Leadership and Coup Support:

Evidence from 1936 Spain

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VERY PRELIMINARY

Abstract

Military coups pose a significant threat to democracy, being responsible for most democratic failures. Understanding what leads military officers to rebel is crucial. The Spanish Coup of 1936, where the army split in two, provides an ideal setting to study coup behavior. Our findings show that previous leaders continued to influence their former subordinates, with officers who had served under rebel leaders before 1936 being 20 percentage points more likely to join the rebellion than those under retired, neutral, or Republican leaders. Using rotation among military leaders, we compare officers exposed to rebel leaders to their peers who were not, showing that our samples are similar in many covariates and findings are not driven by selection. We also study mechanisms behind our main result, ruling out indoctrination and finding support for leaders as coordination devices and for expectations of promotions.

1 Introduction

Military coups are responsible for 75% of democratic failures (Marinov and Goemans (2014)) and are, therefore, the most significant threat to democracy. After the usually small group

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of conspirators launch a coup attempt, its success or failure depends almost entirely on how the rest of the military reacts (Singh (2014), pg. 5). Since around half of these attempts succeed (Teorell et al. (2024)), to understand democratic breakdown and persistence, it is vital to know why military officers sometimes support a rebellion and sometimes stay loyal to the government.

Most coups either fail quickly or succeed with relatively few casualties (Singh (2014), pg. 34), but the Spanish coup of 1936 did neither. The rebel leaders failed to overthrow the government, and the government failed to fully suppress the uprising. The army was split in two, with $19,9\%$ of the officer corps supporting the government and $80,1\%$ the rebels. Because of this split, we can study what drove the decisions of 11,393 military officers. Moreover, the coup led to a three-year civil war that foreshadowed the horrors of World War Two with almost half a million casualties. Since 22% of the officers in our sample died during the conflict, we argue that we are studying the most crucial decision of their lives: whether to support the rebellion or stay loyal to the Republic.

Our paper focuses on the role of military leadership in the Spanish coup of 1936. In particular, we study the influence of *former* leaders. The Republic was adept at placing reliable generals in crucial command positions. However, we observe that the chain of command was broadly disrupted, and the loyalty of key generals failed to secure overwhelming support. Conversely, previous leaders continued to wield influence over their former subordinates. An officer who had served (before 1936) under a rebel leader was 20 percentage points more likely to join the rebellion than a comparable officer who served in the same destination under retired, neutral, or Republican leaders. Our result is not symmetrical, as we observe no effect of exposure to loyal generals.

Our identification strategy exploits (arguably exogenous) rotation among military leaders. We compare officers who were exposed to rebel leaders to their peers who served a few years earlier or later in the same post but were not exposed. We show that, after accounting for destination fixed effects, treated subordinates are very similar to control subordinates in a large number of observable characteristics. Moreover, we show that our findings are not driven by selection: subordinates who arrived at a destination with or after the rebel leader (and therefore may have been hired by him) are not more likely to rebel than those who were there before.

Surprisingly, the influence of former leaders outweighs the influence of current leaders.

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After controlling for exposure to former leaders, the effect of 1936 rebel generals is around zero. This finding shows the limits of a coup-proofing strategy that relies only on rotation. Also, it highlights the challenges new democracies face. Many of the rebel leaders in our sample advanced their careers (and therefore influenced a large number of subordinates) during the previous dictatorship, and they managed to gather support for the rebellion despite not occupying key positions in 1936.

We also study the mechanisms behind our main result. We consider three possibilities. First, right-wing leaders may have transmitted anti-democratic values to their subordinates while they were commanding them. This indoctrination mechanism places the influence of leadership in the *past*. Second, subordinates may have followed their previous leaders during the coup. Coups are coordination games, and the actions of influential leaders may have been focal to participants. This coordination mechanism is rooted in the *present*. Lastly, subordinates who had previous relationships with rebel leaders may have expected material benefits from supporting a coup. This promotion mechanism places the influence in the *future*.

We do not find evidence for the *past* mechanism. We argue that if indoctrination was at play, right-wing leaders who did not participate in the coup (because they were dead or retired) should have a similar effect as actual rebels. We classify as placebo right-wingers those generals who participated in coups in 1923 or 1932 and find that subordinates who served under them were not more likely to support the coup.

We find some suggestive evidence for the *present* mechanism. We argue that leaders who were geographically closer should have wielded more influence, either due to saliency or communication. We find that the effect is larger for subordinates who, on the day of the coup, were posted closer to their former leaders.

We also find some suggestive evidence for the *future* mechanism. We also use the 1923 coup to study this mechanism. This coup installed a dictatorship that lasted until 1931, when elections were called and the Second Spanish Republic was inaugurated. We first show that subordinates who were exposed to the leaders of the 1923 coup were promoted more rapidly during the dictatorship but not during the Republic (i.e. their promotions slowed down after 1931). Moreover, subordinates who were exposed to leaders who were loyal in 1936 got promoted more rapidly during the Republic. Therefore, we conclude that relationships with influential leaders were a determinant of promotions in Spain. It

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is reasonable to assume that forward-looking officers assumed that those relationships will also matter in the future[1].

Despite the importance of military coups for democratic survival, the drivers of coup participation are poorly understood. La Parra-Pérez (2020) also studies the 1936 Spanish coup. He shows that professional and economic interests influenced officers' decisions: for example, those who got promoted under the Republic were more likely to stay loyal and those who got demoted were more likely to rebel. Naidu et al. (2021) shows that Haiti's most central families were more likely to support a coup and benefitted more afterward.

We also contribute to the literature on leadership. Previous theoretical work has emphasized the role of persuasion (Caillaud and Tirole (2007)), coordination (Akerlof and Holden (2016), Loeper et al. (2014)), visibility and modification of social norms (Acemoglu and Jackson (2015), example or sacrifice (Hermalin (1998)), and monitoring (Calvo and Wellisz (1978)). Empirically, Dippel and Heblich (2021) study the role of leaders in the movement against slavery. Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bandiera et al. (2020), and Jones and Olken (2005) study the effects of leaders on firm policies, firm performance, and macroeconomic outcomes respectively. Our paper complements work by Cagé et al. (2023), who show that the home municipalities of French regiments led by Petain at Verdun were more likely to support authoritarian views and to collaborate with the Nazis[2].

Lastly, we contribute to the literature on the Spanish Civil War. Though we do not summarize the historical literature here, some relevant works are Payne (2012), Payne (2017), and Thomas (2001). McLauchlin and Parra-Pérez (2019) studies executions of military officers. Balcells (2011) and Balcells (2012) study violence and victimization in Catalonia and Aragon. Tur-Prats and Valencia Caicedo (2020), Rodon (2024), and Oto-Peralías (2015) (among others) study the long-term effects of the war. More generally, we contribute to the literature on the determinants of democratic breakdown and the rise of fascism[3].

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[1]We are unable to verify whether this was the case. Our data source (the military yearbooks) is only available until 1936.

[2]The reflection problem (Manski (1993)) makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of leaders from the preferences of their followers (which may endogenously determine the leader's rise). Our identification strategy exploits turnover in leaders to identify effects on subordinates. Some papers that use a similar strategy are: Jia et al. (2015), Salgado (2023), Shih et al. (2012), Voth and Xu (2020), and Xu (2018). Jha and Wilkinson (2012) uses variation in military assignments to identify the effects of combat experience.

[3]For example, Acemoglu et al. (2022), Adena et al. (2015), Galofré-Vilà et al. (2021), Koenig (2023), Satyanath et al. (2017), and Voth and Voigtlander (forthcoming).

2   Setting and Data

2.1   Setting

In 1923, a coup led by Miguel Primo de Rivera overthrew a democratic government and installed a dictatorship. In 1930, Primo de Rivera resigned and appointed a transition government. Democracy returned in 1931 with elections, a new constitution, and the abolition of the monarchy. Among the first acts of the Republican government was a military reform that reduced the number of officers and overhauled the divisional structure. Many monarchist officers (and most of the supporters of the 1923 coup) retired then.

In 1932, military officers led by Emilio Barrera and Jose Sanjurjo attempted a coup against the Republican government. It failed after only 24 hours, and its main leaders were imprisoned or exiled. We use the leaders of both the 1923 and the 1932 coups as placebo right-wing leaders (all retired by 1936). These officers were anti-democratic by revealed preference, but they either did not participate in the coup due to death or old age (9 generals), or participated only nominally (expressing support but not playing an important role in the conspiracy or in Franco's government, 5 generals)[4].

A left-wing coalition won the February 1936 elections. The newly formed government proceeded to remove suspect generals from key posts, successfully guessing most of their allegiances[5]. The conspiracy was led by General Mola and intended to have Sanjurjo (then in exile) as its figurehead. Franco himself was hesitant until July, and the main plotters did not intend for him to play a major role in the government. However, his participation was crucial due to his popularity with the Army of Africa and due to his prestige as the former director of the military academy. The murder of right-wing politician Calvo-Sotelo precipitated the coup.

The setting for this paper is the Spanish Coup of 17-21 July 1936. The government failed

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[4]The notable exception is Sanjurjo, who was a major player in the conspiracy and expected to play a major role in a future authoritarian government. He died in a plane crash two days after the coup. Since he was not on active duty, and since his death preceded the decisions of most officers, we include him in the placebo sample. Our results are robust to excluding him.

[5]Franco was removed as chief of staff and sent to the Canary Islands, Mola was removed as general of the Army of Africa and sent to Pamplona, Goded was sent to the Balearic Islands. The only exception was Miguel Cabanellas, assumed by the government to be loyal and put in charge of the 5th military district. Payne (2017) writes: "The government had in fact taken more than a few measures to keep the army under control. Nearly all the top command assignments had been changed, and most of the generals with active commands were, as events proved, loyal to the regime." Also, in Payne (2012): "The government had not erred in its calculation that most generals in active command were loyal; very few joined the rebellion, Franco and Miguel Cabanellas, who commanded a division in Zaragoza, being the only two active major generals to do so... in many garrisons the role of middle-rank and junior officers was decisive".

to suppress the rebellion but managed to keep control of about half of the country and half of the army (53% of the officers were in Republican-controlled territory in July 1936). 62% of active major generals remained loyal to the government, but many of them failed to keep their troops in line[6]. The territory of Spain was therefore divided in two (see map in Figure 1), and the ground was set for the Spanish Civil War, which lasted until 1939 and involved half a million casualties.

Figure 1: Map of Spain in July 1936

Source: Payne (2012). Darker areas were controlled by the rebels.

Therefore, our sample is divided between officers serving in the Republican and Rebel areas during the coup. We observe almost no variation in our dependent variable within the Rebel Zone (93.3% of the officers supported the rebels). In contrast, the Republican Zone has significant variation (68.45% supported the rebels, 31.55% stayed loyal). La Parra-

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[6]For example, in Morocco, General Romerales remained loyal to the Republic, but was imprisoned and later executed by his subordinates. Payne (2017) writes: "Around 4:00 AM on the nineteenth [prime minister] Martinez Barrio began to contact district military commanders by telephone... he found that several of those loyal to the regime had been virtually deposed by younger officers."

Pérez (2020) argues that the dissimilar strategies adopted by each side explain this difference. The rebels imposed discipline and repression to intimidate those loyal to the government. In contrast, the government issued a decree declaring that "all the troops in which officers have positioned themselves against republican legality are discharged" (La Parra-Pérez (2020), p. 18). Since most units had experienced some attempt at rebellion, this act gave freedom of action to the entire military. In short, the rebel strategy was to secure the support of the entire military, while the government deeply suspected it (and therefore proceeded to arm the people)[7].

Since we do not observe variation in the rebel area, our baseline regressions limit the sample to officers in the Republican area. Our results remain significant if include the full sample (our estimates become significantly smaller, as it should be expected from roughly doubling the sample and adding almost no extra variation in the dependent variable). Table A.1 shows descriptive statistics for the full Army and for the Army in the Republican Zone. The Republican Zone is representative of Spain in a number of variables. For example, officer rank and tenure are higher by only 3 and 4% respectively (to be expected since it includes Madrid). Other variables are less balanced; for example, years in Africa are much higher outside (as expected since Africa was under Rebel control).

2.2   Military Yearbooks

Our first data source is the Spanish Military Yearbook[8] *(Anuario militar de España)*. See an example of a page of the 1930 Yearbook in Figure 2.

We use the yearbooks to track the career of every army officer during the ten years before the coup. In particular, chapter X of each yearbook lists every officer, their date of birth, their date of entry into the Army, their seniority, and their *destination*. We use the destination to link officers to their leaders.

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[7]This was confirmed by the President of the Republic, Manuel Azaña, who wrote in a post-war book: "Aiming at leaving the leaders of the coup without troops, the government freed all soldiers from obeisance to their superiors. Obviously, this decree was not followed in those cities already under rebel control, but it applied to important towns under republican command... Soldiers abandoned the garrisons and almost everyone went back home... The professional officers were suspect, and the troops, mostly workers, leaned towards obeying their parties or unions..." Azaña and Jackson (1986).

[8]Available for download from the website of the Spanish National Library https://hemerotecadigital.bne.es/hd/es/results?parent=170edc64-562e-4aa6-baca-6dfa60260d5b&t=alt-asc. We digitized the yearbooks using *Textract*, a machine learning OCR service by AWS, together with extensive manual checking and cleaning.

Figure 2: Example from a page of the 1930 Military Yearbook

2.3 Engel Dataset

The original data source for the classification of officers into rebels and Republicans is Carlos Engel's book *El Cuerpo de Oficiales de la Guerra de España* (Engel Masolvier (2008))[9]. The book classifies the entirety of the Spanish officer corps serving in July 1936 into rebels, Republicans, and neutrals.

Engel classifies officers using official documents and secondary sources, including promotions, rewards, punishments, and defections. For example, if an officer was promoted by the Rebel side, Engel classified him as a rebel. If another officer was executed by the

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[9]This dataset was previously digitized by La Parra-Pérez (2020). We are very thankful to the author for making his replication dataset available. And, of course, we are very thankful to Carlos Engel for his work.

Figure 3: Part of a page from Engel's book

Republic, he classified him as a rebel[10]. We were able to find x% of Engel's Army officers in the 1936 yearbook, which suggests that our digitization of the yearbooks was successful. See an example of a page in Figure 3.

2.4 Our Dataset

After merging the yearbook dataset with the Engel data, we built a dataset where the unit of observation is subordinate i in destination j. In our baseline specifications, we classify every general (including both major generals and brigadier generals) in a given destination as a leader. We classify these generals into rebels (51 generals),Republicans (34), and neutrals or retired (237). Everyone else serving in the destination is a subordinate. A i subordinate serving in destination j is exposed to a rebel leader if at least one of the leaders of j supported the coup. Since there are destinations with multiple generals, we run a robustness check where we use the percentage of rebel leaders instead of the dummy, obtaining similar results.

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[10]Engel also uses the post-war outcomes: if an officer served under the Republic but was afterward reincorporated to the Army by Franco, he is classified as "geographically loyal" to the Republic. In our dataset (and in La Parra-Pérez (2020)), he is considered a rebel. The opposite happens for officers who served under the rebel side but were dismissed after the war. In a robustness check, we show that our results are robust to excluding these "geographically loyal" officers.

We also report specifications using the six principal rebel leaders[11].

Our identification strategy hinges on comparing officers who were exposed to rebel leaders to their peers who served a few years earlier or later in the same post but were not exposed. Therefore, we include destination fixed effects. Therefore, the dataset is built at the individual-destination level. A concern may be that individuals who served in many destinations are overrepresented in the dataset. Therefore we include robustness checks where we weight observations by $\frac{1}{\text{number of destinations}}$. We also report results at the individual level (with 1936 destination fixed effects).

We show that our treatment and control samples are balanced in Table 1. We run regressions for two of our treatment variables (being exposed to a rebel leader or to a principal rebel leader) on potential confounders (variables that may predict rebellion)[12]. After including the destination fixed effects, only three variables are statistically significant in predicting exposure to any rebel leader: treated observations had 3% more destinations, were 21% more likely to be posted in 1936, and were located (in 1936) in a province with 27% higher vote share for the left (for more variables, see Table A.2). The balance is somewhat similar for principal rebel leaders: officer rank, number of destinos, and belonging to the Guardia de Asalto are significant.

A large number of destinations in the control sample do not have a general in charge (by definition, those exposed to rebel generals are in a destination with at least one general). Therefore, we run robustness checks where we restrict the control sample to destinations with generals. In order to cover destinations without generals, we use the Army's organizational structure to link subordinates serving in regiments and battalions to the generals in charge of the divisions and brigades[13]. These relationships are more distant since it is not even guaranteed that a given regiment is located in the same city as the divisional headquarters.

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[11]Francisco Franco Bahamonde, Manuel Goded Llopis, Emilio Mola Vidal, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Serra, Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, and Joaquin Fanjul Goni.

[12]We take these potential confounders from La Parra-Pérez (2020), who also studies individual determinants of rebellion in 1936.

[13]During the Second Republic, the Spanish army troops were organized into eight divisions plus two commands (*Comandancias*). The divisions were located in the mainland territory, while the commands were in two archipelagos, the Baleares and the Canarias. These divisions and commands were subdivided into brigades, and the brigades into regiments. By linking these structures in a hierarchical tree, we could identify leader-subordinate relations between the generals in charge of the divisions and brigades and low-rank officers serving in a specific regiment

Table 1: Balance Table: Effect of Covariates on Treatment Status

	Rebel Leader		Principal Rebel Leader	
Destination FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Officer Rank	0.016	0.001	0.006	0.001
p-value	0.000	0.383	0.000	0.038
as % of	0.564	0.020	0.569	0.095
mean rebel				
Number of Destinos	0.005	-0.001	0.003	0.001
	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.023
	0.185	-0.028	0.233	0.059
Tenure	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
	0.000	0.560	0.000	0.330
	0.047	-0.002	0.041	-0.006
Officer Rank	0.013	0.000	0.005	0.000
in 1936	0.000	0.700	0.000	0.892
	0.453	-0.007	0.445	0.005
Guardia de Asalto	-0.013	0.002	-0.007	-0.005
	0.020	0.548	0.040	0.055
	-0.459	0.065	-0.652	-0.418
Years in Africa	0.008	0.000	0.004	-0.001
	0.000	0.786	0.000	0.320
	0.272	0.007	0.330	-0.054
Years in Africa	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.000
(core)	0.000	0.655	0.001	0.432
	0.068	-0.005	0.098	0.016
Posted in 1936	-0.016	0.006	-0.005	0.000
	0.000	0.006	0.095	0.908
	-0.560	0.215	-0.408	-0.018
Leftist Vote	-0.016	0.008	-0.002	-0.001
in Province	0.022	0.031	0.643	0.793
	-0.556	0.272	-0.181	-0.067
Demoted in the	0.026	0.002	0.013	0.001
1931 Reform	0.000	0.550	0.000	0.630
	0.908	0.054	1.204	0.087
Highest Ranking	0.010	0.001	0.003	0.001
in Garrison (1936)	0.018	0.683	0.362	0.572
	0.366	0.033	0.228	0.091
Loser in the	0.038	-0.001	0.014	0.000
1931 Reform	0.000	0.539	0.000	0.760
	1.340	-0.041	1.268	-0.041

Each cell in this table corresponds to a regression of one covariate against our main treatement variables. The first row shows the co-efficient, the second the p-value, and the third the coefficient as a % of the treatment variable. Columns 1 and 3 report the regressions without fixed effects, showing unbalanced samples. Columns 2 and 4 include destination fixed effects, showing mostly balanced samples.

3   Results

Our baseline regressions are in Table 2. Columns 1-3, 4-6, and 7-9 report the effects of exposure to a Rebel leader, a Principal Rebel leader, or a Republican leader, respectively.

First, note that including a wide range of controls[14] (columns 3, 6, and 9) does not alter the coefficients of the regressions with fixed effects (columns 2, 5, and 8). Since the effect of the treatment is orthogonal to important observable determinants of rebellion, we are confident that it is also independent of unobservables. The effect of exposure to a rebel leader is statistically significant and economically large: A subordinate who served under a rebel leader is 20pp more likely to rebel than a subordinate who served in the same destination under a Republican, neutral, or retired leader (68.45% of the officers in the Republican Zone rebelled). As expected, the effect is larger for the principal leaders, around 32pp[15].

Surprisingly, there is no effect of Republican leaders, so our main result is asymmetric. We have two potential explanations for this null effect. First, many Republican generals were imprisoned or executed in the early days of the rebellion, precluding them from inspiring their subordinates. Second, the actual leaders of the Republican side were the lawfully elected civilian authorities, and therefore military leadership may have been less salient on that side.

Table 2: The Effect of Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel

| | Rebel Subordinate | | | | | | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Rebel Leader	0.081*** (0.021)	0.200*** (0.043)	0.201*** (0.047)						
Principal Rebel Leader				0.085** (0.034)	0.324*** (0.089)	0.323*** (0.077)			
Republican Leader							0.006 (0.030)	0.017 (0.054)	0.025 (0.052)
Destinations FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.683	0.683	0.683	0.684	0.684	0.684
Observations	17,014	17,014	17,014	16,722	16,722	16,722	17,014	17,014	17,014

Baseline Results: This table shows the effect of Rebel Leaders, Principal Rebel Leaders, and Republican Leaders on their subordinates' decisions ($Rebel = 1$). Each observation is an individual in a given destination. For each treatment variable, we report OLS regressions with no fixed effects, with destination fixed effects, and with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Individuals who had more than one type of leader in a given destination were excluded. Furthermore, we dropped leader-subordinate relations active in 1936. Standard errors clustered at the destination level are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3 studies the effect of 1936 leaders on the decision to rebel. In models 1 and 2,

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[14]For maximum robustness, we do not define the controls ourselves, we instead take the full set from La Parra-Pérez (2020) (who also studies individual determinants of rebellion), see list in Tables 1 and A.2.

[15]The endogenous coefficient (without fixed effects) in columns 1 and 4 is significantly smaller. One explanation for this finding is that the government may have placed loyal generals in charge of the most rebellious units, biasing the coefficient downwards.

we include a variable that equals one if the subordinate was serving under a rebel general in 1936 in order to detect the effect of *current* leaders. It should be noted, however, that the assignment of 1936 leaders is not exogenous. Note that the effect of *former* leaders remains significant and with similar magnitude. The effect of current leaders in model 1 (with fixed effects, without controls) is positive but smaller by an order of magnitude. The sign flips when we add the controls, suggesting that the assignment of 1936 leaders was not exogenous[16]. Still, these results highlight the importance of past leaders and confirm the breaking of the chain of command that characterized the 1936 coup. Interestingly, we detect an effect of current *Republican* leaders, in the expected direction (a decrease in the probability of joining the rebellion), suggesting that the government's strategy partially worked.

Table 3: The Effect of Current and Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel

	Rebel Subordinate			
	(3)	(4)	(7)	(8)
Rebel Leader before 1936	0.172*** (0.038)	0.179*** (0.040)		
Rebel Leader in 1936	0.026** (0.011)	−0.020* (0.012)		
Republican Leader before 1936			−0.001 (0.044)	0.0004 (0.041)
Republican Leader in 1936			−0.113*** (0.018)	−0.103*** (0.018)
Destinations FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes s	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.684
Observations	17,593	17,593	17,593	17,593

Analysis around 1936: This table shows the effect of Rebel Leaders, Principal Rebel Leaders, and Republican Leaders on their subordinates' decisions (*Rebel* = 1). Each observation is an individual in a given destination. We included a dummy variable that indicates whether subordinates were serving under rebel (columns 1 and 2) or Republican leaders (columns 3 and 4) in 1936. For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with fixed effects and fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Individuals who had more than one type of leader in a given destination were excluded. Standard errors clustered at the destination level are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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[16]Note that our identification strategy allows us to control for assignment of leaders in the past, but not necessarily in the present. For example, we assume that an officer who served in 1932 in the XV Brigada de Galicia (under Franco) is comparable to an officer who served in 1931. However, their destination (and therefore geographic location) in 1936 is more directly relevant to their coup participation.

3.1 Mechanisms

Table 4 tests our first hypothesized mechanism for the effect of former leaders. We postulate that generals with a right-wing ideology may have indoctrinated their troops when they were in charge. These preferences may have been transferred to their subordinates through persuasion. For example, in 1928 (still during the monarchy) as Director of the Zaragoza Military Academy, Franco gave "ten commandments" to the cadets, the first one being: "Love the Homeland deeply and be loyal to the King" (Preston (2015), ch. 2). Eight years later, during the Republic, that message may have inspired officers to rebel against the regime.

By revealed preference, the generals that supported the 1923 and 1932 coups (the first one succeeded and the second one failed) also had authoritarian preferences. We show in Table 4 that officers who served under them were not more likely to rebel than soldiers who served in the same units under Republican or neutral generals. Columns 1 and 2 show a null effect of these 14 generals (without and with controls). Column 3 shows that our main effect remains unchanged when we include both a variable with rebels and one with retired right-wingers. In the following columns, we disaggregate the right-wing generals into those who supported the 1936 coup[17] and those who did not (as expected, none of these generals *opposed* the coup). It makes no difference whether or not they supported the coup[18]. Therefore, we conclude that indoctrination is unlikely to be the mechanism behind our results.

Next, we investigate whether leaders were focal points in a coordination game. Singh (2014) describes coups as coordination games. After extensive interviews with army officers, he concludes that the risk to life trumps ideological considerations[19]. Therefore, officers attempt to support the winning side. The Spanish Coup was atypical since, after the first few days, the army (if not the officer corps) and the country were split pretty evenly. Therefore, when trying to estimate the split of the Army (which is known to us after decades of historical research, but uncertain at the time), officers may have oversampled those they

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[17]Because he was retired and because he died two days into the coup, Sanjurjo is included in this group. The results are unchanged if we exclude him.

[18]With the exception of Sanjurjo, those who supported the coup were not expected to play a major role (maybe due to their age, or because if incorporated to the Army, they would have outranked the principal conspirators).

[19]"In fact, they believed that it would have been selfish to let their personal political beliefs guide their response. As officers, their first responsibility was to their men, and they felt it was wrong to use their troops, possibly endangering their lives, to support the side they preferred if it was likely to lose." (Singh (2014), p. 6).

Table 4: Indoctrination? The Effect of Right-Wing Retired Generals

	Rebel Subordinate							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Retired Right-Wing Leader	0.033 (0.058)	−0.005 (0.052)	−0.006 (0.053)					
Rebel Leader			0.201*** (0.047)					
Retired Right-Wing Leader Inactive in 1936				−0.019 (0.085)	0.017 (0.096)			0.018 (0.096)
Retired Right-Wing Leader Active in 1936						0.042 (0.057)	−0.004 (0.057)	−0.004 (0.057)
Destinations FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.684
Observations	17,014	17,014	17,014	17,014	17,014	17,014	17,014	17,014
R^2	0.150	0.220	0.221	0.150	0.220	0.150	0.220	0.220

Mechanisms Right-Wing Generals: This table shows the effect of Retired Right-Wing Generals on subordinates' decision ($Rebel = 1$). Each observation is an individual in a given destination. These generals participated in either the 1923 or the 1932 coup attempt. We separate them into those who endorsed the 1936 (Active) and those who did not (Inactive). For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with fixed effects and fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Individuals who had more than one type of leader in a given destination were excluded. Furthermore, we drop leader-subordinate relations active in 1936. Standard errors clustered at the destination level in parentheses.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

knew better (their former leaders).

We postulate that former leaders who were geographically closer to their subordinates were even more salient. Officers had an incentive to keep track of the situation on the ground (especially to save their own lives), and the decisions of officers posted far away were probably less relevant. Therefore, for each subordinate-destination, we calculate the distance (in 1936) between the subordinate and their (former) leader, and we split the sample in two (above and below the median). We report results in Table 5. Indeed, we find that the effect is larger below the median (columns 1 and 2). It is still positive above the median, but it loses significance (columns 3 and 4).

The third mechanism we explore relates to potential material gains to be expected from following former leaders. Previous literature has established that subordinates are more likely to receive promotions when their patrons gain more influence (for example, see Jia et al. (2015), Salgado (2023), Shih et al. (2012), Voth and Xu (2020), and Xu (2018)). Leaders who had been in charge of subordinates in the past may promote them faster in the future, maybe because they have a more accurate signal of their ability, or because they expect

Table 5: Coordination Mechanism? Effect of Rebel Leaders by Distance to Subordinate

| | Rebel Subordinate | | | | | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel Leader	0.255***	0.231***	0.143	0.141				
	(0.047)	(0.067)	(0.124)	(0.116)				
Republican Leader					−0.071	−0.118	0.073	0.063
					(0.116)	(0.104)	(0.086)	(0.077)
Median Condition	Below	Below	Above	Above	Below	Below	Above	Above
Destination FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.685	0.685	0.685	0.685	0.685	0.685	0.685	0.685
Observations	16,666	16,666	16,662	16,662	16,736	16,736	16,800	16,800
R^2	0.152	0.224	0.152	0.223	0.152	0.224	0.151	0.223

In this table, we split the sample by geographic distance between leader and subordinate in 1936 (for treated units, the control sample is the same in all regressions). Observations with multiple leaders were excluded from the analysis. Treatment observations were divided into above and below the median distance. For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with fixed effects and with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Furthermore, we dropped leader-subordinate relations active in 1936. Standard errors clustered at the destination level are in parentheses. *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

reciprocity in the future.

Much like the papers cited above, we test whether previous connections led to promotions in Spain. If they did before the coup, we expect officers to anticipate rewards and, therefore, follow their former bosses. We check whether, during the regime installed in 1923, former subordinates of coup organizers got promoted more rapidly. In Table 6, column 1, we find that they did (before 1931). In column 2, we show that this pattern reversed during the Republic (after 1931). The effects are sizable, a promotion was 22 percentage points more likely for connected officers (the average probability was 29%).

We also show that subordinates who were exposed to loyal leaders in 1936 were promoted more rapidly during the Republic (column 4) but not during the Monarchy (column 3). Of course, this test is reversed (the coup happened after the promotions), so causality may be reversed (those who had more power during the Republic had a greater stake in the regime and, therefore, more incentives to defend it). Still, we consider this further evidence that different regimes gave different degrees of power to different types of general, and that their (former) subordinates beneficiated in turn.

Table 6: Promotions Mechanism? Effect of Connections on Promotions

	Promotion			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Right Wing Leader Coup 1923	0.218*** (0.063)	−0.273*** (0.005)		
Republican Leader			0.009 (0.076)	0.173** (0.077)
Regime	Monarchy	Republic	Monarchy	Republic
Destinations FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Promotion	0.295	0.248	0.295	0.248
Observations	15,578	20,855	15,578	20,855
R^2	0.156	0.178	0.155	0.177

This table shows that subordinates of the 1923 coup organizers were promoted more rapidly during the monarchy (1927-1931) and more slowly afterward (1932-1936). The unit of observation is an individual in a given destination. Also, subordinates of leaders who stayed loyal in 1936 got promoted more rapidly during the Republic and more slowly before that. The variable Promotion is equal to 1 if we observe an increase in the officer's rank. For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with fixed effects and with fixed effects plus additional controls. Standard errors clustered at the destination level in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

3.2 Robustness Checks

As explained in section 2.4, the unit of observation in our dataset is the individual in a given destination (because we can then use destination fixed effects and compare subordinates who served in the same units). In Table A.3, we aggregate our dataset to the individual level and calculate the percentage of the subordinate's career under rebel leaders. The table mimics Table 2, but at the individual level. Instead of destination fixed effects, we include fixed effects for the officers' 1936 destination. As in our baseline, we find positive effects of rebel leaders and null effects of Republican leaders. The effects are smaller, especially after we include the controls. Note that these estimates should not be interpreted as causal, since there may be unobservables biasing the results. For example, the government may have placed loyal generals in charge of the most rebellious units, biasing the coefficient downwards. A potential problem with the individual-destination dataset is that individuals who served in many destinations are overrepresented in the dataset. Therefore, in Table A.4, we weight observations by $\frac{1}{\text{number of destinations}}$. Our results remain substantively unchanged.

As a robustness check, Table A.5 defines the treatment variable as % of Rebel/Principal Rebel/Republican generals (in a given destination), instead of the dummy we use in the baseline regressions (Table 2). Of course, this change in the definition only affects officers

in destinations with multiple generals. Our results remain substantively unchanged.

In Table A.6, we show that our results are not driven by selection. For each type of leader, we define the variable "Potentially Selected", which equals 1 if the subordinate joined that destination *after* the leader. Everyone else had been serving at the unit *before* the arrival of the leader. Individuals who arrived after may have been hired by the leader and therefore selected in unobservables (for example, proclivity to support a coup). We find no additional effect for these potentially hired officers, suggesting that leaders were not hiring based on coup proclivity or that they could not observe it. Therefore, selection is unlikely to drive our results.

A large number of destinations in the control sample do not have a general in charge (by definition, those exposed to rebel generals are in a destination with at least one general). Therefore, in Table A.7 we run robustness checks where we restrict the control sample to destinations with (retired or neutral) generals. The sample is smaller by approximately an order of magnitude, but our results remain unchanged[20]. In order to cover the vast majority of the sample, those not serving *directly* under a general, we use the Army's organizational structure to link, for example, subordinates serving in regiments and battalions to the generals in charge of the divisions or brigades[21]. We report the results in Table A.8. The coefficients for rebel leaders are positive but smaller in magnitude. This is to be expected since the relationships between high-ranking and low-ranking officers are necessarily more distant. For example, it is not even guaranteed that a given regiment is located in the same city as the divisional headquarters. Still, in column 3, we see that being exposed to a rebel leader increases the probability of rebellion by 4% (around 6% of the average probability), a much smaller but still substantive effect.

In Table A.9, we show that our results are robust to different decisions in sample definition. First, in columns 1 and 2, we show that when we include the Rebel Zone in our estimation, our estimates remain positive and significant but decrease by roughly half. This is to be expected since there is almost no variation in the dependent variable within the Rebel Zone (as explained in Section 2.1). In columns 3 and 4, we drop those serving under

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[20]This is a product of how we define the destinations. In our baseline regressions, we take the destinations literally (as they appear in the yearbooks, see 2). Therefore, someone serving in the "First Division, Second Brigade, Third Regiment" will not be serving under a general since they were in charge of brigades and divisions, not battalions. Our main regressions, therefore, are informative of the relationship between high-ranking and middle-ranking officers, not necessarily reflecting effects on low-ranking officers.

[21]Note that in doing so we exclude from the dataset anyone outside this hierarchical structure, such as support or training units.

Republican generals from the control group, and our results remain unchanged. In columns 5 and 6, we include 1936 connections between rebel leaders and subordinates (excluded from our baseline regressions because we are focusing on the effect of *former* leaders). In columns 7 and 8, we keep in the treatment group the observations where a subordinate is treated by both a rebel and a Republican (we drop them in our baseline regressions).

4 Conclusion

For Spanish Army officers, choosing what side to support in the coup may have been the most important decision of their lives. For Spain, the split of the Army led to a civil war with half a million casualties and a forty-year-long dictatorship. In this paper, we have shown that replacing key generals was not sufficient for the Republic to survive. The widespread breaking of the chain of command seems to suggest that the military hierarchy does not matter, but we, in fact, find the opposite: subordinates followed their *former* leaders. Therefore, this paper highlights the role of *past hieararchies*.

We contribute to a small but growing literature that posits the question: Why do individuals follow leaders? Since we focus on *past* leaderships, we rule out compliance with the chain of command.

The two sides in the Spanish Civil War were separated by wide ideological differences. The Republican government had support from a wide range of factions including republicans, socialists, communists, and anarchists. The rebel ideology was largely monarchist, conservative, and authoritarian. Internationally, the government had support from the Soviet Union, while the rebels had support from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. However, we do not find that indoctrination played a role. Officers exposed to retired or dead right-wing generals are not more likely to support the coup.

Our results point to mechanisms consistent with forward-looking agents. First, we show that the effect of leadership is stronger for those who were posted closer to their respective former leaders on the day of the coup. If leaders who are geographically closer are more salient, this is consistent with a "coordination" theory of leadership. Leaders are focal individuals, and their actions are a public signal.

Another possibility is a "reciprocal" nature of leadership. Subordinates support their leaders because they expect material rewards from doing so. Agents can benefit if their

former leaders have more power and resources. First, their former leaders have a more accurate signal of their abilities and are, therefore, more likely to pick them for promotions. Second, leaders and subordinates (or, as it is more common in the literature, patrons and clients) may be engaged in a long-term repeated cooperation game, where they exchange support for material rewards. Spanish officers in 1936 had reason to believe this would be the case. Officers who had served under the leaders of the 1923 coup were promoted more rapidly than their peers during the dictatorship, and their promotions slowed down during the Republic.

In summary, the Spanish Coup of 1936 provides very valuable insights into two topics. Regarding coup dynamics, it highlights the role of past hierarchies and warns about the limitations of leader rotation as a coup-proofing mechanism. This is most relevant for young democracies, whose recent past hierarchies were shaped by former dictators. It may also explain why consolidated democracies can fall into an absorbing state. Regarding the nature of leadership, our results highlight its strategic nature, suggesting that subordinates follow when they are looking for coordination devices or when they expect material reward from doing so.

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A   Appendix

Table A.1: Comparison between the Full Army and the Army in the Republican Zone

	All of Spain Mean	Republican Area Mean	Difference
Rebel Subordinate	0.814	0.684	0.129
p-value			0.000
diff as %			0.159
of mean			
Rebel Leader	0.027	0.028	-0.001
			0.337
			-0.055
Principal Rebel Leader	0.011	0.011	0.000
			0.689
			-0.036
Republican Rebel Leader	0.012	0.014	-0.002
			0.029
			-0.198
Officer Rank	2.592	2.670	-0.078
			0.000
			-0.030
Number of Destinations	4.500	4.572	-0.072
			0.000
			-0.016
Tenure	22.083	23.016	-0.932
			0.000
			-0.042
Rank in 1936	3.852	3.951	-0.099
			0.000
			-0.026
Guardia de Asalto	0.038	0.055	-0.017
			0.000
			-0.458
Years in Africa (core)	0.315	0.277	0.038
			0.000
			0.121
Years in Africa	2.376	1.989	0.387
			0.000
			0.163
Posted in 1936	0.921	0.903	0.018
			0.000
			0.019
Leftist Vote in Province	0.406	0.483	-0.077
			0.000
			-0.190
Demoted in 1931 Reform	0.072	0.070	0.002
			0.365
			0.030
Highest Ranking in Garrison (1936)	0.097	0.092	0.005
			0.072
			0.050
Loser in 1931 Reform	0.146	0.162	-0.016
			0.000
			-0.108

The purpose of this table is to compare the full Spanish Army with the Army in the Republican Area. Since most officers in the Rebel Area did not have the choice of whether or not to rebel, our baseline specifications only use the Republican Area sample.

Table A.2: Balance Table: Effect of More Covariates on Treatment Status

Destination FE	Rebel Leader		Principal Rebel Leader	
	No	Yes	No	Yes
Cavalry Corps	0.040	0.002	0.021	0.008
p-value	0.000	0.634	0.000	0.011
as % of	1.425	0.067	1.888	0.726
mean rebel				
Infantary Corps	-0.005	0.001	-0.002	0.003
	0.053	0.667	0.222	0.089
	-0.181	0.035	-0.184	0.282
Engineer Corps	0.010	-0.002	0.003	-0.031
	0.015	0.681	0.278	0.000
	0.368	-0.067	0.263	-2.825
Aviation Corps	0.005	0.010	0.007	0.013
	0.432	0.026	0.072	0.000
	0.168	0.351	0.618	1.133
Carabineros Corps	-0.013	0.006	-0.004	0.007
	0.002	0.107	0.139	0.018
	-0.475	0.226	-0.365	0.665
Train Corps	0.077	0.000	0.042	0.008
	0.004	1.000	0.014	0.456
	2.729	0.000	3.746	0.716
Guardia Civil Corps	-0.024	0.008	-0.009	0.004
	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.105
	-0.852	0.280	-0.846	0.391
Change Position 1932	0.013	0.010	0.004	0.004
	0.012	0.000	0.255	0.051
	0.473	0.344	0.347	0.374
Change Position 1933	-0.013	0.002	-0.005	0.000
	0.003	0.392	0.055	0.965
	-0.457	0.068	-0.479	0.007
Change Position 1934	-0.016	-0.004	-0.004	0.000
	0.003	0.130	0.196	0.927
	-0.553	-0.146	-0.390	-0.018
Change Position 1935	0.005	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002
	0.322	0.807	0.746	0.235
	0.164	-0.021	-0.086	-0.205
Change Position 1936	0.000	-0.002	-0.003	-0.005
	0.938	0.205	0.124	0.000
	0.007	-0.062	-0.237	-0.414
First Division	0.022	0.001	0.011	0.000
	0.000	0.511	0.000	0.897
	0.768	0.036	0.960	-0.014
Second Division	-0.007	0.004	-0.005	0.001
	0.154	0.135	0.109	0.693
	-0.258	0.157	-0.468	0.083
Third Divion	-0.016	-0.001	-0.006	0.001
	0.000	0.603	0.005	0.629
	-0.581	-0.039	-0.555	0.073
Fourth Division	-0.014	0.001	-0.006	0.000
	0.000	0.566	0.006	0.826
	-0.501	0.040	-0.508	0.031
Sixth Division	0.001	-0.003	-0.005	0.001
	0.824	0.255	0.106	0.815
	0.040	-0.120	-0.471	0.050

Each cell in this table corresponds to a regression of one covariate against our main independent variables. The first row shows the coefficient, the second the p-value, and the third the coefficient as a % of the independent variable. Columns 1 and 3 report the regressions without fixed effects, showing unbalanced samples. Columns 2 and 4 include destination fixed effects, showing mostly balanced samples.

Table A.3: The Effect of Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel: Individual Level Regressions

	Rebel Subordinate								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Percentage Rebel Leader	0.174*** (0.035)	0.122*** (0.033)	0.055* (0.032)						
Percentage Principal Rebel Leader				0.305*** (0.075)	0.249*** (0.069)	0.139* (0.075)			
Percentage Republican Leader							0.037 (0.051)	−0.021 (0.053)	−0.056 (0.057)
Destinations 1936 FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.648	0.648	0.648	0.648	0.648	0.648	0.648	0.648	0.648
Observations	4,612	4,612	4,612	4,612	4,612	4,612	4,612	4,612	4,612
R^2	0.005	0.212	0.285	0.004	0.212	0.285	0.000	0.210	0.285

This table shows the effect of Rebel Leaders, Principal Rebel Leaders, and Republican Leaders on their subordinates' decisions ($Rebel = 1$) using a dataset where each observation is an individual. For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with no fixed effects, with 1936 destination fixed effects, and with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Furthermore, subordinates who in 1936 were in destinations with any type of General were excluded. Standard errors clustered at the destination level in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.4: Regressions Weighted by the Inverse of the Number of Destinations

	Rebel Subordinate								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Rebel Leader	0.107*** (0.026)	0.240*** (0.047)	0.234*** (0.048)						
Principal Rebel Leader				0.112*** (0.042)	0.366*** (0.055)	0.371*** (0.058)			
Republican Leader							0.031 (0.035)	0.016 (0.064)	0.015 (0.056)
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Destinations FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.683	0.683	0.683	0.684	0.0684	0.684
Observations	17,014	17,014	17,014	16,722	16,722	16,722	17,014	17,014	17,014
R^2	0.001	0.179	0.250	0.0004	0.180	0.251	0.00004	0.178	0.249

This table shows the effect of Rebel Leaders, Principal Rebel Leaders, and Republican Leaders on their subordinates' decisions ($Rebel = 1$). Each observation is an individual in a given destination. We weight observations by the inverse of the number of destinations per individual. For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with no fixed effects, with destination fixed effects, and with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup, individuals who have more than one type of leadership by destination were excluded. Furthermore, connections that were active in 1936 have been discarded. Standard errors clustered at the destination level in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.5: Continuous Definition of Treatment Variable
(for destinations with multiple generals)

	Rebel Subordinate								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
% Rebel Leaders	0.091*** (0.024)	0.156** (0.068)	0.159*** (0.057)						
% Principal Rebel Leader				0.159*** (0.052)	0.375*** (0.084)	0.352*** (0.058)			
% Republican Leader							0.036 (0.033)	0.001 (0.081)	−0.013 (0.068)
Destinations FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	17,377	17,377	17,377	17,377	17,377	17,377	17,377	17,377	17,377
R^2	0.001	0.149	0.218	0.001	0.149	0.219	0.0001	0.148	0.218

This table shows the effect of Rebel Leaders, Principal Rebel Leaders, and Republican leaders on their subordinates' decisions ($Rebel = 1$). Each observation is an individual in a given destination. For destinations with multiple generals, we compute the % of Rebels/Principal Rebels/Republicans, instead of the dummy we use in the baseline regressions (Table 2). For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with no fixed effects, with destination fixed effects, and with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Furthermore, connections that were active in 1936 have been discarded. Standard errors clustered at the destination level in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.6: Selection? Effect of Rebel Leaders by Date of Incorporation

	Rebel Subordinate								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Rebel Leader	0.129** (0.054)	0.175** (0.083)	0.214** (0.087)						
Rebel Leader Potentially Selected	−0.057 (0.059)	0.035 (0.111)	−0.019 (0.105)						
Principal Rebel Leader				0.024 (0.080)	0.229*** (0.074)	0.261*** (0.073)			
Principal Rebel Leader Potentially Selected				0.075 (0.088)	0.147 (0.150)	0.096 (0.131)			
Republican Leader							−0.006 (0.061)	0.038 (0.052)	0.059 (0.049)
Republican Leader Potentially Selected							0.016 (0.070)	−0.030 (0.065)	−0.049 (0.066)
Destinations FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.683	0.683	0.683	0.684	0.684	0.684
Observations	17,014	17,014	17,014	16,722	16,722	16,722	17,014	17,014	17,014
R^2	0.001	0.151	0.221	0.0004	0.152	0.223	0.00001	0.150	0.220

This table shows the effect of Rebel Leaders, Principal Rebel Leaders, and Republican Leaders on their subordinates' decisions ($Rebel = 1$). Each observation is an individual in a given destination. The "Potentially Selected" variables equal 1 if the subordinate arrived at the destination at the same time or after the leader. For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with no fixed effects, with destination fixed effects, and with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup, individuals who have more than one type of leadership by destination were excluded. Furthermore, connections that were active in 1936 have been discarded. Standard errors clustered at the destination level in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.7: The Effect of Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel:
Only Destinations with Generals

				Rebel Subordinate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Rebel Leader	0.067***	0.208***	0.219***						
	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.049)						
Principal Rebel Leader				0.072**	0.327***	0.346***			
				(0.036)	(0.092)	(0.117)			
Republican Leader							−0.030	−0.019	−0.009
							(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.051)
Destinations FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.716	0.716	0.716	0.706	0.706	0.706	0.716	0.716	0.716
Observations	1,621	1,621	1,621	1,329	1,329	1,329	1,621	1,621	1,621
R^2	0.005	0.105	0.175	0.003	0.116	0.188	0.001	0.096	0.166

This table shows the effect of Rebel Leaders, Principal Rebel Leaders, and Republican Leaders on their subordinates' decisions ($Rebel = 1$). Each observation is an individual in a given destination. In this sample, we dropped individuals serving at destinations without generals. Therefore, the control group consists of individuals serving under retired or neutral generals. For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with no fixed effects, with destination fixed effects, and with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Individuals who had more than one type of leader in a given destination were excluded. Furthermore, we dropped leader-subordinate relations active in 1936. Standard errors clustered at the destination level are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.8: Effect of Rebel Leaders using the Military Hierarchy

				Rebel Subordinate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Rebel Leader	0.037***	0.031	0.040**						
	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.018)						
Principal Rebel Leader				−0.005	0.048**	0.048**			
				(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.020)			
Republican Leader							−0.002	−0.035	−0.022
							(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Destinations FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.688	0.688	0.688	0.688	0.688	0.688	0.688	0.688	0.688
Observations	12,237	12,237	12,237	12,237	12,237	12,237	12,237	12,237	12,237
R^2	0.001	0.165	0.231	0.000	0.165	0.231	0.000	0.165	0.231

This table shows the effect of Rebel Leaders, Principal Rebel Leaders, and Republican Leaders on their subordinates' decisions ($Rebel = 1$). Each observation is an individual in a given destination. We use the military hierarchy to identify leaders above the subordinate, even if not in the same literal destination (for example, the leader may be in the First Division, and the subordinate in the First Division, Second Brigade, Third Regiment). For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with no fixed effects, with destination fixed effects, and with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Individuals who had more than one type of leader in a given destination were excluded. Furthermore, we dropped leader-subordinate relations active in 1936. Standard errors clustered at the destination level are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.9: The Effect of Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel:
Alternative Sample Definitions

	Rebel Subordinate							
	Both Sides		*Without Republicans*		*With 1936*		*Not Droping Both Leaders*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel Leader	0.082***	0.091***	0.230***	0.227***	0.177***	0.175***	0.160***	0.143***
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.028)	(0.034)
Destinations FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.814	0.814	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.686	0.686
Observations	35,448	35,448	16,772	16,772	17,593	17,593	17,377	17,377
R^2	0.140	0.242	0.152	0.223	0.147	0.217	0.150	0.219

This table shows the effect of Rebel Leaders on their subordinates' decisions ($Rebel = 1$). Each observation is an individual in a given destination. The "Both Sides" columns include subordinates who were in the Republican and Rebel zones on the day of the coup. The "Without Republicans" columns exclude subordinates under Republicans Leaders from the Control Group. The "With 1936" columns include connections with generals in 1936. Finally, the "Not Dropping Both Leaders" columns include observations that have both Republican and Rebel leaders within the destination. For each pair of columns, we present an OLS regression with destination fixed effects and with fixed effects plus additional controls. Standard errors clustered at the destination level are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01