legislative seats

State legislators in Brazil are elected according to an open-list proportional election rule where candidates compete against their list-mates and against candidates from other electoral coalitions. Within such a system, every state-level political coalition – which is comprised of at least one or

more political parties – proposes an open list of legislative candidates - each of which is affiliated with a single political party. Voters then vote for a single candidate.

Seats are first allocated to coalitions according to the total number of votes to candidates in the coalition, and then the seats are distributed within parties according to the number of individual candidate votes. Seats are distributed within a coalition to candidates with the highest number of votes until the last seat obtained by the coalition is assigned. Thus, in the Brazilian institutional context, the intra-coalition distribution of seats is the relevant race to apply a regression discontinuity design.

Considering the context above, the vote margin of each candidate depends on how far a political candidate was from losing or winning the last legislative seat assigned to a coalition. Formally, the vote margin of a candidate i in a coalition c in a state s , denoted by M_{ics} , determines the electoral outcome of that candidate. A candidate with $M_{ics} \geq 0$ is assigned to the group of elected state legislators ($T_i = 1$), whereas $M_{ics} < 0$ implies assignments to the group of non-elected candidates ($T_i = 0$). The analyses use this rule to apply a sharp regression discontinuity design (sharp RDD) to estimate the effect of an electoral victory on the average value of public contracts per contributing firm of marginally elected candidates when compared to marginally non-elected candidates.

Measuring politician's access to experienced unelected officials via their political parties

Unlike in the analyses reported in the main text, where the authors had data to the career history of unelected officials directly appointed by elected candidates to local-level executive seats, this exercise relies on a coarser measure of access to unelected officials that may be accessible via the candidate's political party. More precisely, the authors used the dataset Filiaweb, an official party affiliation database managed by the TSE and that was available for consult at the individual level with information up until 2010. This database provided information about the political party affiliation of all individuals in the county which are above 16-years old.

Furthermore, the authors had access to the name and locality of individuals working as political appointees in state-level congresses in any year between 2007 and 2010, as well as the

number of years they had worked in such state-level congress. Using an exact string-matching algorithm, these political appointees were matched to the data on political party affiliation (using an individual's full name and metropolitan area). It is important to note that appointees employed by state legislatures do not need to be affiliated with any party. Out of a total of 25,809 appointees employed in the eight state legislatures in 2007-2010, 23% of them (5,920 individuals) were matched to the party affiliation data.¹⁶ For each of these 5,920 individuals, the dataset has information about how long they have worked for a state legislature and the party they were affiliated to. Using such information, the authors identified political parties that had experienced appointees working in the state legislature.

The variable *party with experienced staff* is a binary variable that takes value one if the candidate is affiliated to a political party with at least one politically appointed member working in the state legislature between 2007 and 2010 that strictly more than two (2) political terms of experience, and zero otherwise. The choice of using whether individuals had worked at least in three legislative mandates (9 years or longer) originates from Brazil having a maximum of a two-term reelection rule for executive positions. Thus, a politically appointed candidate that worked for at least three terms in the state legislature must have worked with at least two different executive governments, granting the person experience and knowledge that is not necessarily specific to a single ruling politician. This measure reflects each member's pre-election accumulated experience associated with the inner workings of the government. 62.7% of the focal candidates for a legislative position in the final sample were affiliated with a political party that had at least one appointed staff with such level of experience.

Methods

The methods are analogous to those used in the main text, with the main differences being the following (1) the use of the vote margin as computed within coalitions – as explained above –, (2) the consideration of all potential candidates – not only the runner-up candidates – as several

¹⁶ To increase the matching rate, we alternatively checked whether matching the RAIS data to the FiliaWeb data by individual full name and state. This procedure led to a matching rate of 30% of appointees.

candidates could be marginally not elected, and (3) the explicit consideration of candidates running for reelection, since all states had candidates running for reelection. Since over 50% of the elected candidates were running for reelection, removal of such candidates could create bias as candidates it is frequent for congressmen to be reelected. Considering only “newcomers” that are successfully elected could imply these individuals have extraordinary abilities that enable them to be elected in the first place even when the odds favor reelecting candidates. As a result, we control for this variable parametrically. It also implies that we interpret the results as suggestive associations.

Results

Table C1 shows that the only characteristic that is systematically different between marginally elected and non-elected candidates is whether they are running for reelection. All other characteristics from them (i.e., campaign expenditures) and from their respective political parties (e.g., tradition and size) are similar. Indeed, due to the dynamics of legislative elections in Brazil whereby there are no limits to the number of reelections, elected candidates are much more likely to be running for reelection the non-elected candidates. As a result, any result reported here should be interpreted as correlational, and not causal, and we control for such variable in parametric specifications

<< INSERT TABLE C1 HERE >>

Figures C1-C4 report the graphical analyses showcasing the additional returns provided by marginally elected candidates relatively to marginally non-elected candidates for legislative seats following the 2006 elections. Throughout, the results bundling all candidates show elected candidates having a higher total value of public contracts awarded to contributing firms, value of public contracts per contributing firm, likelihood of at least one contributing firm receiving a contract, and higher maximum value of public contract to a contributing firm. Moreover, all the analyses show that such returns are (visually and point-wise) higher for candidates from parties that had at least one experienced staff working in their respective congress.


<< INSERT FIGURES C1-C4 HERE >>

Tables C2-C3 show the results using local non-parametric and parametric estimates for several bandwidths of the running variables. While these results are not causal, and considering the parametric estimate controls for whether candidates are running for reelections, the pattern aligns, the consistent pattern is that candidates whose parties potentially provide them with access to experienced unelected officials via unelected officials that are party affiliates are associated with higher values of public contracts to their contributing firms.

Overall, these results – albeit limited both in terms of the data and in terms of them being correlational – create a consistent narrative with the main results reported in the main text in terms of showcasing the critical role of unelected staff in enabling elected politicians in providing returns to their connected firms.


<< INSERT TABLES C2-C3 HERE >>

Figure C1. Graphical analysis of differences in the returns provided by elected state-level legislators relative to marginally non-elected state-level legislators in the 2006 elections – Total value of public contracts to pool of contributing firms




Notes: The figure reports the graphical analyses from the RD design for the additional private returns provided by elected candidates for state-level legislative seats vis-à-vis non-elected candidates in terms of total value of public procurement contracts to their pool of contributing firms. The dots represent the estimated value of public procurement contracts for firms that contributed to candidates in each of the 50 bins of the vote margin on each side of the cut-off. All estimates originate from local non-parametric regressions with a 1st order polynomial. The figure also plots 95% confidence interval associated to each local non-parametric estimation. This figure plots all candidates with vote margin in-between -5% and 5%. The right-hand side panel bundles all candidates. The mid panel only considers candidates from parties that had at least one affiliated member working as an experienced political appointee in the state-level congress. The left-hand side panel only considers candidates from parties that had no affiliated member working as an experienced political appointee in the state-level congress.

Figure C2. Graphical analysis of differences in the returns provided by elected state-level legislators relative to marginally non-elected state-level legislators in the 2006 elections – Value of public contracts per contributing firm




Notes: The figure reports the graphical analyses from the RD design for the additional private returns provided by elected candidates for state-level legislative seats vis-à-vis non-elected candidates in terms of value of public contracts per contributing firm. The dots represent the estimated value of public contracts per contributing firm considering candidates in each of the 50 bins of the vote margin on each side of the cut-off. All estimates originate from local non-parametric regressions with a 1st order polynomial. The figure also plots 95% confidence interval associated to each local non-parametric estimation. This figure plots all candidates with vote margin in-between -5% and 5%. The right-hand side panel bundles all candidates. The mid panel only considers candidates from parties that had at least one affiliated member working as an experienced political appointee in the state-level congress. The left-hand side panel only considers candidates from parties that had no affiliated member working as an experienced political appointee in the state-level congress.

Figure C3. Graphical analysis of differences in the returns provided by elected state-level legislators relative to marginally non-elected state-level legislators in the 2006 elections – Likelihood of at least one contributing firm obtaining a public contract



Notes: The figure reports the graphical analyses from the RD design for the additional private returns provided by elected candidates for state-level legislative seats vis-à-vis non-elected candidates in terms of the likelihood of at least one contributing firm receiving a public contract. The dots represent the estimated likelihood of at least one contributing firm receiving a public contract considering candidates in each of the 50 bins of the vote margin on each side of the cut-off. All estimates originate from local non-parametric regressions with a 1st order polynomial. The figure also plots 95% confidence interval associated to each local non-parametric estimation. This figure plots all candidates with vote margin in-between -5% and 5%. The right-hand side panel bundles all candidates. The mid panel only considers candidates from parties that had at least one affiliated member working as an experienced political appointee in the state-level congress. The left-hand side panel only considers candidates from parties that had no affiliated member working as an experienced political appointee in the state-level congress.

Figure C4. Graphical analysis of differences in the returns provided by elected state-level legislators relative to marginally non-elected state-level legislators in the 2006 elections – Likelihood of at least one contributing firm obtaining a public contract



Notes: The figure reports the graphical analyses from the RD design for the additional private returns provided by elected candidates for state-level legislative seats vis-à-vis non-elected candidates in terms of the likelihood of at least one contributing firm receiving a public contract. The dots represent the estimated likelihood of at least one contributing firm receiving a public contract considering candidates in each of the 50 bins of the vote margin on each side of the cut-off. All estimates originate from local non-parametric regressions with a 1st order polynomial. The figure also plots 95% confidence interval associated to each local non-parametric estimation. This figure plots all candidates with vote margin in-between -5% and 5%. The right-hand side panel bundles all candidates. The mid panel only considers candidates from parties that had at least one affiliated member working as an experienced political appointee in the state-level congress. The left-hand side panel only considers candidates from parties that had no affiliated member working as an experienced political appointee in the state-level congress.

Table C1. Non-parametric mean comparison test of characteristics of elected versus non-elected candidates

Sample of candidates for state-level legislative seats	Full sample			Party with experienced unelected staff in Congress					
				High			Low		
	Mean (elected)	Mean (non- elected)	p- value	Mean (elected)	Mean (non- elected)	p- value	Mean (elected)	Mean (non- elected)	p- value
<i>Candidate's characteristics</i>									
Age	47.5	47.6	0.901	48.0	48.0	0.973	46.7	46.4	0.924
Gender (male)	0.851	0.872	0.802	0.875	0.865	0.761	0.83	0.878	0.239
Educational background: elementary school	0.048	0.081	0.933	0.053	0.064	0.615	0.045	0.105	0.660
Educational background: high school	0.266	0.285	0.958	0.23	0.291	0.840	0.352	0.267	0.875
Educational background: higher education	0.685	0.634	0.927	0.717	0.645	0.646	0.602	0.628	0.736
Civil state: married	0.81	0.704	0.036	0.822	0.704	0.060	0.795	0.703	0.335
Civil state: single	0.125	0.145	0.330	0.125	0.137	0.521	0.114	0.169	0.317
Civil state: divorced	0.012	0.017	0.620	0.013	0.014	0.761	0.011	0.017	0.313
Civil state: widower	0.052	0.134	0.025	0.039	0.145	0.016	0.08	0.11	0.642
Reported wealth (in BRL 000s) (ln)	5.3	4.5	0.593	5.5	4.7	0.684	5.0	3.9	0.686
Share of campaign revenue originating from firms' contributions	0.26	0.26	0.182	0.265	0.253	0.482	0.246	0.267	0.350
Average contribution per contributing firm (in BRL) (ln)	2.6	1.9	0.406	2.6	1.9	0.427	2.5	2.0	0.758
Share of firms' contributions from firms that only donated to the candidate	0.26	0.26	0.182	0.265	0.253	0.482	0.246	0.267	0.350
Total campaign expenditure (in BRL 000s) (ln)	6.9	7.0	0.536	7.0	7.1	0.912	6.6	6.7	0.935
Running for reelection	0.492	0.087	0.003	0.507	0.097	0.161	0.477	0.081	0.017
<i>Candidate's political party</i>									
Left-wing-party	0.258	0.333	0.863	0.296	0.348	0.590	0.193	0.244	0.870
Years of existence	20.2	20.4	0.447	20.6	21.0	0.499	19.3	18.4	0.819
Campaign expenditure state-level legislative candidates in the party within the focal state (in BRL 000s) (ln)	10.6	11.0	0.682	11.0	11.4	0.481	9.9	10.2	0.683
Campaign expenditure state-level legislative candidates in the party within the country (in BRL 000s) (ln)	13.1	13.1	0.531	13.2	13.2	0.480	12.9	12.9	0.173
Number of candidates in state-level legislative elections in the focal state (ln)	53.0	67.0	0.989	63.7	76.4	0.258	33.8	40.8	0.737
Number of candidates in state-level legislative elections in the country (ln)	654.9	664.2	0.494	690.6	681.2	0.387	593.3	613.1	0.119
Number of parties in coalition of state-level legislative election	2.4	2.0	0.788	2.1	1.8	0.057	3.1	2.5	0.158
Number of candidates in coalition of state-level legislative election	81.2	90.9	0.101	93.8	102.1	0.368	60.3	65.3	0.799
Party elected at least one candidate in the last 2 state-level legislative election	0.742	0.79	0.276	0.888	0.863	0.969	0.466	0.628	0.385
Governor's party	0.222	0.159	0.425	0.211	0.161	0.445	0.25	0.174	0.853
President's party	0.129	0.142	0.420	0.184	0.204	0.910	0.023	0.0831	
Total observations			1524			948			576
Effective observations			890			574			260
Absolute value of the MSE symmetric bandwidth			0.042			0.039			0.042

Table C2 – Additional Returns Provided by Elected Candidates for State-Level Legislative Seats Following the 2006 Elections

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (ln)		Value of public contracts per contributing firm (ln)		=1 if at least one contributing firm received a public contract		Maximum value of public contract to a contributing firm (ln)	
Panel A - All candidates								
Elected candidate	3.266	3.085	4.181	3.834	0.207	0.185	3.239	3.066
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]
<i>Total observations</i>	1524	1524	1524	1524	1524	1524	1524	1524
<i>Effective observations</i>	890	890	894	894	932	932	886	886
<i>MSE symmetric bandwidth</i>	0.042	0.042	0.043	0.043	0.047	0.047	0.042	0.042
Panel B - Candidates from parties with experienced staff in Congress								
Elected candidate	3.684	3.794	4.762	4.892	0.243	0.247	3.681	3.794
	[0.004]	[0.000]	[0.004]	[0.000]	[0.004]	[0.000]	[0.004]	[0.000]
<i>Total observations</i>	948	948	948	948	948	948	948	948
<i>Effective observations</i>	574	574	571	571	578	578	574	574
<i>MSE symmetric bandwidth</i>	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039
Panel C - Candidates from parties without an experienced staff in Congress								
Elected candidate	2.304	2.064	2.852	2.158	0.128	0.0615	2.24	1.997
	[0.163]	[0.098]	[0.199]	[0.202]	[0.263]	[0.485]	[0.169]	[0.107]
<i>Total observations</i>	576	576	576	576	576	576	576	576
<i>Effective observations</i>	260	260	274	274	288	288	261	261
<i>MSE symmetric bandwidth</i>	0.042	0.042	0.043	0.043	0.048	0.048	0.042	0.042
State dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Candidates' characteristics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Parties' characteristics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Panel A reports results about differences between marginally elected and runner-up candidates. Panels B and C reports analogous results considering candidates from parties with (or without, respectively) experienced staff working in Congress. All estimates use samples within bandwidths referred above. The bandwidths were computed via a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth algorithm for each respective dependent variable and subsample using the non-parametric specifications (reported in odd columns). All columns report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regressions. Odd columns report a first-order local non-parametric results. Even columns report estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above and listed on Tables C2.

Table C3 – Robustness to Additional Returns Provided by Elected Candidates for State-Level Legislative Seats Following the 2006 Elections – Different Bandwidths of the Vote Margin

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]	[12]
	Total value of public contracts to contributing firms (ln)			Value of public contracts per contributing firm (ln)			=1 if at least one contributing firm received a public contract			Maximum value of public contract to a contributing firm (ln)		
Panel A - All candidates												
Elected candidate	2.966	2.990	2.893	3.708	3.722	3.597	0.171	0.185	0.186	2.956	2.968	2.867
	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.005]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.013]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.000]
<i>Total observations</i>	1524	1524	1524	1524	1524	1524	1524	1524	1524	1524	1524	1524
<i>Effective observations</i>	660	967	1128	660	967	1128	660	967	1128	660	967	1128
<i>Symmetric bandwidth (manual)</i>	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.07
Panel B - Candidates from parties with experienced staff in Congress												
Elected candidate	3.243	3.803	3.720	4.223	4.867	4.737	0.209	0.252	0.252	3.262	3.793	3.704
	[0.007]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.007]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.009]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.007]	[0.000]	[0.000]
<i>Total observations</i>	948	948	948	948	948	948	948	948	948	948	948	948
<i>Effective observations</i>	465	669	770	465	669	770	465	669	770	465	669	770
<i>Symmetric bandwidth (manual)</i>	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.07
Panel C - Candidates from parties without an experienced staff in Congress												
Elected candidate	2.744	1.733	1.354	3.009	1.906	1.420	0.092	0.060	0.044	2.658	1.678	1.305
	[0.042]	[0.146]	[0.231]	[0.103]	[0.245]	[0.361]	[0.347]	[0.490]	[0.598]	[0.047]	[0.156]	[0.245]
<i>Total observations</i>	576	576	576	576	576	576	576	576	576	576	576	576
<i>Effective observations</i>	195	298	358	195	298	358	195	298	358	195	298	358
<i>Symmetric bandwidth (manual)</i>	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.07
State dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidates' characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parties' characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: p-values in parenthesis were computed from estimates of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Panel A reports results about differences between marginally elected and runner-up candidates. Panels B and C reports analogous results considering candidates from parties with (or without, respectively) experienced staff working in Congress. The estimates use alternative bandwidths, as indicated above. All columns report the results of triangle kernel-weighted local-linear regressions and they use estimates from a first-order local parametric regression approach controlling for the covariates indicated above and listed on Tables C2.