Promoting Exports*

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Abstract

Export promotion agencies worldwide spend heavily on interventions to induce domestic firms to start exporting. Yet we lack a proper evaluation of the efficacy of such programs. We implement a firm-level randomized controlled trial to assess whether providing information about the exporting process affects the likelihood that firms will start exporting. The first intervention offers access to online courses that provide information on different types of export impediments: bureaucracy, financial frictions, and demand uncertainty. The second, more intensive intervention offers firm-specific and individual consultancies on overcoming barriers to exporting. In a sample of 1,125 small, medium, and large Brazilian non-exporting manufacturing firms, we evaluate the impact of the interventions on firms' decision to export and their related employment dynamics. By combining the two types of interventions, we will be able to evaluate the main informational bottlenecks faced by firms and identify which intervention is more effective in shaping firms' internationalization decisions. At the current, interim stage of evaluation, we have identified a positive and statistically significant effect of the first treatment on firms' decision to export, as well as a larger positive effect on their intention to export in the future.

Keywords: Randomized controlled trial, Export promotion, Firm export decision

JEL classification: F10, F14, C93, D24

In progress

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1 Introduction

Export-led growth is a key driving force behind economic development. It can potentially increase firms' productivity, sales, profitability, and survival rates, as well as boost employment and wages (Feenstra et al., 2019). Despite that, exporting is a relatively rare activity, as discussed by Bernard et al. (2018) for the U.S. In Brazil, among the small, medium, and large firms belonging to the manufacturing industry, almost 90% have never participated in exporting activities.[1]

Several studies discuss frictions that firms face and need to overcome when they decide to export. Some of the frictions that shape the decision of firms to export are credit constraints, demand uncertainty, and "red tape" requirements to export. Firms with weaker credit constraints are more likely to be exporters (Muûls, 2015; Paravisini et al., 2015). Demand uncertainty affects firms' decisions on whether to export as well as how they expand within and across new markets (Albornoz et al., 2012). Finally, the "red tape" in the process of exporting discourages firms from selling their products abroad by increasing their perceived costs (Fontagné et al., 2020).

Given the importance of exporting and the impediments firms face during their export experiences, there may exist room for policy interventions to encourage firms to start exporting. Indeed, most governments worldwide actively engage in export promotion policies, spending heavily on Export Promotion Agencies (EPAs) to provide information to firm managers seeking to overcome the challenges of exporting. According to Lederman et al. (2010), the number of national EPAs has tripled over the three decades to 2010. Between 3/5 and 4/5 of the agencies obtained more than 75% of their budget from public funding. For instance, the budget of the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX-Brasil) in 2023 was around R$823 million (± $165 million), all of it from the Treasury. However, the evidence regarding the effectiveness of this type of public policy is sparse, at best.

In this study, we carry out a randomized controlled trial evaluate whether low-cost informational interventions can induce firms in Brazil to engage in exporting activities and how this decision affects firms' other economic decisions. By combining two types of interventions (online courses and to one-to-one consultancy sessions), we aim to evaluate the most effective ways to reduce informational barriers and to identify the types of information that shape firm export decisions. We also analyze how these different channels affect firms' employment dynamics. Do firms hire more workers to export? If so, do they hire skilled or non-skilled workers? The

[1] Own estimates based on the SECEX/MDIC dataset (firms' exporting status) and Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS), a matched employer-employee dataset.

answers to these questions could help policymakers promote economic development through international trade more effectively.

We implement two well-defined treatments. We can assess the effects for firms receiving either intervention alone or together. Specifically, we will compare three different scenarios. In the first one, firms receive a scalable and cheaper intervention (online courses);[2] in the second, firms receive a more tailored intervention; in the third scenario, firms have both interventions. Based on the estimated impacts and the costs of the two policies, we will be able to inform policymakers on the most cost-effective policy to boost firm export engagement, or whether, due to complementarities, they should invest in both.[3]

We already have results from the first two follow-up surveys, which we compare to the baseline survey. In the first follow-up, carried out right after the first intervention, we find a sizeable (between a 12% and a 25% increase from the baseline) and statistically significant impact on the intention to export for treated firms, relative to the control group. There is also a positive and significant effect on the perception about the benefits of exporting. Surprisingly, these effects are driven by the the *short* course. While the sign of the coefficients are similar, the estimates for the long course are not statistically significant. This could reflect, for example, information overload dampening interest in exporting.

The second follow-up was conducted one year after the first intervention, so it shows its medium-term effects. The positive effect on the intention to export in the future remains present and, in fact, is about 50% larger than in the first follow-up. Moreover, there is a positive and statistically significant effect on firms actually exporting during this period. We also find a reduction in the perception about the costs of exporting. Interestingly, although the positive and statistically significant effect on the intention to export in the future is driven by firms treated in the short course – as it is the case in the short run – the positive and statistically significant effect on *actual* exporting (as reported by the firms) stems from firms treated with the long course. In neither follow-up we identify a robust effect on firms' hiring decisions.[4]

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first project to decompose and quantify (some of) the frictions affecting exporting decisions using a randomized controlled trial involving firms of

[2]We provide two versions of this treatment: a one-week and a 3-week online course. The long version encompasses all the material from the short version, with additional content. Treated firms are randomly assigned to each.

[3]If the interventions are complementary, the net benefits of having both will be higher than the net benefits of having just one intervention.

[4]We have not yet evaluated the effects of the more intensive intervention, which took place until February 2024. The next follow-up, starting on September 2024, will be able to assess its impacts.

different sizes in different sectors. Additionally, within our study, we implement two distinct interventions using the same sample, enabling us to assess differences and complementary outcomes between them. In a related paper, Atkin et al. (2017) randomize foreign market access across rug producers in Egypt and investigate how it affects producers' performance. They find evidence of learning by exporting, i.e., treated firms increase their productivity, profits, and manufacture higher quality products compared to firms that did not benefit from international market access. Different from Atkin et al. (2017), our experiment investigates the informational frictions affecting firms' decisions to access foreign markets.

In another closely related paper, Kim et al. (2018) randomize participation in an export promotion seminar across a small group of Vietnamese firms in the textile sector to study export participation. Surprisingly, they find that participants were discouraged from exporting as they found exporting more challenging than non-participants did.[5] They show, however, that large firms were encouraged to engage in exporting (relative to large non-participants). In contrast, our objective is to study distinct channels of export promotion by using a significantly larger sample and analyzing different types of interventions. Hence, the external validity of our project is presumably significantly broader than in Kim et al.'s analysis.

In a recent study, Gonzalez et al. (2023) conduct an RCT involving 213 food and beverage Argentine SMEs. They implement a capability-building program aimed at training firms to adopt good exporting practices (GEP). Treated firms receive 72 hours of individual consulting over 6 months. The program primarily addresses demand impediments, such as learning practices to adapt products to foreign demand, improving production processes to enhance quality, and establishing long-term relationships with foreign distributors while adapting to their business practices. Despite the intensive treatment, the study finds no discernible impact on exports. Regarding the adoption of exporting practices, they observe that GEP scores grew considerably more for the treatment group. However, this difference was not statistically significant after controlling for pre-treatment levels of GEP adoption.

Several other studies seek to evaluate the efficacy of export promotion policies using non-experimental methods, with mixed findings (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Martincus and Carballo, 2008; Martincus and Carballo, 2010; Görg et al., 2008; Van Biesebroeck et al., 2015; Broocks and Van Biesebroeck, 2017; Munch and Schaur, 2018; Kabir et al., 2024). Since they are not based on an experiment with a comparable control group, they face challenges in establishing a causal relationship between the programs and their outcomes. The main

[5] Breinlich et al. (2017) carry out a related experiment and find similar negative results. A key difference between their study and ours is that they simply make information available to firms, whereas our treatments are more targeted and intense.

difficulty is that the firms that participate usually seek those programs precisely because they are already planning to export. This is not the case in our study, which uses a random sample of non-exporters for treated and control firms.

The remainder of this preliminary version of the paper is organized as follows. Section II explains our experimental intervention. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents the empirical strategy and the outcomes from the first intervention. Section V presents the empirical strategy from the second intervention. Section VI provides final remarks and indicates the next steps.

2 The Experiment

We implemented two interventions. In both, we provided information about different export impediments in Brazil. In the first intervention, we offered online courses, while in the second we offered one-to-one online consultancy sessions to the participating managers.

The online courses were conducted in mid-2022. After the baseline survey, we randomly assigned firms into a control group and two treatment groups, arms 1 and 2, each with 375 firms. For firms in the first arm, we provided a 6-hour course on the red tape barriers associated with export procedures. The course lasted one week, from Monday to Thursday, and was split into four sessions of an hour and a half each day. In the second arm, we offered export courses on demand uncertainty, financial frictions, and red tape barriers associated with export procedures. The course lasted 18 hours (6 hours for each module) during three weeks, also from Monday to Thursday, and split into an hour and a half each day. The timeline was as follows. The arm 2 participants took the demand course first, the financial course in the second week, and the red tape course in the third week. Both arms took the red tape course together. The online courses were offered in a webinar format, with no contact, exchanges, or spillovers between participants from the same or different treatment groups.

Before designing the intervention, our team met with technicians from APEX-Brazil and experts in export promotion within the country to seek guidance regarding the selection of content and the sequence of courses to be followed. The demand uncertainty course provided information on how to conduct internal modifications necessary for exporting and strategies for identifying and reaching out to foreign buyers. The financial frictions course encompassed information on lines of credit available to exporters and the procedures to access them, alongside detailed information on insurance options and tax payment procedures. Lastly, the red tape course covered essential information about the processes required for exporting, including the

related paperwork and the regulatory burden associated with the activity.

To implement the intervention, we hired a company to co-manage the process and a specialist with extensive expertise in this type of instruction from COPPEAD, the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro's business school. All courses were online and in synchronous format through the ZOOM platform. One instructor provided classes, and an assistant was available on a chat channel, selecting questions from participants to be answered during classes. One person from each firm attended the course, and the participants were unaware of the different treatment arms. For each participant, we created a register with an email, login (four-letter code), and a password to access the class. We monitored all participants' attendance, time of entry, and departure in the online rooms. We did not charge participation fees or recorded classes. Participants had no contact with each other via chat. Every Friday, we provided a Q&A channel where the instructor was available for four hours to answer questions.

To encourage firms to complete the questionnaires at each data collection, all the firms whose managers completed the baseline and all the follow-ups could take a free online asynchronous business course at the end of the last follow-up survey. The course will be offered to the treated and control groups, will last approximately two hours, and will not be associated with export topics to avoid an intention-to-treat to export in the control group.

We carried out the second intervention during seven months between 2023 and 2024. It encompassed a smaller group of firms selected randomly from our entire sample (treatment and control). This intervention was more intensive and consisted of a one-to-one consulting program to understand firm-specific exporting challenges and find individualized solutions that could help them overcome barriers to exporting, considering the firm's size and the product it sells. For this intervention, we hired two consultants with vast experience in export procedures involving Brazilian firms, who had previously worked directly with APEX-Brazil. The sessions lasted four hours, split into two meetings of two hours. They were online and individualized by firms, and the firms could assign any number of employees to participate. As in the first intervention, we monitored the attendance of all participants and did not charge participation fees.

In sum, we have six groups of firms. The first received only the one-week online course. The second group received only the three-week online course. The third and the fourth received the one-to-one consultancy and either the first or the second arm of the first intervention (one-week or three-week courses). The fifth only received the one-to-one consultancy. Finally, a group of firms did not receive any intervention (pure control group). Our design allows us to assess whether any of those interventions are effective to boost firm export participation and, if so,

which intervention type is more cost-effective to achieve that goal.

Table 1 displays the project timeline. The first intervention (online courses) occurred in July-August of 2022, just after the baseline survey. The first follow-up survey was carried out between September and November of the same year, with 854 respondents. Appendix A presents the dictionary of the first follow-up survey. The second follow-up, conducted in May and July of 2023, garnered responses from 753 firms. After the second follow-up survey, we carried through the second intervention from August 2023 to February 2024. In the mobilization stages, we contacted the treated firms to confirm their participation in the interventions, to obtain relevant information (such as name, telephone number, and e-mail of the participant), and to explain how the intervention works. We plan to conduct the third and fourth follow-up surveys between August and September 2024 and August and September 2025, respectively.

Table 1: Research Timeline

Project Steps	**Period**
Baseline Survey	March - June 2022
1st Mobilization	June - July 2022
1st Intervention (Online Courses)	July - August 2022
1st Follow-up Survey	September - November 2022
2nd Follow-up Survey	June - July 2023
2nd Mobilization	July - December 2023
2nd Intervention (Online Consultancies)	August 2023 - February 2024
3rd Follow-up Survey	August - September 2024 (expected)
4th Follow-up Survey	August - September 2025 (expected)

Notes: This table illustrates the research timeline. The final two lines outline our anticipated timing for the upcoming follow-up surveys.

Between the Baseline and Follow-Up 1 surveys, 74% of respondents are the same. This rate decreases to 65% when comparing the Baseline Survey with Follow-Up 2. However, 82% of respondents between Follow-Up 1 and Follow-Up 2 are the same. Of the participants of the 2nd Intervention, 84% completed the Follow-Up 1 questionnaire, and 92% completed the Follow-Up 2 questionnaire.

3 Data

In addition to the primary data from our experiment, we employ three databases. Data from *Relação Anual de Informações Sociais* (RAIS) provides comprehensive information on

firms' size and sector. The Brazilian Ministry of Labor collects the data annually, providing information on employer-employee matches for all formal employees in Brazil. Data from firms' exporting status come from the Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade (Secretary of International Trade). Lastly, we obtain firms' contact information from the Brazilian Federal Revenue Office (Federal Revenue of Brazil). The database provides basic firm information, including telephone numbers and addresses. We merge all the databases through the firms' CNPJ (*Cadastro Nacional de Pessoa Jurídica*), a unique identifying number provided by the Brazilian Federal Revenue Office.

We restricted our starting sample in three ways. First, we selected active firms with twenty or more employees (from RAIS 2018). This criteria excludes micro-enterprises, which are highly unlikely to have the capabilities to export. Second, we focused on manufacturing firms. While it would be interesting to extend the analysis to services, we decided to concentrate on manufacturing, which in general produces more tradable products and is not as heterogeneous as services. Third, we exclude firms that have engaged in exports in any of the three years prior to the first treatment (2018, 2019 and 2020), since our primary goal is to study how the interventions induce firms to begin exporting. We end up with a database encompassing 21,487 firms. See Appendix B for further details about firms' sectors and sizes.

Given our budget constraint and power calculations, we aimed at 1,500 firms for our initial sample. However, only 1,125 firms replied to the baseline survey. The dictionary can be found in the Appendix A (Table A1), providing details about the survey. Before randomly assigning firms to the treated and control groups, we stratified the final sample of the 1,125 firms according to firms' size, geographical region, and intention to export (a question from the baseline survey). The table below presents the strata statistics:

Table 2: Strata Statistics

Region	Firms	%	Size (# employees)	Firms	%	Intention to Export	Firms	%
Sao Paulo (SP)	384	34	Small (20-99)	990	88	No (0)	577	51
South	308	27	Medium (100-499)	127	11	Yes (1)	548	49
Southeast (other than SP)	218	19	Large (500+)	8	1			
Other regions	215	19						

Notes: This table presents the number of firms per region, size (number of employees), and intention to treat (if firms pretend to export or not in the future). Firm size strata based on IBGE's classification. See the geographical distribution of firms in Appendix B.

After the baseline survey, we randomly assigned firms to the treatment and control groups and ran the first intervention. In Appendix A, we show the balance tests for the groups in Table A4, while Table A5 shows descriptive statistics. The groups are generally well-balanced.

We denote by Arm 1 the group that received the one-week course, and by Arm 2 the group that received the three-week course.

Table 3 presents details of the final sample and attrition rates across surveys. In Appendix C, we show that there are no notable differences in group sizes and that there is no evidence of selective attrition.

Table 3: Attrition

	Total	Arm 1	Arm 2	Control
Contacted Firms	1,125	375	375	375
Follow-up 1	854	289	285	280
Follow-up 2	753	254	245	254
Follow-up 1 & 2	661	227	219	215

Notes: Number of firms by follow-Up and treatment designation. The last line represents the number of firms that are in the first and second follo-up surveys.

4 First Intervention: Online Courses

4.1 Take-up

It is well documented in the literature the difficulty in convincing firms to participate in experimental interventions (e.g., Valero et al., 2023). Our study is not an exception. We have two types of non-compliance: (i) firms that refused to participate upon invitation, and (ii) firms that accepted the invitation but did not attend the classes. We denote the first group of non-compliers as "Refusing Firms". For clarity, Table 4 provides the labels and descriptions for each group.

Table 4: Labels

Label	Description
Initial Sample	Initial sample of the 21,487 firms
Contacted Firms	The 1,125 firms that were contacted
Treatment Group	The 750 firms (Arm 1 and Arm 2) that received the invitation for the online courses
Accepting Firms	Firms that accepted the online course
Refusing Firms	Firms that refused the online course
Control Group	The 375 firms that did not receive the invitation for the online courses

Table 5 depicts the firms' participation figures. As it shows, around a third of the firms refused to participate after the invitation. This proportion is slightly higher for Arm-2 firms.

Among those who accepted to participate, around 40% of the firms took at least one class, and a quarter took at least 50% of the classes. These figures are similar to other firm-level studies. However, they raise important concerns about participation selection.

Table 5: Class Attendance

	Arm 1 (one course)	Arm 2 (three courses)
Treatment Group (Total)	375	375
Accepting Firms	254	217
Refusing Firms	121	158
Class Attendance		
At least 1	93	95
At least 50%	63	51

Notes: This table illustrates the distribution of firms across each arm. Accepting firms are those that accepted the course invitation, while refusing firms are those that declined it. The table shows the number of firms that attended at least one class and those that attended at least 50% of the classes.

To compare the characteristics of compliers and non-compliers, we run the following regression:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 1\{i = \text{Refusing Firm}\} + \boldsymbol{W_i\theta} + \varepsilon_i, \tag{1}$$

where y_i is an outcome and $\boldsymbol{W_i}$ represents the strata dummies. The standard error is clustered at the strata level. Table D1 in Appendix D shows the results for the baseline sample. The columns labeled "Refusing Firms vs. Control" compare the refusing firms and the control group. The columns labeled "Refusing vs Accepting Firms" compare the refusing firms and the firms that accepted the participation in the online courses. Columns labeled "Diff" display the regression's estimates for β_1. The groups exhibit similarities in the baseline survey. We cannot reject that β_1 is different from zero for almost all outcomes.

We run the same regression for outcomes of Follow-up 1. We also include the baseline outcome variable as an additional control for this exercise. In Appendix D, Table D2 shows that Refusing firms report less interest and, therefore, less expectation to export than the control and the remainder of the treated groups. This seems odd, since those firms changed views (relative to the control group) during the treatment period despite not being treated in any way. This discrepancy may stem from either measurement errors or the possibility that companies declining to participate grew weary of the survey, intentionally providing negative responses.

4.2 Empirical Strategy

Initially, our focus lies on the intention-to-treat (ITT). Thus:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 z_i + \boldsymbol{W_i}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \varepsilon_i. \tag{2}$$

Here, y_i represents the outcome variable of interest for firm i in consideration of the follow-up survey. The variable z_i takes on the value 1 if firm i is assigned to treatment. The vector $\boldsymbol{W_i}$ encompasses control variables, including the correspondent baseline variable for y_i (if it exists) and strata dummies. Furthermore, we implement the specification above using two sets of control variables. Initially, a dummy variable for "Refusing Firm" is omitted from $\boldsymbol{W_i}$, and subsequently this control variable is incorporated. When controlling for the refusing firms, we are essentially narrowing down our sample, which can compromise the initial randomization. Nevertheless, the preceding section demonstrates that these companies responded to the survey notably disparately. Therefore, considering both controlling and non-controlling results allows for a more comprehensive interpretation. Later, we discuss potential solutions for this problem. Lastly, ε_i is clustered at the strata level.

Considering the low take-up in both samples, we need to address one-sided partial compliance. Consequently, we adopt an instrumental variable approach, specifically examining the effect of the treatment on firms that opted for the courses. Now, we focus on the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). In the first stage, our regression model is as follows:

$$x_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 z_i + \boldsymbol{W_i}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \mu_i. \tag{3}$$

The outcome variable x_i represents the class attendance of firm i. Three options are considered: (i) $x_i = 1$ if the firm attended any class; (ii) $x_i = 1$ if the firm attended at least half of the classes; and (iii) $x_i =$ attendance rate, a variable ranging from 0 to 1.

Finally, the second stage is:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \hat{x}_i + \boldsymbol{W_i}\boldsymbol{\theta} + \varepsilon_i. \tag{4}$$

4.3 Results: 1st Follow-Up

We first show the results for Follow-Up 1. The tables present the results with and without considering the Refusing Firms dummy.

Our outcome variables are derived from self-reported data provided by the firms them-

selves. It is important to address the potential influence of experimenter demand effects, wherein treated firms tend to inflate their responses to align with perceived expectations, such as demonstrating positive attitudes towards exporting, to please the research team and course staff. Accordingly, we elicit the firm's "willingness to pay" (WTP) for information related to export activities. We further test whether the intervention was able to impact the WTP of the firms.

Table 6 displays the outcomes of the combined intention to export for Arm 1 and Arm 2. That is, z_i is equal to 1 if the firm is in Arm 1 or Arm 2. In this case, x_i is equal to 1 if firm i attended at least one class. The control group contains the firms not selected for the intervention that answered the first follow-up questionnaire. Perceptions of the benefits of exporting and perceptions of the costs of exports are derived from the first principal component of questions addressing benefits and costs, respectively. Table A3 presents all the questions related to the PCA variables.

Notably, the results exhibit no significant deviation from zero without including the refusing firm control. However, with the inclusion of this additional control, there is a positive impact on the intention to export (where the dummy variable receives 1 if the firm intends to export within the next three years). The ITT effect is about 6 p.p., while the LATE impact is about 14 p.p. The ITT result implies a 12% increase in the intention to export since the baseline mean of intention to export in the control group was 0.49 (Table A5), as the LATE results are twice as large.

Furthermore, there is a positive and significant impact on the benefits of exporting, when controlling for refusing firms. There is a negative impact on the costs of exports, but it is not statistically significant. Lastly, there is no discernible effort to hire employees proficient in another language.

Table 6: Joint Arms Results for Follow-Up 1: Intention to Export

Variable			Control Refus.	
	ITT	LATE	ITT	LATE
Intention to export (in 3 yrs)	0.02	0.06	0.06*	0.14*
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Perceptions of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	0.14	0.48	0.27*	0.65*
	(0.14)	(0.48)	(0.13)	(0.34)
Perceptions of the costs of exporting (PCA)	-0.13	-0.44	-0.14	-0.32
	(0.14)	(0.48)	(0.14)	(0.34)
Employees who speak another language	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.09
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.08)

Notes: Results for outcomes related to export variables. In this case, $z_i = 1$ if firm i belongs to Arm 1 or Arm 2 and $x_i = 1$ if firm i attended at least one class (see equation 4). The initial two columns display the $\hat{\beta}_1$ for ITT and LATE without accounting for refusing firms, whereas the last two columns incorporate this control in the analysis. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.10$.

The willingness to pay is constructed through a three-round dynamic process. We follow the BDM (Becker–DeGroot–Marschak) approach: in each round, the respondent is provided with 20 lottery tickets, which can be used to enter a draw for a coffee machine or exchanged for advanced guides on export information,[6] each assigned a random price. Suppose the price chosen by the respondent is greater than or equal to the random price. In that case, the respondent obtains the guide and pays the random price, and the difference between 20 tickets and the random price accumulates towards a coffee maker lottery. In cases where the random price exceeds the respondent's chosen price, she retains the 20 tickets for participation in the draw but does not get the guide.[7] Importantly, this is a truth-telling mechanism.

Table 7 presents the combined results for Arm 1 and Arm 2. The dependent variable is the price chosen by the firm. There is an attempt to pursue more information about exports' logistical and bureaucratic challenges. The ITT specification indicates a mean effect of nearly 1 ticket when controlling for refusing firms. In contrast, the LATE approach suggests that firms are willing to provide an additional 2 tickets for further information. The raw mean in the control group stands at approximately 10 tickets—no effect on the benefits of exports and the (placebo) FGV study. The latter suggests no pre-existing tendency for treated companies to express interest in any document.

[6]Guide on the Benefits of Exporting, Guide on Logistical and Bureaucratic Challenges to Export, and FGV Study about Protectionist Policies in Practice: the Brazilian Automotive Sector (this is a placebo guide).

[7]To illustrate, consider the following scenario: if the respondent opts to spend 15 tickets on Guide 1 and the random price is 10, the respondent will successfully acquire the guide and retain 10 tickets for the draw Conversely, if the random price is 16, the respondent will not obtain the guide but will still accumulate 20 tickets for the draw.

Table 7: Joint Arms Results for Follow-Up 1: Willingness-to-Pay

Variable				Control Refus.	
	Avg. Control	ITT	LATE	ITT	LATE
WTP Benefits of Exporting	9.40	0.10	0.33	0.63	1.50
		(0.46)	(1.56)	(0.56)	(1.40)
WTP Logistical and Bureaucratic Challenges	9.82	0.29	0.99	0.87*	2.09*
		(0.37)	(1.24)	(0.42)	(1.05)
WTP FGV Study	5.42	-0.30	-0.99	0.03	0.08
		(0.39)	(1.25)	(0.38)	(0.91)

Notes: Results for outcomes related to willingness to pay. In this case, $z_i = 1$ if firm i belongs to Arm 1 or Arm 2 and $x_i = 1$ if firm i attended at least one class (see equation 4). The column Avg. Control presents the mean outcome for the control group. The subsequent two columns display the $\hat{\beta}_1$ for ITT and LATE without accounting for refusing firms, whereas the last two columns incorporate this control in the analysis. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.10$.

We now present the results for Arm 1 and Arm 2 separately. Both Arms received online courses, but the Arm 2 course had a longer duration and covered a greater number of topics. This extended information set can potentially enhance knowledge and amplify the impact of the treatment. However, too many classes may lead to information overload and heightened disinterest. It is important to note that the course content was not tailored to the specific context of each company. Moreover, the abundance of concepts and definitions may pose a potential impediment, creating a perception that exporting is a highly intricate process.

Tables 8 and 9 present the results for intention to export for Arm 1 and Arm 2, respectively. The tables display the results for ITT and LATE. For LATE, we categorize the treatment into two groups: at least one class and at least 50% of the classes. The results are increasing in the proportion of classes attended (the effect of 1 class is smaller than the effect of at least half). Additionally, we incorporate the continuous measure of frequency into the analysis.

Table 8: Arm 1 Results for Follow-Up 1: Intention to Export

Variable		IV			Control Refusing Firms			
					IV			
	ITT	At least 1	$\geq 50\%$	cont	ITT	At least 1	$\geq 50\%$	cont
Intention to export (in 3 yrs)	0.04	0.15	0.22	0.22	0.07*	0.18*	0.25*	0.25*
	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Perceptions of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	0.28	0.98	1.38	1.39	0.43**	1.15**	1.61**	1.62**
	(0.19)	(0.66)	(0.96)	(0.95)	(0.15)	(0.42)	(0.63)	(0.61)
Perceptions of the costs of exporting (PCA)	-0.12	-0.43	-0.61	-0.61	-0.16	-0.42	-0.59	-0.59
	(0.17)	(0.62)	(0.86)	(0.87)	(0.18)	(0.47)	(0.66)	(0.66)
Employees who speak another language	0.04	0.15	0.21	0.21	0.07*	0.18*	0.27*	0.27*
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.14)

Notes: Results for outcomes related to export variables. In this case, $z_i = 1$ if firm i belongs to Arm 1 Columns named with at least 1, $\geq 50\%$ and cont indicate that $x_i = 1$, if the firm attended at least 1 class, $x_i = 1$ if the firm attended at least half of the classes, and $x \in [0, 1]$ as the frequency measure, respectively (see equation 4). The first four columns do not use the refusing firm's control, while the last one does. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Table 9: Arm 2 Results for 1st Follow-Up: Intention to Export

Variable		IV			Control Refusing Firms			
					IV			
	ITT	At least 1	$\geq 50\%$	cont	ITT	At least 1	$\geq 50\%$	cont
Intention to export (in 3 yrs)	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06	-0.05	0.04	0.08	0.14	0.14
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Perceptions of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.17	0.30	0.29
	(0.15)	(0.48)	(0.86)	(0.83)	(0.16)	(0.34)	(0.63)	(0.61)
Perceptions of the costs of exporting (PCA)	-0.14	-0.47	-0.83	-0.81	-0.14	-0.29	-0.53	-0.51
	(0.16)	(0.55)	(0.99)	(0.95)	(0.17)	(0.37)	(0.68)	(0.65)
Employees who speak another language	-0.03	-0.09	-0.16	-0.16	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.16)

Notes: Results for outcomes related to export variables. In this case, $z_i = 1$ if firm i belongs to Arm 2 Columns named with at least 1, $\geq 50\%$ and cont indicate that $x_i = 1$, if the firm attended at least 1 class, $x_i = 1$ if the firm attended at least half of the classes, and $x_i \in [0, 1]$ as the frequency measure, respectively (see equation 4). The first four columns, do not use the refusing firm's control, while the last one does. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Observe that the main effects stem from Arm 1. In Table 8, when the treatment group is the one with the shortest course, we observe a positive and statistically significant impact on the intention to export, perceptions of the benefits of exports, and the intention to hire employees who speak another language. Controlling for firms that declined participation, the IV specification reveals that firms experience an increase of 18 and 25 percentage points in the intention to export over the next three years if they attended at least one class and at least half of the classes, respectively. However, Table 9 reveals no significant effects when comparing the longer course to the control group. Even when we control for the *Refusing Firm* dummy, the results display the same sign, but are not statistically significant. The findings for the at least 50% dummy and the continuous variables (attendance rate) exhibit a similar pattern in both scenarios.

The results for WTP demonstrate a comparable trend. Table 10 shows the results. Panel A displays the outcomes for Arm 1. Regarding Guide 2, firms are willing to pay more than 4 tickets when participating in at least 50% of the classes. Panel B outlines the results for Arm 2. While all estimated coefficients for Guide 1 and 2 are positive when accounting for refusing firms, none are statistically significant.

Table 10: Arm 1 and Arm 2 Results for Follow-Up 1: Willingness-to-Pay

Variable		IV			Control Refusing Firms			
						IV		
	ITT	At least 1	$\geq 50\%$	cont	ITT	At least 1	$\geq 50\%$	cont
Panel A: Arm 1 (one week course)								
WTP Benefits of Exporting	0.39	1.33	1.89	1.89	0.75	1.98	2.82	2.82
	(0.57)	(2.02)	(2.88)	(2.87)	(0.63)	(1.74)	(2.48)	(2.47)
WTP Logistical and Bureaucratic Challenges	0.66	2.29	3.25	3.26	1.11*	2.91*	4.15*	4.14*
	(0.42)	(1.45)	(2.15)	(2.12)	(0.53)	(1.46)	(2.17)	(2.14)
WTP FGV Study	-0.09	-0.30	-0.42	-0.42	-0.03	-0.08	-0.11	-0.11
	(0.51)	(1.75)	(2.48)	(2.49)	(0.56)	(1.48)	(2.11)	(2.11)
Panel B: Arm 2 (three week course)								
WTP Benefits of Exporting	-0.17	-0.55	-0.99	-0.95	0.45	0.95	1.72	1.67
	(0.48)	(1.56)	(2.76)	(2.69)	(0.57)	(1.25)	(2.31)	(2.22)
WTP Logistical and Bureaucratic Challenges	-0.07	-0.21	-0.38	-0.37	0.55	1.18	2.13	2.06
	(0.50)	(1.64)	(2.93)	(2.84)	(0.53)	(1.15)	(2.13)	(2.04)
WTP FGV Study	-0.54	-1.77	-3.18	-3.07	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.56)	(1.76)	(3.12)	(3.03)	(0.74)	(1.57)	(2.84)	(2.75)

Notes: Results for outcomes related to WTP. In this case, $z_i = 1$ Columns named with at least 1, $\geq 50\%$ and cont indicate that $x_i = 1$, if the firm attended at least 1 class, $x_i = 1$ if the firm attended at least half of the classes, and $x_i \in [0, 1]$ as the frequency measure, respectively (see equation 4). The first four columns do not use the refusing firm's control, while the last one does. Panel A presents the results for Arm 1 Panel B presents the results for Arm 2. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Hence, it can be concluded that the shorter course has a positive effect on firms' intention to export and on their perception about the benefits and costs of exporting. Surprisingly, the longer course had no perceptible effect on those variables. This is consistent with the results of Kim et al. (2018): too much untargeted information about exporting may be counterproductive to compel firms to engage firms to engage in exporting. See Appendix E for all 1st Follow-Up results, including hiring decisions and other questions about export preferences.

4.4 Results: 2nd Follow-Up

We employed a comparable specification to that of (2) and (4), with the only change being on the Follow-Up 2 survey responses as the dependent variable. This second follow-up occurred approximately one year after the intervention, allowing us to assess the medium-term effects and ascertain whether there are discernible shifts in preferences among the firms.

We present the results similarly to the preceding section. Additionally, we incorporated a

question regarding whether the company engaged in exports following Follow-Up 1. Initially, we show the outcomes for the Joint Arms and break down the analysis for Arm 1 and Arm 2. The findings for Joint Arms are in Table 11. Notably, there is a positive and statistically significant effect on successful exports when accounting for firms that declined participation. This outcome suggests that in the medium run the intervention is effective in changing firms' decision to start exporting. Once again, there is a noticeable positive and heightened impact on the intention to export. There is no discernible impact on the perceptions of the benefits associated with exporting. However, there is a small reduction in the perceived costs of exporting.

Table 11: Joint Arms Results for Follow-Up 2: Intention to Export

Variable			Control Refus.	
	ITT	LATE	ITT	LATE
Exported (after fop1)	0.03	0.11	0.05*	0.11*
	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Intention to export (in 3yrs)	0.02	0.09	0.09***	0.23***
	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Perceptions of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	0.11	0.35	0.26	0.60
	(0.15)	(0.49)	(0.17)	(0.41)
Perceptions of the costs of exporting (PCA)	-0.24	-0.78	-0.33*	-0.76
	(0.17)	(0.58)	(0.18)	(0.44)
Employees who speak another language	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.07)

Notes: Results for outcomes related to export variables. In this case, $z_i = 1$ if firm i belongs to Arm 1 or Arm 2 and $x_i = 1$ if firm i attended at least one class (see equation 4). The initial two columns display the $\hat{\beta}_1$ for ITT and LATE without accounting for refusing firms, whereas the last two columns incorporate this control in the analysis. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.10$.

The Willingness to Pay dynamics in Follow-Up 2 is slightly different. Instead of eliciting the WTP for more information, we now gauge the WTP for a customized exporting consultancy. In Follow-up 2, respondents receive 10 tickets, which they can use to enter a draw for a coffee machine or exchange for participation in a lottery for the one-to-one consulting program. Suppose the firm's chosen price equals or exceeds the randomly selected price. In that case, the firm qualifies for the consultancy lottery, and the difference between 10 tickets and the random prices contributes to the coffee machine draw. Otherwise, the firm does not receive the ticket for the consultancy lottery and all the tickets remain for the draw. Table 12 shows no difference between Joint Arms and the control group.

Table 12: Joint Arms Results for Follow-Up 2: Willingness-to-Pay

Variable	Avg. Control	ITT	LATE	Control Refus. ITT	Control Refus. LATE
WTP Consulting Program	5.71	-0.23	-0.77	0.18	0.43
		(0.36)	(1.19)	(0.40)	(0.94)

Notes: Results for outcomes related to willingness to pay. In this case, $z_i = 1$ if firm i belongs to Arm 1 or Arm 2 and $x_i = 1$ if firm i attended at least one class (see equation 4). The column Avg. Control presents the mean outcome for the control group. The subsequent two columns display the $\hat{\beta}_1$ for ITT and LATE without accounting for refusing firms, whereas the last two columns incorporate this control in the analysis. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Finally, we present the results separately for Arm 1 and Arm 2 (Tables 13 e 14). In line with the result for Joint Arms, in all specifications for each Arm, we observe a positive impact on exporting, although we do not have enough statistical power to reject the null effect without controlling for the *Refusing Firms*. When we do control for them, the point estimates remain very similar for both Arms, and they are statistically significant at the 10% level for the long (Arm 2) course. This is consistent with the results in the short run, where we find a positive and significant impact on the intention to export. Once more, the analysis reveals that the main effect on the intention to export and the benefits of exporting come from Arm 1. In contrast, the negative impact on the costs of exporting is driven by Arm 2 (firms that received more information about the export procedures). In those regressions, the influence of the *Refusing Firms* dummy is smaller. There are no differences in signs controlling or not for this type of firm. And again, the results are increasing in the number of classes attended.

Finally, Table 15 presents the WTP results. There is no impact for either Arm 1 or Arm 2. See Appendix E for all Follow-Up 2 results.

Table 13: Arm 1 Results for Follow-Up 2: Intention to Export

Variable		IV			Control Refusing Firms			
						IV		
	ITT	At least 1	$\geq 50\%$	cont	ITT	At least 1	$\geq 50\%$	cont
Exported (after fop1)	0.04	0.12	0.18	0.18	0.05	0.11	0.17	0.17
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Intention to export (in 3yrs)	0.06*	0.23*	0.38*	0.36*	0.14***	0.36***	0.60***	0.57***
	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Perceptions of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	0.34***	1.11**	1.66**	1.64**	0.44***	1.08**	1.61**	1.59**
	(0.11)	(0.39)	(0.66)	(0.61)	(0.14)	(0.39)	(0.62)	(0.58)
Perceptions of the costs of exporting (PCA)	-0.13	-0.41	-0.62	-0.61	-0.13	-0.31	-0.46	-0.46
	(0.19)	(0.63)	(0.96)	(0.94)	(0.22)	(0.56)	(0.84)	(0.83)
Employees who speak another language	0.05	0.15	0.23	0.23	0.05	0.13	0.20	0.20
	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)

Notes: Results for outcomes related to export variables. In this case, $z_i = 1$ if firm i belongs to Arm 1 Columns named with at least 1, $\geq 50\%$ and cont indicate that $x_i = 1$, if the firm attended at least 1 class, $x_i = 1$ if the firm attended at least half of the classes, and $x \in [0, 1]$ as the frequency measure, respectively (see equation 4). The first four columns do not use the refusing firm's control, while the last one does. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Table 14: Arm 2 Results for Follow-Up 2: Intention to Export

Variable		IV			Control Refusing Firms			
						IV		
	ITT	At least 1	$\geq 50\%$	cont	ITT	At least 1	$\geq 50\%$	cont
Exported (after fop1)	0.03	0.11	0.18	0.17	0.05*	0.11*	0.18*	0.17*
	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Intention to export (in 3yrs)	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	0.04	0.10	0.19	0.18
	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.27)	(0.25)
Perceptions of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	-0.08	-0.28	-0.46	-0.45	0.09	0.20	0.33	0.32
	(0.22)	(0.72)	(1.18)	(1.16)	(0.24)	(0.54)	(0.94)	(0.91)
Perceptions of the costs of exporting (PCA)	-0.33	-1.07	-1.81	-1.76	-0.56***	-1.23***	-2.10**	-2.04**
	(0.20)	(0.66)	(1.14)	(1.10)	(0.17)	(0.40)	(0.74)	(0.69)
Employees who speak another language	-0.03	-0.11	-0.19	-0.19	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.19)

Notes: Results for outcomes related to export variables. In this case, $z_i = 1$ if firm i belongs to Arm 2 Columns named with at least 1, $\geq 50\%$ and cont indicate that $x_i = 1$, if the firm attended at least 1 class, $x_i = 1$ if the firm attended at least half of the classes, and $x_i \in [0, 1]$ as the frequency measure, respectively (see equation 4). The first four columns, do not use the refusing firm's control, while the last one does. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Table 15: Arm 1 and Arm 2 Results for Follow-Up 2: Willingness-to-Pay

Variable		IV			Control Refusing Firms			
						IV		
	ITT	At least 1	$\geq 50\%$	cont	ITT	At least 1	$\geq 50\%$	cont
Panel A: Arm 1 (one week course)								
WTP Consulting Program	0.10	0.33	0.50	0.49	0.59	1.43	2.15	2.12
	(0.32)	(1.03)	(1.55)	(1.53)	(0.36)	(0.92)	(1.39)	(1.36)
Panel B: Arm 2 (three week course)								
WTP Consulting Program	-0.52	-1.73	-2.91	-2.83	-0.24	-0.54	-0.92	-0.90
	(0.49)	(1.66)	(2.68)	(2.64)	(0.52)	(1.15)	(1.90)	(1.86)

Notes: Results for outcomes related to WTP. In this case, $z_i = 1$ Columns named with at least 1, $\geq 50\%$ and cont indicate that $x_i = 1$, if the firm attended at least 1 class, $x_i = 1$ if the firm attended at least half of the classes, and $x_i \in [0, 1]$ as the frequency measure, respectively (see equation 4). The first four columns do not use the refusing firm's control, while the last one does. Panel A presents the results for Arm 1 Panel B presents the results for Arm 2. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.10$.

5 Second Intervention: One-to-One Consultancies

During the second intervention, companies engage in one-on-one consultancy sessions with a professional specialized in exporting guidance. This intervention is tailored to individual firms, with the firm representative (which could be one or more) having exclusive time with the specialist across two two-hour meetings. The consultancy encompasses a broader range of topics than the online course, providing more specific insights into both the selected subjects and the firm's market.

5.1 Attendance

In the Follow-Up 2 phase, the Willingness-To-Pay question determined the selection for the second intervention. If a firm opts for a WTP equal to or greater than the randomly determined price, it qualifies to compete for the consultancy session. Appendix F presents the number of firms categorized by the number of tickets chosen, distinguishing between those who set a price higher than the drawn price and those who set a price lower than the drawn price. A total of 413 firms chose a price exceeding the randomly determined value. We stratified these firms into groups (Arm 1, Arm 2, and Control) and randomly arranged them. A total of 124 companies participated in the consultancy sessions, out of the 310 companies that were invited. The distribution includes 41 companies from the control group, 42 from Arm 1, and 41 from Arm 2. Among the treated companies, 43 attended at least one class of the first intervention. Among the firms classified as *Refusing firms* in the first intervention, only 10 eventually engaged in the consultancy. Table 16 below illustrates the number of firms attended by each consultant.

Table 16: One-to-one consultancy attendance

	Consultant A		Consultant B		
	1st Part	2nd Part	1st Part	2nd Part	**Total**
Control	4	17	1	19	41
Arm 1	2	17	1	22	42
Arm 2	1	20	0	20	41
Total	7	54	2	61	124

Notes: This table delineates the number of firms attended by each consultant, categorized by the segments of the course.

In this context, there are six distinct groups: those who did not receive either the online

course or consultancy, those who received only one online course (from either Arm 1 or Arm 2), those who received both the online course (from either Arm 1 or Arm 2) and the consultancy, and those that did not receive any course. Table 17 displays the number of firms in the second intervention with some participation in the first intervention. We can see that Arm 2 (the long course) is predominant.

Table 17: Intersecction between the First and the Second Interventions

	Arm 1		Arm 2	
	At least 1	At least 50%	At least 1	At least 50%
Consultant A	6	3	12	7
Consultant B	10	8	15	7
Total	16	11	27	14

Notes: This table displays the number of firms in the second intervention that participated in some way in the first intervention.

5.2 Empirical Strategy

To estimate the effect of each combination of treatments, we use an instrumental variable approach. Participation in the consultancy is treated as the dependent variable, and the firm's random price is the instrument. In the first stage of this analysis, we regress the participation in the consultancy outcome on the random price, conditioning on the WTP price.

$$x_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 p_i + \alpha_2 WTP_i + \boldsymbol{W_i}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \mu_i, \tag{5}$$

where p_i represents the random price for firm i and WTP_i signifies the price chosen by the firm. It is important to note that $\boldsymbol{W_i}$ denotes a vector that includes the strata dummies for firm i. Finally, the second stage is:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \hat{x_i} + \beta_2 WTP_i + \boldsymbol{W_i}\boldsymbol{\theta} + \varepsilon_i. \tag{6}$$

This approach allows us to assess the impact of a more targeted intervention, tailored to each company's specific challenges, as observed in the third follow-up.

6 Final Remarks and Next Steps

Tthere is an issue with controlling for the firms that declined participation, which challenges the initial randomization. To address this, our initial proposal involves predicting the likelihood of refusal among firms in the control group. While we currently only have information on the refusing firms in the treatment group, our approach involves training a random forest model using all treated firms and incorporating variables from RAIS, such as firm size and payroll. Subsequently, we use this model to predict whether control firms are likely to refuse participation, integrating this prediction as a control in the main regression analysis. Given the similarity of the results to those previously presented, we will refrain from reiterating them here. We note that those results are preliminary.

In the upcoming stages, we will estimate the impact of the one-to-one consultancy treatment on firms' export decisions. Additionally, we aim to explore how participation in the first course influences subsequent engagement in the second course. As the treatment group is not too large, we intend to perform a randomization inference to verify whether there are any changes in the outcomes.

By now, we have analyzed the outcomes considering the short and medium runs. For the next step, we will carry out the data analysis from the second intervention and conduct the third and fourth follow-up surveys between August and September 2024 and August and September 2025, respectively. With these two surveys, we expect to observe long-run impacts from both interventions on export activities.

It is important to stress that public policies require a reliable cost-benefit analysis to support policymakers in choosing which programs to implement. Our findings will allow for better targeting and more tailored informational programs toward exporting. Our analysis can also assist policymakers in promoting inclusive growth. Exporting firms must be formal to access foreign markets. Thus, the interventions we implement could stimulate formality and improve social protection for the workforce. Furthermore, as firms expand by selling abroad, they face more competition. This makes discrimination in the labor market more costly, because hiring workers based on attributes unrelated to their productivity, such as sex or race, will decrease the firm's productivity and may make its foreign sales unprofitable (Becker, 1971). For this reason, we will also analyze how the treatments affect the likelihood of firms hiring minorities (women and black people) and its impacts on gender and racial gaps within firms.

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A Dictionary and Balance Test

Table A1: Baseline Dictionary

Questions	Variable
Has the company ever exported any product abroad?	Already exported
Has the company exported any product abroad in the last 3 years?	Exported (last 3yrs)
In the last year that it exported. What was the share of exports (in %) in your company's revenue?	Export as % of revenue
In the last year that it exported. to how many countries did your company export?	Exported to # countries
Has your company imported any product in the last 3 years?	Imported (last 3 yrs)
Does your company sell to other states besides the state of headquarters?	Sells to other states
Does your company intend to export in the next 3 years?	Intention to export (in 3yrs)
What is the expectation that your company will export in the next 3 years?	Expectation of exporting
Has your company been informed about how to insert its products in the foreign market?	Products on the foreign market
Has your company prepared a business plan that includes foreign market sales?	Business plan for the foreign market
Has your company initiated contact with possible external buyers?	Possible foreign buyers
Has your company hired employees with export experience at other companies?	Employees with export experience
Did your company's employees undergo any training focused on export practices?	Export training
Has your company already contacted any government agency or private institutions to assist in the export process?	Contacted agency for export
Has your company made modifications or adaptations to its products in the last year?	Product modifications
Has your company made modifications or adaptations to the packaging of its products in the last year?	Packaging modifications
Has your company sought to develop new products in the last year?	New products
Did your company buy machinery or equipment to expand or improve the production process in the last year?	Buy machinery
Has your company hired new employees with a university degree in the last year?	Employees with higher education
How many direct employees (CLT) does the company currently have?	# employees
What was the company's annual revenue (in reais) last year?	Revenue (last year)
What is the company's expected annual revenue (in reais) this year?	Revenue Expectation
Perception of the benefits of exporting (Principal Component Analysis)	Perception of the benefits of exporting (PCA)
Perception of the costs of exporting (Principal Component Analysis)	Perception of the costs of exporting (PCA)

Table A2: Follow-Up 1 Dictionary

Question	Variable
Has your company already exported any product abroad?	Already exported
After our last interview, what was the last year your company exported?	Last year you exported
Has your company imported any product in the last 3 years?	Imported (last 3 yrs)
Does your company intend to export in the next 3 years?	Intention to export (in 3 yrs)
What is the expectation that your company will export in the next 3 years?	Expectation of exporting
Does your company plan to hire employees with export experience in the next 12 months?	Employees with export experience
Did your company's employees undergo any training focused on export practices?	Export training
Does your company plan to contact any government agency or private institutions in the next 12 months to assist in the export process?	Contact agency for export
Does your company plan to make modifications or adaptations to its products in the next 12 months?	Product modifications
Does your company plan to carry out modifications or adaptations in the packaging of its products in the next 12 months?	Packaging modifications
Does your company plan to develop new products in the next 12 months?	New products
Does your company plan to buy machinery or equipment to expand or improve the production process in the next 12 months?	Buy machinery
Does your company plan to hire new employees with a university degree in the next 12 months?	Employees with higher education
Does your company plan to hire new employees with knowledge of a foreign language?	Employees who speak another language
Does your company have plans to invest in more environmentally sustainable processes or products?	Environmentally sustainable products
Does your company have plans to increase the participation of women in the workforce?	Increase women's participation
Does your company have plans to increase the participation of blacks in the workforce?	Increase participation of black people
Numb. of tickets to get the "Benefits of Exporting Guide"	WTP Benefits of Exporting
Numb. of tickets to get the "Logistical and Bureaucratic Challenges Guide"	WTP Logistical and Bureaucratic Challenges
Numb. of tickets to get the FVG Study	WTP FGV Study
Perception of the benefits of exporting (Principal Component Analysis)	Perception of the benefits of exporting (PCA)
Perception of the costs of exporting (Principal Component Analysis)	Perception of the costs of exporting (PCA)

Table A3: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) Questions

	Question (1 - Strongly Disagree; . . . ; 5 - Strongly Agree)
Benefits	Exporting would increase the company's net profit
	Exporting would increase the company's sales to a greater extent than expanding into the domestic market
	Exporting would increase the company's credibility
	Exporting would increase the company's financial viability
	Exporting would make the company more innovative
Costs	It is difficult to adapt the products for the foreign market
	It is difficult to deal with the bureaucratic process related to export
	It is difficult to afford the export-related duties and taxes
	It is difficult to learn how to enter a foreign market for the first time, that is, how to make the first contact
	It is difficult to ensure that external contracts will be fulfilled and payment for products will be made
	It is difficult to allocate company employees to carry out the export process
	It is difficult to understand the language and culture of the foreign market to negotiate products
	It is difficult to access export credit

Table A4: Balance test

		Arm 1		Arm 2		Joint Arms
Variable	# control	#	Diff.	#	Diff.	Diff.
Already exported	375	375	0.00	375	0.03	0.01
			(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.03)
Exported (last 3yrs)	375	375	-0.03	375	-0.01	-0.02
			(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Export as % of revenue	92	84	0.05	103	0.00	0.02
			(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.05)
Exported to # countries	93	84	1.20	102	0.58	0.84
			(0.92)		(0.97)	(0.83)
Imported (last 3 yrs)	375	375	0.00	375	-0.02	-0.01
			(0.02)		(0.04)	(0.03)
Sells to other states	375	375	-0.02	375	-0.02	-0.02
			(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.01)
Intention to export (in 3yrs)	375	375	0.00	375	0.00	0.00
			(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Expectation of exporting	375	375	0.04*	375	0.01	0.02
			(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.02)
Products on the foreign market	183	182	-0.06*	183	-0.08	-0.07**
			(0.03)		(0.05)	(0.03)
Business plan for the foreign market	183	182	0.09***	183	0.02	0.06*
			(0.02)		(0.05)	(0.03)
Possible foreign buyers	183	182	0.03	183	-0.08	-0.02
			(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.05)
Employees with export experience	375	375	0.05**	375	-0.02	0.02
			(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.01)
Export training	375	375	0.00	375	-0.01	0.00
			(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.01)
Contacted agency for export	375	375	-0.02	375	0.02	0.00
			(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.02)
Product modifications	375	375	0.01	375	0.04	0.02
			(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.03)
Packaging modifications	374	375	-0.03	375	-0.05	-0.04
			(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
New products	375	375	0.03	375	0.00	0.01
			(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.03)
Buy machinery	375	375	0.01	375	0.03	0.02
			(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Employees with higher education	375	375	-0.01	375	0.03	0.01
			(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.02)
# employees	370	367	0.12	367	0.16*	0.13*
			(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.07)
Revenue (last year)	253	244	-0.15	248	0.26	0.03
			(0.16)		(0.2)	(0.16)
Revenue Expectation	263	257	-0.21	257	0.12	-0.06
			(0.15)		(0.20)	(0.14)
Perception of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	374	373	0.2	375	-0.16	0.04
			(0.12)		(0.11)	(0.10)
Perception of the costs of exporting (PCA)	374	373	0.07	374	-0.16	-0.04
			(0.19)		(0.23)	(0.18)

Notes: In conducting the balance test, we perform the following regression: $y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + \boldsymbol{W_i}\boldsymbol{\theta} + \epsilon_i$, where y_i is the baseline variable and T_i receives 1 if the firm i is Arm 1 or Arm 2. The table provides the number of firms in each group and the columns labeled as Diff. present the estimated β_1.

Table A5: Descriptive Analyses

	Control		Arm 1		Arm 2	
Variable	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Already exported	0.25	0.43	0.22	0.42	0.27	0.45
Exported (last 3yrs)	0.16	0.36	0.12	0.33	0.14	0.35
Export as % of revenues	0.09	0.28	0.13	0.34	0.11	0.31
Exported to # countries	2.50	4.40	3.40	7.50	2.40	5.10
Imported (last 3 yrs)	0.36	0.48	0.35	0.48	0.33	0.47
Sells to other states	0.89	0.32	0.87	0.33	0.89	0.31
Intention to export (in 3yrs)	0.49	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.49	0.50
Expectation of exporting	0.34	0.47	0.36	0.48	0.34	0.47
Products on the foreign market	0.58	0.49	0.51	0.50	0.56	0.50
Business plan for the foreign market	0.25	0.43	0.32	0.47	0.30	0.46
Possible foreign buyers	0.54	0.50	0.58	0.50	0.50	0.50
Employees with export experience	0.08	0.27	0.10	0.31	0.07	0.26
Export training	0.11	0.32	0.10	0.30	0.12	0.33
Contacted agency for export	0.20	0.40	0.18	0.38	0.21	0.41
Product modifications	0.63	0.48	0.63	0.48	0.63	0.48
Packaging modifications	0.49	0.50	0.46	0.50	0.46	0.50
New products	0.76	0.43	0.79	0.41	0.73	0.45
Buy machinery	0.71	0.45	0.73	0.44	0.72	0.45
Employees with higher education	0.49	0.50	0.47	0.50	0.50	0.50
# employees	4.00	0.91	4.10	0.99	4.10	1.00
Perceptions of the benefits of exporting	8.50	2.10	8.70	1.90	8.30	2.00
Perceptions of the costs of exporting	10.00	2.40	10.00	2.30	9.90	2.20

B Characteristics of the sample

Table B6: Firms' sector

Manufacturing of low processing (CNAE A)	Production of food products Beverages Tobacco products Wood products Cellulose, paper and paper products Coke, petroleum-derived products and biofuels Non-metallic mineral products Metallurgy
Manufacturing of high processing (CNAE B)	Production of textile products Apparel and accessories Manufacture of leather goods, travel articles and footwear Printing and reproduction of recordings Rubber and plastic products Metal products, except machinery and equipment Furniture Miscellaneous products manufacturing
Chemical products (CNAE C)	Production of chemical products
Light technological products (CNAE D)	Pharmochemical and pharmaceutical products Computer equipment, electronic and optical products
Machinery and equipment (CNAE E)	Machinery, appliances and electrical materials Machinery and equipment
Transport material (CNAE G)	Motor vehicles, trailers and bodies Other transport equipment, except motor vehicles

Notes: This table shows the firms' sectors that comprise the sample. The code CNAE refers to the national economic activity classification code.

Table B7: Firms' size

	(1) Contacted	(2) Ref. Firms	(3) Intention to Export	(4) At least 1 class	(5) Intention to Export
log(payroll)	0.005**	-0.045**	0.072***	0.050*	0.080***
	(0.002)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.029)
CNAE's dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Region's dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	21,486	750	750	471	407
R^2	0.005	0.039	0.048	0.084	0.082
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.015	0.024	0.048	0.040

Notes: This table illustrates the significance of a firm's size, indicated by its total payroll, on variables representing the inclination to participate in the experiment or engage in exporting activities. The initial column elucidates the correlation between size and participation in the experiment, encompassing the entire sample. Columns (2) and (3) investigate the influence on firms within the treatment groups (750 firms), assessing whether firm size plays a role in determining whether the firm is classified as a 'refusing firm' or has an intention to export, respectively. The final two columns focus exclusively on treated firms that consented to participation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Figure 1: Percentage of firms in each category, distinguished between initial and final samples



Figure 2: Number of Firms per Region



C Attrition

To assess attrition, we employ the following specification:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Fop_i + \beta_2 Arm_i + \beta_3 Fop_i \times Arm_i + \boldsymbol{W_i\theta} + \varepsilon_i$$

where y_i is the baseline outcome, Fop_i receives 1 if the company answered Follow-Up 1 (same logic for Follow-up 2), Arm_i is the treatment designation, and $\boldsymbol{W_i}$ is a vector of strata controls. Tables C1 and C2 present the results for Follow-Up 1 and Follow-Up 2, respectively. The standard error is clustered at the strata level. For both tables, notice that the estimated β_1 and β_2 coefficients are (almost always) indistinguishable from zero.

Table C1: Attriton for Follow-Up 1

	Arm 1		Arm 2		Joint Arms	
Variable	Fop	Arm × Fop	Fop	Arm × Fop	Fop	Arm × Fop
Already exported	0.00	-0.06	0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Exported (last 3yrs)	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Export as % of revenues	0.04	-0.05	0.05	-0.11	0.06	-0.10
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Exported to # countries	0.55	1.88	0.68	0.18	0.62	0.79
	(0.29)	(1.00)	(0.39)	(0.76)	(0.32)	(0.77)
Imported (last 3 yrs)	0.10**	-0.07	0.10**	0.05	0.10**	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Sells to other states	-0.09*	0.12*	-0.09*	0.05	-0.09*	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Intention to export (in 3yrs)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Expectation of exporting	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Products on the foreign market	0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Business plan for the foreign market	0.03	0.00	0.04	-0.18	0.03	-0.09
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Possible foreign buyers	0.06	-0.20	0.04	0.04	0.05	-0.08
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Employees with export experience	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Export training	-0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Contacted agency for export	-0.03	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Product modifications	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Packaging modifications	-0.06	0.00	-0.06	0.12	-0.06	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
New products	-0.06	0.12**	-0.05	-0.04	-0.06	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Buy machinery	0.08	-0.15	0.08	-0.07	0.08	-0.10
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Employees with higher education	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.09)
# employees	0.10*	0.09	0.10*	0.02	0.10*	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.10)
Revenue (last year)	-0.05	0.62*	-0.03	0.42	-0.03	0.50**
	(0.13)	(0.33)	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.12)	(0.23)
Revenue Expectation	-0.10	0.66	-0.09	0.31	-0.08	0.47
	(0.18)	(0.38)	(0.17)	(0.33)	(0.17)	(0.30)
Perceptions of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	0.02	0.19	0.05	0.34	0.04	0.27
	(0.18)	(0.29)	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.19)	(0.26)
Perceptions of the costs of exporting (PCA)	-0.10	0.38	-0.12	-0.25	-0.09	0.03
	(0.35)	(0.46)	(0.34)	(0.43)	(0.34)	(0.39)

Table C2: Attrition for Follow-Up 2

	Arm 1		Arm 2		Joint Arms	
Variable	Fop	Arm × Fop	Fop	Arm × Fop	Fop	Arm × Fop
Already exported	0.03	-0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Exported (last 3yrs)	0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Export as % of revenues	0.03	-0.14	0.02	-0.08	0.03	-0.12
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Exported to # countries	-0.38	2.74	-0.60	0.66	-0.49	1.56
	(0.99)	(2.12)	(1.05)	(1.18)	(1.02)	(1.49)
Imported (last 3 yrs)	0.05	-0.03	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Sells to other states	-0.01	0.06	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Intention to export (in 3yrs)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Expectation of exporting	-0.03	0.05	-0.03	0.06	-0.03	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Products on the foreign market	-0.08	0.13	-0.08	0.13	-0.08	0.14
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Business plan for the foreign market	-0.03	0.04	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Possible foreign buyers	-0.03	0.02	-0.03	0.01	-0.03	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Employees with export experience	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04	0.03	-0.04	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Export training	-0.05	0.04	-0.05	0.06	-0.05	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Contacted agency for export	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Product modifications	-0.01	0.11	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Packaging modifications	-0.01	0.03	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)
New products	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.00	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Buy machinery	0.00	-0.07	0.00	-0.04	0.00	-0.05
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Employees with higher education	-0.08*	0.11	-0.08*	0.07	-0.08*	0.10*
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.05)
# employees	-0.08	0.20*	-0.07	0.18**	-0.08	0.18**
	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Revenue (last year)	0.00	0.30	0.06	0.33	0.05	0.28
	(0.16)	(0.27)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.20)
Revenue Expectation	0.01	0.31	0.06	0.20	0.05	0.23
	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Perceptions of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	-0.36	0.48	-0.36	0.25	-0.34	0.35*
	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Perceptions of the costs of exporting (PCA)	-0.69***	1.20***	-0.72***	0.43	-0.71***	0.81***
	(0.22)	(0.38)	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.22)	(0.27)

D Refusing Firms

Table D1: Refusing Firms vs Other Groups: Baseline

	Refusing Firms vs Control			Refusing vs Accepting Firms		
Variable	# control	# Ref. Firms	Diff	# Acc. Firms	# Ref. Firms	Diff
Already exported	375	279	-0.02	471	279	-0.04
			(0.03)			(0.03)
Exported (last 3yrs)	375	279	-0.03	471	279	-0.02
			(0.03)			(0.03)
Export as % of revenue	92	52	0.01	135	52	-0.01
			(0.08)			(0.06)
Exported to # countries	93	52	-0.94**	134	52	-1.63*
			(0.40)			(0.85)
Imported (last 3 yrs)	375	279	-0.04	471	279	-0.04
			(0.04)			(0.03)
Sells to other states	375	279	0.02	471	279	0.03
			(0.02)			(0.03)
Intention to export (in 3yrs)	375	279	0.00	471	279	0.00
			(0.00)			(0.00)
Expectation of exporting	375	279	-0.02	471	279	-0.04*
			(0.02)			(0.02)
Products on the foreign market	183	91	0.01	274	91	0.08***
			(0.03)			(0.01)
Business plan for the foreign market	183	91	0.05	274	91	-0.01
			(0.04)			(0.03)
Possible foreign buyers	183	91	0.03	274	91	0.04
			(0.05)			(0.05)
Employees with export experience	375	279	0.00	471	279	-0.02
			(0.02)			(0.02)
Export training	375	279	0.00	471	279	0.01
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Contacted agency for export	375	279	-0.01	471	279	-0.01
			(0.02)			(0.02)
Product modifications	375	279	-0.03	471	279	-0.06
			(0.02)			(0.04)
Packaging modifications	374	279	-0.03	471	279	0.00
			(0.05)			(0.04)
New products	375	279	-0.04	471	279	-0.04
			(0.04)			(0.03)
Buy machinery	375	279	0.01	471	279	-0.01
			(0.04)			(0.03)
Employees with higher education	375	279	-0.02	471	279	-0.02
			(0.04)			(0.03)
# employees	370	272	-0.02	462	272	-0.12*
			(0.06)			(0.07)
Revenue (last year)	253	162	-0.13	330	162	-0.18
			(0.17)			(0.19)
Revenue Expectation	263	176	-0.23	338	176	-0.23
			(0.17)			(0.19)
Perception of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	374	278	0.03	470	278	-0.05
			(0.11)			(0.09)
Perception of the costs of exporting (PCA)	374	278	0.18	469	278	0.19
			(0.19)			(0.20)

Table D2: Refusing Firms vs Other Groups: Follow-Up 1

	Refusing Firms vs Control			Refusing vs Accepting Firms		
Variable	# control	# Ref. Firms	Diff	# Acc. Firms	# Ref. Firms	Diff
Already exported	280	167	-0.01	407	167	0.01
			(0.03)			(0.03)
Last year you exported	81	36	-1.36	118	36	-1.12
			(2.37)			(1.94)
Imported (last 3 yrs)	280	167	0.01	407	167	0.01
			(0.04)			(0.04)
Intention to export (in 3 yrs)	280	167	-0.08	407	167	-0.14***
			(0.05)			(0.04)
Expectation of exporting	280	167	-0.11**	407	167	-0.15***
			(0.05)			(0.04)
Employees with export experience	280	167	-0.10**	407	167	-0.12***
			(0.04)			(0.04)
Export training	280	167	-0.08***	407	167	-0.12***
			(0.03)			(0.03)
Contact agency for export	280	167	-0.10**	407	167	-0.09***
			(0.03)			(0.02)
Product modifications	279	167	-0.12**	400	167	-0.10***
			(0.04)			(0.03)
Packaging modifications	278	166	-0.06	398	166	-0.07
			(0.04)			(0.04)
New products	280	167	-0.10***	402	167	-0.06*
			(0.03)			(0.03)
Buy machinery	276	162	-0.03	394	162	-0.01
			(0.03)			(0.05)
Employees with higher education	274	162	-0.15***	392	162	-0.13***
			(0.03)			(0.04)
Employees who speak another language	278	164	-0.07**	392	164	-0.11***
			(0.03)			(0.03)
Environmentally sustainable products	274	166	-0.07	396	166	-0.06
			(0.04)			(0.04)
Increase women's participation	272	162	-0.06	388	162	0.05
			(0.04)			(0.06)
Increase participation of black people	266	158	0.00	376	158	0.05
			(0.04)			(0.05)
WTP Benefits of Exporting	280	167	-1.30*	407	167	-1.78**
			(0.66)			(0.8)
WTP Logistical and Bureaucratic Challenges	280	167	-1.19**	407	167	-1.93***
			(0.45)			(0.54)
WTP FGV Study	280	167	-1.12*	407	167	-1.16***
			(0.53)			(0.35)
Total WTP	280	167	-3.61**	407	167	-4.87***
			(1.33)			(1.39)
WTP 1 Participation	280	167	-0.12***	407	167	-0.14***
			(0.04)			(0.04)
WTP 2 Participation	280	167	-0.10***	407	167	-0.13***
			(0.03)			(0.02)
WPT 3 Participation	280	167	-0.11**	407	167	-0.12***
			(0.05)			(0.02)
Perception of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	279	167	-0.15	406	167	-0.43**
			(0.21)			(0.17)
Perception of the costs of exporting (PCA)	279	167	-0.13	406	167	0.00
			(0.24)			(0.23)

E Results

E.1 Follow-Up 1

Table E1: Joint Arms Results for Follow-Up 1

			Control Refus.	
Variable	ITT	LATE	ITT	LATE
Already exported	-0.02	-0.08	-0.03	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Last year you exported	-0.55	-1.24	-0.42	-0.76
	(0.90)	(2.03)	(0.67)	(1.23)
Imported (last 3 yrs)	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Intention to export (in 3 yrs)	0.02	0.06	0.06*	0.14*
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Expectation of exporting	-0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.09
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Employees with export experience	-0.03	-0.10	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Export training	0.02	0.06	0.05*	0.13*
	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Contact agency for export	-0.03	-0.12	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Product modifications	-0.06*	-0.19*	-0.03	-0.07
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Packaging modifications	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.07)
New products	-0.04	-0.15	-0.03	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.09)
Buy machinery	-0.02	-0.07	-0.02	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Employees with higher education	-0.06	-0.19	-0.02	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.09)
Employees who speak another language	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.09
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Environmentally sustainable products	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Increase women's participation	-0.07*	-0.24	-0.08	-0.20
	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.12)
Increase participation of black people	-0.02	-0.06	-0.03	-0.08
	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.10)
WTP Benefits of Exporting	0.10	0.33	0.63	1.50
	(0.46)	(1.56)	(0.56)	(1.40)
WTP Logistical and Bureaucratic Challenges	0.29	0.99	0.87*	2.09*
	(0.37)	(1.24)	(0.42)	(1.05)
WTP FGV Study	-0.3	-0.99	0.03	0.08
	(0.39)	(1.25)	(0.38)	(0.91)
Total WTP	0.10	0.33	1.54	3.66
	(1.00)	(3.37)	(1.13)	(2.87)
WTP 1 Participation	-0.02	-0.07	0.02	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.08)
WTP 2 Participation	0.01	0.03	0.05*	0.12*
	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.06)
WPT 3 Participation	-0.03	-0.10	0.00	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.09)
Perception of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	0.14	0.48	0.27*	0.65*
	(0.14)	(0.48)	(0.13)	(0.34)
Perception of the costs of exporting (PCA)	-0.13	-0.44	-0.14	-0.32
	(0.14)	(0.48)	(0.14)	(0.34)

Table E2: Arm 1 Results for Follow-up 1

					Control Refusing Firm			
		IV				IV		
Variable	ITT	At least 1	≥ 50%	cont	ITT	At least 1	≥ 50%	cont
Already exported	-0.02	-0.07	-0.10	-0.10	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Last year you exported	0.03	0.07	0.09	0.09	-0.14	-0.30	-0.38	-0.40
	(1.03)	(2.36)	(3.04)	(3.24)	(1.09)	(2.29)	(2.93)	(3.12)
Imported (last 3 yrs)	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Intention to export (in 3 yrs)	0.04	0.15	0.22	0.22	0.07*	0.18*	0.25*	0.25*
	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Expectation of exporting	0.02	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.13	0.18	0.18
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Employees with export experience	-0.01	-0.05	-0.07	-0.07	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Export training	0.02	0.08	0.11	0.11	0.05	0.14	0.20	0.20
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Contact agency for export	-0.02	-0.06	-0.09	-0.09	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Product modifications	-0.02	-0.08	-0.12	-0.12	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Packaging modifications	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)
New products	-0.02	-0.08	-0.11	-0.11	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Buy machinery	-0.03	-0.12	-0.18	-0.18	-0.01	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Employees with higher education	-0.04	-0.13	-0.18	-0.18	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Employees who speak another language	0.04	0.15	0.21	0.21	0.07*	0.18*	0.27*	0.27*
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Environmentally sustainable products	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Increase women's participation	-0.06	-0.20	-0.30	-0.30	-0.07	-0.18	-0.25	-0.25
	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Increase participation of black people	0.02	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.19)
WTP Benefits of Exporting	0.39	1.33	1.89	1.89	0.75	1.98	2.82	2.82
	(0.57)	(2.02)	(2.88)	(2.87)	(0.63)	(1.74)	(2.48)	(2.47)
WTP Logistical and Bureaucratic Challenges	0.66	2.29	3.25	3.26	1.11*	2.91*	4.15*	4.14*
	(0.42)	(1.45)	(2.15)	(2.12)	(0.53)	(1.46)	(2.17)	(2.14)
WTP FGV Study	-0.09	-0.30	-0.42	-0.42	-0.03	-0.08	-0.11	-0.11
	(0.51)	(1.75)	(2.48)	(2.49)	(0.56)	(1.48)	(2.11)	(2.11)
Total WTP	0.96	3.32	4.72	4.73	1.83	4.82	6.85	6.85
	(1.12)	(3.96)	(5.73)	(5.68)	(1.06)	(3.00)	(4.42)	(4.34)
WTP 1 Participation	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	0.03	0.08	0.11	0.11
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.14)
WTP 2 Participation	0.02	0.09	0.12	0.12	0.06*	0.15*	0.22	0.22
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)
WPT 3 Participation	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Perception of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	0.28	0.98	1.38	1.39	0.43**	1.15**	1.61**	1.62**
	(0.19)	(0.66)	(0.96)	(0.95)	(0.15)	(0.42)	(0.63)	(0.61)
Perception of the costs of exporting (PCA)	-0.12	-0.43	-0.61	-0.61	-0.16	-0.42	-0.59	-0.59
	(0.17)	(0.62)	(0.86)	(0.87)	(0.18)	(0.47)	(0.66)	(0.66)

Table E3: Arm 2 Results for Follow-Up 1

					Control Refusing Firms			
		IV				IV		
Variable	ITT	At least 1	$\geq 50\%$	cont	ITT	At least 1	$\geq 50\%$	cont
Already exported	-0.03	-0.08	-0.15	-0.15	-0.04	-0.09	-0.16	-0.15
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Last year you exported	-1.10	-2.53	-3.49	-3.49	-0.90	-1.44	-1.98	-1.99
	(0.95)	(2.18)	(2.91)	(2.94)	(0.52)	(0.86)	(1.23)	(1.24)
Imported (last 3 yrs)	-0.01	-0.05	-0.08	-0.08	-0.03	-0.06	-0.11	-0.11
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Intention to export (in 3 yrs)	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06	-0.05	0.04	0.08	0.14	0.14
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Expectation of exporting	-0.03	-0.09	-0.16	-0.15	0.02	0.04	0.07	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Employees with export experience	-0.05*	-0.17*	-0.3*	-0.29*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Export training	0.01	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.12	0.21	0.21
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Contact agency for export	-0.05	-0.17	-0.31	-0.30	-0.02	-0.03	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Product modifications	-0.09**	-0.31**	-0.55**	-0.53**	-0.06	-0.12	-0.22	-0.21
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Packaging modifications	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.04	0.08	0.14	0.14
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.14)
New products	-0.07	-0.23	-0.41	-0.40	-0.07	-0.15	-0.26	-0.25
	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Buy machinery	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.06	-0.10	-0.10
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Employees with higher education	-0.08*	-0.26*	-0.50*	-0.48*	-0.04	-0.09	-0.16	-0.16
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Employees who speak another language	-0.03	-0.09	-0.16	-0.16	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Environmentally sustainable products	-0.02	-0.05	-0.10	-0.09	0.05	0.10	0.19	0.19
	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Increase women's participation	-0.08**	-0.28*	-0.52*	-0.50*	-0.09*	-0.20*	-0.38*	-0.37*
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Increase participation of black people	-0.06	-0.19	-0.35	-0.34	-0.07	-0.15	-0.29	-0.28
	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.17)
WTP Benefits of Exporting	-0.17	-0.55	-0.99	-0.95	0.45	0.95	1.72	1.67
	(0.48)	(1.56)	(2.76)	(2.69)	(0.57)	(1.25)	(2.31)	(2.22)
WTP Logistical and Bureaucratic Challenges	-0.07	-0.21	-0.38	-0.37	0.55	1.18	2.13	2.06
	(0.50)	(1.64)	(2.93)	(2.84)	(0.53)	(1.15)	(2.13)	(2.04)
WTP FGV Study	-0.54	-1.77	-3.18	-3.07	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.56)	(1.76)	(3.12)	(3.03)	(0.74)	(1.57)	(2.84)	(2.75)
Total WTP	-0.78	-2.53	-4.54	-4.39	0.98	2.10	3.80	3.68
	(1.27)	(4.13)	(7.27)	(7.09)	(1.55)	(3.41)	(6.31)	(6.08)
WTP 1 Participation	-0.03	-0.11	-0.19	-0.19	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.14)
WTP 2 Participation	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06	-0.06	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.13
	(0.03)	(0.1)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.12)
WPT 3 Participation	-0.06	-0.19	-0.34	-0.32	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.22)
Perception of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.17	0.30	0.29
	(0.15)	(0.48)	(0.86)	(0.83)	(0.16)	(0.34)	(0.63)	(0.61)
Perception of the costs of exporting (PCA)	-0.14	-0.47	-0.83	-0.81	-0.14	-0.29	-0.53	-0.51
	(0.16)	(0.55)	(0.99)	(0.95)	(0.17)	(0.37)	(0.68)	(0.65)

E.2 Follow-Up 2

Table E4: Joint Arms Results for Follow-Up 2

			Control Refus.	
Variable	ITT	LATE	ITT	LATE
Exported (after fop1)	0.03	0.11	0.05*	0.11*
	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Exports as % in revenue	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Exported to # countries	0.09	0.18	0.02	0.04
	(0.57)	(1.08)	(0.46)	(0.79)
Imported (after fop1)	-0.05	-0.17	-0.04	-0.10
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.09)
Sell to other states	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Release employee for export course	-0.03	-0.09	0.04	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.13)
Intention to export (in 3yrs)	0.02	0.09	0.09***	0.23***
	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Expectation of exporting	0.03	0.09	0.07**	0.16**
	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Products on the foreign market	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.05)	(0.13)
Business plan for the foreign market	-0.07	-0.21	-0.05	-0.13
	(0.08)	(0.23)	(0.09)	(0.21)
Possible foreign buyers	0.08	0.22	0.12**	0.29**
	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Employees with export experience	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Export training	0.12**	0.31***	0.14**	0.30**
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Contacted agency for export	-0.05	-0.12	-0.02	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.18)
Product modifications	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Packaging modifications	-0.02	-0.06	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.10)
New products	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Buy machinery	-0.05	-0.15	-0.02	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.09)
Employees with higher education	-0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Employees who speak another language	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Environmentally sustainable products	0.02	0.07	0.03	0.08
	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.09)
Increase women's participation	0.04	0.12	0.05	0.11
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Increase participation of black people	0.08**	0.27**	0.09**	0.20**
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.08)
# employees	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.12
	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Revenue (last year)	0.16	0.45	0.18	0.39
	(0.16)	(0.46)	(0.18)	(0.38)
Revenue Expectation	0.23	0.67	0.29*	0.63**
	(0.14)	(0.40)	(0.14)	(0.29)
WTP Participation	-0.01	-0.03	0.03	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.11)
WTP	-0.23	-0.77	0.18	0.43
	(0.36)	(1.19)	(0.40)	(0.94)
Perception of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	0.11	0.35	0.26	0.60
	(0.15)	(0.49)	(0.17)	(0.41)
Perception of the costs of exporting (PCA)	-0.24	-0.78	-0.33*	-0.76
	(0.17)	(0.58)	(0.18)	(0.44)

Table E5: Arm 1 Results for Follow-Up 2

					Control Refusing Firms			
		IV				IV		
Variable	ITT	At least 1	≥ 50%	cont	ITT	At least 1	≥ 50%	cont
Exported (after fop1)	0.04	0.12	0.18	0.18	0.05	0.11	0.17	0.17
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Exports as % in revenue	0.17*	0.42	0.52	0.54	0.19*	0.40	0.51	0.53
	(0.05)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.06)	(0.19)	(0.27)	(0.3)
Exported to # countries	-0.31	-0.91	-1.22	-1.19	-0.42	-1.02	-1.36	-1.33
	(0.70)	(2.13)	(3.12)	(3.03)	(0.43)	(1.27)	(1.91)	(1.86)
Imported (after fop1)	-0.03	-0.11	-0.17	-0.17	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Sell to other states	0.03	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.02	0.06	0.09	0.08
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Release employee for export course	-0.03	-0.09	-0.14	-0.14	0.03	0.08	0.12	0.12
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Intention to export (in 3yrs)	0.06*	0.23*	0.38*	0.36*	0.14***	0.36***	0.60***	0.57***
	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Expectation of exporting	0.04	0.15	0.22	0.22	0.1***	0.23***	0.35***	0.35***
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Products on the foreign market	0.05	0.14	0.20	0.21	0.09	0.24	0.35	0.36
	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Business plan for the foreign market	-0.07	-0.21	-0.31	-0.32	-0.06	-0.15	-0.22	-0.22
	(0.10)	(0.28)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.11)	(0.27)	(0.39)	(0.40)
Possible foreign buyers	0.15**	0.43**	0.63**	0.65**	0.18***	0.46**	0.67**	0.69**
	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Employees with export experience	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Export training	0.10	0.24*	0.33*	0.34*	0.12*	0.26*	0.36*	0.36*
	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Contacted agency for export	-0.02	-0.06	-0.08	-0.08	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.05
	(0.10)	(0.25)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.11)	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Product modifications	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Packaging modifications	-0.02	-0.06	-0.09	-0.09	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.16)
New products	-0.02	-0.07	-0.11	-0.11	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Buy machinery	-0.06	-0.21	-0.31	-0.31	-0.05	-0.12	-0.18	-0.17
	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.2)
Employees with higher education	-0.02	-0.05	-0.08	-0.08	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Employees who speak another language	0.05	0.15	0.23	0.23	0.05	0.13	0.20	0.20
	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Environmentally sustainable products	0.02	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Increase women's participation	0.08*	0.26*	0.38	0.38	0.09*	0.22	0.32	0.32
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Increase participation of black people	0.11**	0.37**	0.54**	0.54**	0.11**	0.27**	0.40**	0.40**
	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.17)
# employees	0.05	0.18	0.28	0.27	0.10	0.25	0.38	0.37
	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Revenue (last year)	0.11	0.32	0.52	0.51	0.17	0.38	0.63	0.62
	(0.17)	(0.49)	(0.78)	(0.78)	(0.19)	(0.45)	(0.70)	(0.70)
Revenue Expectation	0.15	0.45	0.69	0.70	0.25	0.56	0.85*	0.85*
	(0.12)	(0.36)	(0.53)	(0.55)	(0.14)	(0.32)	(0.45)	(0.47)
WTP Participation	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.13	0.20	0.20
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.14)
WTP	0.10	0.33	0.50	0.49	0.59	1.43	2.15	2.12
	(0.32)	(1.03)	(1.55)	(1.53)	(0.36)	(0.92)	(1.39)	(1.36)
Perception of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	0.34***	1.11**	1.66**	1.64**	0.44***	1.08**	1.61**	1.59**
	(0.11)	(0.39)	(0.66)	(0.61)	(0.14)	(0.39)	(0.62)	(0.58)
Perception of the costs of exporting (PCA)	-0.13	-0.41	-0.62	-0.61	-0.13	-0.31	-0.46	-0.46
	(0.19)	(0.63)	(0.96)	(0.94)	(0.22)	(0.56)	(0.84)	(0.83)

Table E6: Arm 2 Results for Follow-Up 2

					Control Refusing Firms			
		IV				IV		
Variable	ITT	At least 1	$\geq$ 50%	cont	ITT	At least 1	$\geq$ 50%	cont
Exported (after fop1)	0.03	0.11	0.18	0.17	0.05*	0.11*	0.18*	0.17*
	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Exports as % in revenue	-0.03	-0.05	-0.07	-0.07	-0.04	-0.05	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Exported to # countries	-0.05	-0.08	-0.11	-0.11	-0.05	-0.08	-0.11	-0.11
	(0.82)	(1.43)	(1.96)	(1.91)	(0.81)	(1.30)	(1.75)	(1.72)
Imported (after fop1)	-0.07	-0.23	-0.39	-0.38	-0.09*	-0.20*	-0.33*	-0.32*
	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Sell to other states	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Release employee for export course	-0.03	-0.09	-0.16	-0.15	0.04	0.08	0.14	0.13
	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.26)	(0.25)
Intention to export (in 3yrs)	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	0.04	0.10	0.19	0.18
	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.27)	(0.25)
Expectation of exporting	0.01	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.14	0.13
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Products on the foreign market	-0.05	-0.14	-0.22	-0.22	-0.04	-0.08	-0.13	-0.13
	(0.07)	(0.2)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.29)	(0.28)
Business plan for the foreign market	-0.07	-0.22	-0.34	-0.34	-0.06	-0.13	-0.20	-0.20
	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.33)	(0.32)
Possible foreign buyers	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.10	0.15	0.15
	(0.07)	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Employees with export experience	-0.02	-0.07	-0.10	-0.10	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Export training	0.16***	0.42**	0.63***	0.62**	0.18**	0.36**	0.53**	0.53**
	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.2)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Contacted agency for export	-0.06	-0.16	-0.24	-0.23	-0.05	-0.10	-0.15	-0.15
	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Product modifications	-0.01	-0.05	-0.08	-0.07	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Packaging modifications	-0.02	-0.06	-0.11	-0.11	-0.02	-0.05	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.18)
New products	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.10	0.09
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Buy machinery	-0.03	-0.1	-0.17	-0.17	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Employees with higher education	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.12	0.12
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Employees who speak another language	-0.03	-0.11	-0.19	-0.19	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Environmentally sustainable products	0.01	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.04	0.09	0.15	0.15
	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.21)	(0.2)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Increase women's participation	-0.01	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.2)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Increase participation of black people	0.04	0.14	0.24	0.23	0.06**	0.12**	0.21**	0.21**
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.09)
# employees	-0.02	-0.07	-0.12	-0.12	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Revenue (last year)	0.18	0.56	1.09	1.07	0.18	0.39	0.76	0.75
	(0.17)	(0.49)	(0.97)	(0.93)	(0.22)	(0.45)	(0.86)	(0.84)
Revenue Expectation	0.28	0.86*	1.63*	1.58*	0.32*	0.68*	1.30*	1.26*
	(0.16)	(0.47)	(0.92)	(0.88)	(0.17)	(0.33)	(0.65)	(0.62)
WTP Participation	-0.03	-0.10	-0.17	-0.16	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.2)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.24)	(0.23)
WTP	-0.52	-1.73	-2.91	-2.83	-0.24	-0.54	-0.92	-0.90
	(0.49)	(1.66)	(2.68)	(2.64)	(0.52)	(1.15)	(1.90)	(1.86)
Perception of the benefits of exporting (PCA)	-0.08	-0.28	-0.46	-0.45	0.09	0.20	0.33	0.32
	(0.22)	(0.72)	(1.18)	(1.16)	(0.24)	(0.54)	(0.94)	(0.91)
Perception of the costs of exporting (PCA)	-0.33	-1.07	-1.81	-1.76	-0.56***	-1.23***	-2.10**	-2.04**
	(0.2)	(0.66)	(1.14)	(1.10)	(0.17)	(0.40)	(0.74)	(0.69)

F Second Intervention: Tickets

Figure 3: Number of firms according to the number of tickets



(a) Number of firms participating in the draw



(b) Number of firms **not** participating in the draw